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Assessment of the Current State of VAT 
Implementation in SADC Member States: 
Towards VAT Revenue Enhancement,  
Co-ordination and Co-operation  
 
 
 
I.  Introduction to study 
 
The Southern African Development Community (SADC) is a regional development 
Community that evolved out of the Southern African Development Co-ordination 
Conference (SADCC), which was established in 1980.  It has fourteen Member States 
namely Angola, Botswana Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Lesotho, 
Madagascar (from Aug 2005), Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, South 
Africa, Swaziland, United Republic of Tanzania (Tanzania), Zambia and Zimbabwe.    
 
This study undertakes an assessment (including an economic assessment of the 
current state of Value Added Tax (VAT) implementation among SADC Member 
States.  It should be noted, however, that as the study was concluded in early 2005 
and Madagascar only joined SADC in August 2005, Madagascar is not included in the 
study.  Consequently, reference below to SADC having 13 Member States reflects the 
period prior to Madagascar joining SADC.  
 
Many of the SADC Member States are additionally members of other regional 
groupings such as East African Community (EAC) and Common Market for Eastern 
and Southern Africa (COMESA). A particularly important grouping as far as this 
study is concerned is the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) that has as its 
member countries South Africa, Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland.  It can 
be seen that all the SACU member countries are also SADC Member States. 
Furthermore, within SACU there is a grouping excluding South Africa (Botswana, 
Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland) commonly referred to as the BLNS countries. 
 
The SADC tax coordination agenda is being taken forward as part of wider SADC 
financial integration that is being operationalised by a series of Memoranda of 
Understanding (MOU’s) that will be subsumed into a binding SADC Protocol on 
Finance and Investment (FIP) in 2006.   
 
The SADC tax coordination agenda is reflected in the SADC MOU on “Cooperation 
in Taxation and Related Matters” (SADC Tax MOU) that was signed in August 2002. 
This emphasizes the need for SADC Member States to take explicit steps to 
harmonize their tax systems and Article 6(1)(2)(9) and (10) of the MOU emphasizes 
the importance of effective coordination, harmonization and cooperation in the 
formulation of policy and administration of VAT or sales tax.  It says, “Member 
States will take such steps as are necessary to harmonize their VAT regimes and will:  
 
(a) set minimum standard rates;  
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(b) harmonize, over time, the application of zero-rating and VAT exemption of goods 
and services; and  
(c) establish a SADC forum for collectively dealing with VAT matters.”   
 
The view, that indirect tax systems on consumption should be harmonized, is 
consistent with a recent recommendation of the World Trade Organization (WTO) for 
SACU member countries.  The WTO review stated:  
 
“Differences in internal taxation between SACU members increase transaction costs 
for traders, encourage smuggling and tax evasion, and distort trade flows. In 
practice, when goods are exported from one SACU country to another, the shipper 
applies for VAT/sales tax refunds from the exporting country, and then pays the 
relevant tax to the importing country. Filing paperwork with two different countries 
unnecessarily increases the costs of conducting international trade. In the absence of 
harmonization, border controls have to be maintained within the SACU area. 
Harmonizing the taxation system would be more trade-friendly, and would foster 
economic integration within the region, and between the SACU area and the rest of 
the world.”1   
 
At the same time, however, SADC Member States are at different stages of 
development, face different fiscal pressures, and have different capacities to raise tax 
revenues to meet their public sector revenue demands.  The implications of these 
factors on the pace at which harmonization of indirect tax systems can be achieved 
need to be included in the assessment of how fast co-ordination of VAT systems can 
be achieved. 
 
Since the VAT started to be implemented internationally in the 1960s, its use has 
grown rapidly around the world.  By April 2001, some 123 countries had 
implemented VAT systems.2   Since Malawi first introduced a VAT system to its 
Surtax in 1989 and South Africa introduced VAT in 1991, 10 of the 13 SADC 
Member States have introduced VAT with 3 of these countries since 2001.  
Zimbabwe is the most recent in January 2004.   Three countries have alternative 
domestic indirect tax systems, Angola, DRC and Swaziland.  There is significant 
VAT experience within the region, but many countries are still in the early stages of 
implementation.   
 
Given that the VAT is fairly demanding in terms of high standards of accounting and 
book keeping, it places a significant compliance burden on the private sector taxpayer.  
Any new tax system also demands the development of adequate tax administration 
capacity to make it efficient and effective.   Hence, the adequacy of the current tax 
administrations in SADC Member States to administer VAT will have an impact on: 
 
(a)  whether or not the remaining countries will be able to introduce VAT systems in 
the medium term, and  
                                                 
1 World Trade Organization, Trade Policy Review: Southern African Customs Union, Report by the 
Secretariat, WT/TPR/S/114, 24 March 2003, p32 
 
2 Liam Ebrill, Michael Keen, Jean-Paul Bodin and Victoria Summers, The Modern VAT, IMF , 
Washington DC (2001), Table 1.3. 
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(b) whether or not the revenue performance and administrative capacities of the 
countries that already have VAT systems will permit harmonization of the VAT 
systems in the medium term as well.   
 
It will also be important to identify the tax structure differences that need to be 
reduced and administrative capacity changes and strengthening that need to be 
introduced to allow this harmonization of VAT systems in SADC.  To accelerate the 
effective reform of VAT structures and to strengthen VAT administration will require 
a degree of co-operation across member countries.  It will be important to identify the 
potential areas of administration reform as these will form the agenda for future 
SADC co-operation in the area of taxation. 
 
A VAT imposed on consumption (sometimes referred to as a “destination principle” 
VAT) taxes imports, but zero rates exports.  Its successful implementation clearly 
depends on the effective administration by customs of taxes on international trade.   
Customs administration controls trade at the border, collects taxes on imports, and 
verifies exports.   
 
Co-operation and co-ordination between SADC Member States with regard to trade is 
being operationalised through the SADC Trade Protocol. This was concluded in 1995 
but only entered into force in 2000 with the accession of South Africa.  The SADC 
Trade Protocol envisages a SADC Free Trade Area (FTA) by 2008 but this is being 
implemented incrementally by the Member States and it is planned that it will be 
complete by 2012.  SADC has the goal of a customs union by 2010 and a common 
market by 2015 that (as outlined in the SADC Regional indicative Strategic 
Development Plan (RISDP)).  Notably, free trade has long existed within SACU 
where customs and excise duties are collected in a pooled fashion and border controls 
between member countries have been relaxed, but not fully removed.  Border controls 
within the SADC FTA will remain as rules of origin will be applied to determine 
goods coming from within SADC, but the nature of border controls that will remain 
as SADC develops into a customs union and subsequently a common market have not 
yet been determined.  The nature of these border controls will dramatically impact the 
nature of the VAT structure and the nature and extent of coordination that can be 
successfully implemented in the SADC region in the long-term.  As the European 
Union (EU) is finding out, their VAT systems are becoming increasingly difficult to 
enforce now that national boundaries have, in principle, disappeared for economic 
purposes under their “common market.”    
 
From an economic perspective it is important that VAT systems in SADC are neutral 
to investment and trade decisions across the region, while still being effective revenue 
raising instruments for Member States.  The movement towards freer trade within the 
region will need to be accompanied by a sequence of changes to Member States’ 
national VAT laws as well as international or regional treaties to sustain VAT systems 
in a SADC FTA or common market. 
 
In light of the introductory observations, the remainder of this study is structured as 
follows:   
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• Chapter II gives a short summary of the diversity of the states of the 
economies in the SADC region.   
• Chapter III reviews  
o first, the current status and revenue importance of the domestic indirect 
tax systems and provides  a more systematic introduction to the tax 
structure issues that arise with the implementation of a VAT in the 
context of developing countries and,  
o second, situations where international fiscal boundaries may be 
weakened in the context of establishing a common market.    
• Chapter IV gives a brief description of the economic and fiscal status of each 
country and some detail on the role and status of its domestic indirect taxes 
and especially its VAT or sales tax systems.   
• Chapter V focuses on the revenue demands faced by SADC Member States, 
especially those arising out implementation of the SADC and SACU 
agreements regarding trade and macroeconomic convergence, and the 
potential for VAT to solve these revenue problems.    
• Chapter VI analyses the tax capacity relating to structural features of the 
economies (sector, trade, poverty, educational status, etc) of the SADC 
Member States in some detail to understand the potential of the VAT and 
other taxes in general to solve their revenue problems.  It goes on to further 
analyze the effective size of the tax bases available in each country (or VAT 
efficiencies) and the implication of these for revenue yields from changes in 
the standard VAT rates.   
• Chapter VII reviews the roles of exemptions (including the minimum turnover 
rate for registration for the VAT), zero rating and refund rules, in reducing the 
effective VAT base and in creating distortions in trade and investment 
decisions across SADC Member States.  
• Chapter VIII analyses the issues arising in the operation of a VAT in a multi-
jurisdictional region where the customs controls are weakened or removed and 
evaluates the various options available to SADC members to sustain the VAT 
system.  It identifies the various options available depending upon the strength 
of border controls maintained and also analyzes a range of different 
approaches to revenue sharing that would take into account he differences in 
trade balances between the member countries and their different VAT 
collection efficiencies 
• Chapter IX presents the results of a survey of SADC Member States of their 
tax administration structures and capacities to administer a VAT, sales or 
turnover tax.  It analyzes the status of tax administration across member 
countries and identifies strengths and weakness across these countries as well 
as suggesting directions for reforms and potential areas of cooperation 
between member countries.    
• Chapter X draws the conclusions and recommendations arising from the study 
including the prospects for converging on a standard VAT structure. 
 
The body of the report is supported by a series of appendices as follows: 
 
• Appendix A gives some details of the new SACU revenue sharing 
arrangements.   
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• Appendix B tabulates the VAT, sales or turnover tax exemption and zero 
rating structures of the SADC Member States. 
• Appendix C analyses the importance of customs to VAT collection 
effectiveness.   
• Appendix D expands in some detail on the different approaches to dealing 
with the application of a VAT within a common market. 
• Appendix E develops some different ways of sharing VAT revenues between 
member countries that deal with equity and efficiency problems that arise in 
the case of pooled revenue collections.  
• Appendix F provides the template questionnaire answered by the revenue 
authorities in the Member States. 
• Appendix G lists officials of SADC member states interviewed in the course 
of the study. 
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II. Economic background on SADC Countries 
 
Members of SADC number fourteen countries as at August 2005.  These include all 
the countries in the southern region of Africa reaching from South Africa up to the 
DRC in the west, Zambia in the center, and Tanzania on the east of Africa plus the 
islands of Mauritius and Madagascar.3  Given this study predates Madagascar joining 
SADC, it only refers to the other 13 countries.  See Table 2.1.  Before focusing on the 
policy and structural issues of the VAT and the directly relevant structures of the 
various economies, it is useful to introduce the diversity of the SADC Member States.    
First in terms of broad classifications, Table 2.1 shows that there are five middle-
income countries, namely, all the members of the Southern African Customs Union 
(SACU), except for Lesotho, plus Mauritius.  All the other eight members are low-
income countries six of which are classified as “Least Developed Countries (LDC)” 
by the United Nations (UN), five of these six have been designated as Heavily 
Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) and of these five, four are classified as severely 
indebted. 
 
Table 2.1:  Income and Indebtedness Classification of SADC Member States 
    Income class 
UN Least 
Developed 
Country (LDC)
Heavily 
Indebted 
Poor 
Country 
(HIPC) Indebted 
Angola  Low * * Severely 
Botswana  Upper middle   Less 
DRC  Low * * Severely 
Lesotho  Low *  Less 
Malawi  Low * * Severely 
Mauritius  Upper middle   Less 
Mozambique  Low * * Less 
Namibia  Lower middle   Less 
South Africa  Lower middle   Less 
Swaziland  Lower middle   Less 
Tanzania  Low * * Moderately 
Zambia  Low * * Severely 
Zimbabwe   Low     Moderately 
World Bank, World Development Indicators, 2003    
 
The economies of SADC Member States are relatively small.  Table 2.2 shows that all 
the member countries except for South Africa had Gross Domestic Products (GDPs) 
below ten billion United States Dollars in 2001.  The size of the South African 
economy dominates the SADC region.  The GDP of South Africa, which stood at US$ 
113 billion in 2001, is nearly twice as large as all the other members combined GDP.   
With a population of 44 million, South Africa is the second largest in the SADC 
region compared to the 52 million in the DRC, however, the GDP per capita in South 
Africa ranks third behind those of the two upper-middle income countries, namely, 
Mauritius and Botswana.   The SADC region also contains some countries with very 
low per capita incomes, including Tanzania ($271), Mozambique ($197), Malawi 
                                                 
3 The Seychelles was a member of SADC but withdrew in 2003. 
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($166), and the DRC ($99).   In later Chapters, these low-income countries will also 
be seen to have large agricultural sectors (along with large informal and non-monetary 
sectors) plus low educational attainment in their adult populations.  These factors will 
be shown to put severe limits on the capacity of these countries to raise domestic 
taxes.  Differences in their import to GDP shares and in their external financial 
relations that result in different level of gross national disposable income (GNDI) 
compared to their gross domestic production will become evident.  The consumption 
possibilities that form the VAT consumption tax base are ultimately supported by the 
GNDI, which may be supported by financial and transfer inflows.   
 
All these countries, however, have strong common interests in regional trade and 
investment. 
 
Table 2.2:  GDP, Population and Per capita GDP, SADC 
Member States, 2001 
  GDP Population GDP per capita 
    US$, millions Millions US$ 
Angola  9,471 13.5 701 
Botswana  5,196 1.7 3,066 
DRC  5,187 52.4 99 
Lesotho  797 2.1 386 
Malawi  1,749 10.5 166 
Mauritius  4,500 1.2 3,751 
Mozambique  3,569 18.1 197 
Namibia  3,100 1.8 1,730 
South Africa  113,270 44.4 2,550 
Swaziland  1,255 1.1 1,175 
Tanzania  9,341 34.4 271 
Zambia  3,639 10.3 354 
Zimbabwe   9,057 12.8 706 
World Development Indicators 2003 
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III.  Overview of VAT/ sales tax status and issues  
 
  
3.1. General tax issues 
 
As mentioned in Chapter I, the VAT has been a remarkable innovation in 
international taxation that has spread to the tax systems of the majority of the 
countries in the world since the 1960s, especially the type of VAT structured as a 
credit-method tax using the destination principle (taxing imports, but not exports).  It 
has attractive features, including:  
  
(i) as a tax on domestic consumption, the potential to remove taxes from 
investment and exports, and  
(ii) effective collections because of -  
a. the collection of taxes on all non-exempt imports (in contrast to the 
normal sales tax),  
b. the “self-enforcing” nature of the tax in that registered taxpayers 
require VAT paid invoices from their suppliers in order to gain credit 
for the input taxes to keep their output prices competitive, and  
c. the effective paper trail it provides to tax administrators of the input 
and output activities of a registered taxpayer to assist with effective 
audit within and between taxpayers.    
(iii)  Moreover, in low-income countries, which tend to rely heavily on indirect 
taxes (including import duties) as opposed to direct taxes in middle and 
high-income countries, the VAT (along with other domestic indirect taxes 
such as the excise duties) has to serve the double duty of enhancing 
government revenues as well as replacing import duties as countries 
undertake trade liberalization measures. 
 
The VAT, as a broad-based tax on consumption, is often expected to solve a range of 
fiscal problems.  Its primary role is often seen as a substitute for trade taxes 
(principally customs duties) in the process of trade liberalization.  Its secondary, but 
ultimate long-term role is to be a major efficient source of government revenues.   
 
Therefore generally, the VAT is seen as a major source of economic efficiency gains 
in revenue collections as a substitute for trade taxes on final consumption goods. A 
number of such situations are identified below.  Where trade taxes (customs duties) 
are being removed, however, these efficiency gains may not be achieved by VAT 
substitution, and the VAT may well struggle to replace the forgone revenues.  For 
example, if trade taxes are being removed from intermediate and capital goods (rather 
than final consumption goods), as is often the case in the early years of trade 
liberalization, then the VAT puts an added tax burden on final goods consumption 
rather than substituting for import duties on theses goods.  Similarly, a range of trade 
tax changes arising out of the new SACU and SADC agreements are explored later to 
ascertain the extent of their revenue consequences, whether or not these will impact 
on final consumption or other goods, and whether or not VAT will be able to cover 
any revenue short-falls.  At the same time, in addition to the trade liberalization 
planned between SADC Members States, some SADC countries are undertaking more 
traditional switches from trade to consumption taxes.  In addition, for a number of 
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SADC Member States, the degree of freedom of using the VAT to replace trade taxes 
may also be constrained by the fact that the existing VAT rates are already high.  
These country-specific situations are identified below. 
 
Aside from substituting for trade taxes, SADC Member States are and will be faced 
by increasing revenue demands.  Already countries may have large debts and be 
running sizable budget deficits.  They may also be financing a large share of 
expenditures with foreign aid.   The size and scope of some these added revenue 
demands are identified across SADC countries and the scope of VAT to solve them is 
considered.    
 
In situations where the import duties are not being lowered on final consumption 
goods, attempts to raise revenues with higher VAT rates will raise domestic prices.  
The price responsiveness of the effective VAT tax base will therefore have a 
significant impact on the effectiveness of the VAT to raise revenues.  The price 
responsiveness of the base will depend upon the structure of the economy that may 
constrain the base on which the VAT can be effectively applied.  In addition, the 
degree to which the base is further lost through exemptions and zero-rating is further 
explored.  These issues become a major focus of later Chapters. 
 
As a tax on consumption, the VAT should not affect investment decisions between 
countries.  If the VAT is not ideally structured, however, such as through exemptions 
that may either favor imports, or zero-rating that is structured to favor domestic 
producers, or delays in VAT refund payments that effectively tax exporters and 
investors, the economically neutral role of the VAT can be become distorted.  The 
extent and sources of such trade and investment biases is identified in the exemption, 
zero-rating and refund structures of the VAT systems in the SADC Member States in 
Chapter VII. 
  
  
3.2. VAT within a trade preference area 
 
The credit-method VAT has had an effective performance internationally as a 
domestic tax on consumption when imposed nationally using the destination 
principle.  The fundamental reason for this is that as a national tax it utilizes the 
existing customs controls at the border to collect taxes on imports and verify exports. 
Within such national structures, individual countries can impose and vary VAT rates 
independently without causing major economic distortions between countries, e.g., 
the consumers in the countries with the higher VAT rates bear the higher tax burden.  
Problems arise, however, when countries apply the VAT at sub-national levels in 
federal systems such Brazil, Canada, or India.  These problems arise in such systems 
because of the lack of economic border controls between the states of a federation.  
Solutions require the federal government to play a strong supervisory role, and 
possibly a compensatory role between states to ensure effective collection and 
appropriate revenue allocation.  Similar, and possibly more acute problems arise 
within preferential trade areas, such as a common market, if the internal border 
controls on trade within the region are relaxed or removed.  The European Union 
(EU) has faced problems that it still has to resolve completely in the enforcement of 
the European VAT as it has relaxed the internal economic borders in recent years.   
As discussed later, the higher the share of final taxes collected on imports by a 
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country, the more challenging the problems created by relaxed border controls.  
Typically, lower income countries collect a significant share of final VAT from 
imports, and therefore, these taxes can be put at risk with relaxed border controls.  In 
addition, problems of VAT export frauds are expected to increase with relaxed border 
controls, and pressures for cross-border shopping in response to tax rate differential 
between countries also increase.  As discussed in more detail below, some of these 
problems are already arising within SACU as evidenced by South Africa and Lesotho 
establishing a bilateral treaty to assist with the better enforcement of the VAT in 
transactions between these countries.   
 
With the agreement by SADC Member States to move towards a common market, to 
gain the full benefit of freer trade within the region, pressures will arise to relax 
internal border controls on trade between Member States.  This provides SADC with a 
major agenda to consider carefully the options to sustain and to coordinate the VAT 
systems across member countries.   This topic is analyzed in detail in subsequent 
Chapters. 
 
 
3.3. Role and importance of indirect taxes and sales taxes/VAT in  
          SADC Member States 
 
As already noted above, as of January 2004 with the introduction of the VAT in 
Zimbabwe, ten of the then thirteen member countries in SADC had introduced broad-
based credit method VATs.  See Tables 3.1 and 3.2.  The first of these tables gives the 
importance of the domestic sales tax, VAT or similar taxes over 1997-2001 as 
measured by the ratio of tax revenues to GDP and the share that these revenues form 
of total revenues (tax plus non-tax revenues, but excluding grants):   
 
• Relative to GDP, four countries exceeded 5 percent (Malawi, South Africa, 
Zambia and Zimbabwe) and three were below 3 percent (Angola, Botswana 
and DRC).    
• Relative to total revenues, the countries with the highest shares were 
Mozambique, Tanzania, Malawi and Zambia in the range of 29 to 35 percent, 
while countries with the lowest shares (below 10 per cent) were Botswana, 
Angola, DRC and Lesotho.    
 
With the exception of Lesotho and DRC, among the low-income countries, VAT or 
sales taxes were important shares of total revenues.  Among the middle-income 
countries, while as a share of GDP, VAT and sales taxes can be relatively high, as a 
share of total revenues they tended to be lower as other sources, especially the income 
tax, increase in importance.  Among the SACU members (excluding South Africa), 
the SACU customs and excise collections are important alternative source of tax 
revenues.  
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Table 3.1:  Relative importance of broad-based domestic sales tax or VAT in      
SADC Member States over 1997-2001 
 
 Average percentage over 1997-2001 
Country Tax over GDP 
Tax over  
Total revenue Type of tax 
Angola 2.1 5.5 
Manufacturers “Selective 
Sales" Tax (non-oil) 
Botswana 1.8 4.1 Retail Sales Tax (selective) 
DRC 0.4 6.8 Producers Turnover 
Lesotho (%GDP) 4.5 8.6 Retail Sales Tax 
Lesotho (%GNDIa) 3.1 8.6  
Malawi 5.3 29.8 Manufacturers level VAT 
Mauritius 4.0 18.4 VAT 
Mozambique 4.2 34.4 Sales Tax/VAT(1999) 
Namibia 4.8 14.9 Retail Sales Tax 
South Africa 5.8 22.2 VAT 
Swaziland 3.7 12.8 Retail Sales Tax 
Tanzania 3.2 30.2 Sales Tax/VAT(1999) 
Zambia 5.5 29.1 VAT 
Zimbabwe 5.7 20.2 Retail Sales Tax 
 
a.  GNDI = Gross National Disposable Income.  In the case of Lesotho, GNDI exceeds GDP by 44% in 1997-
2001.  See table 6.7.  For most countries GNDI differs from GDP by less than 10% 
 
 
Table 3.2 gives the importance of VAT or sales tax revenues in the most recent fiscal 
year for which data was available along with the standard tax rate charged in that 
year.  As of 2001, Botswana, Lesotho and Zimbabwe had not introduced their VATs, 
and Malawi had not expanded out its VAT from the manufacturers to retail level.  
Except for the Zimbabwe VAT, which commenced only in 2004, some of these 
revenue impacts are captured in Table 3.2.   Compared to the revenue performance 
shown in Table 3.1, the average tax-over-GDP ratio increased by 0.8 percentage 
points and the share of total revenues increased by 3.4 percentage points.   The largest 
increases in the tax-to-GDP ratio came in Botswana, Mauritius, Mozambique, 
Namibia, and Zimbabwe. 
 
The standard tax rates of VAT have moved into a fairly narrow range of 10 to 20 
percent and average 15.2 percent in Table 3.2.  It is notable that the highest rates are 
among the low-income countries with Malawi (20%), Tanzania (20%), Zambia 
(17.5%), and Mozambique (17%), while the two highest income countries have low 
rates with Botswana (10%) and Mauritius (12%).  These four low-income countries 
all rely on the VAT for a high share of the total revenues. 
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Table 3.2:  Most recent figure on relative importance of broad-based domestic 
sales tax or VAT in SADC Member States 
      
Country 
Standard 
tax rate 
Fiscal Year 
(Year end)
Tax 
over 
GDP 
Tax over 
Total 
revenue Type of tax 
 %  % %  
Angola 10 2002 3.0 7.7 
Manufacturers excise or 
“selective sales” tax 
(non-oil) 
Botswana 10 2003 3.7 8.8 VAT 
DRC 13 2001 0.3 6.9 Producers Turnover 
Lesotho (%GDP) 14 2003 4.4 11.3 VAT (July 2002) 
Lesotho (%GNDI)  2003 2.9   
Malawi 20 2003 6.2 33.0 Retail VAT (Sept 2002) 
Mauritius 12 2002 5.7 28.2 VAT 
Mozambique 17 2002 4.9 38.0 VAT 
Namibia 15 2003 6.7 21.2 VAT 
South Africa 14 2003 6.3 25.6 VAT 
Swaziland 14 2002 3.6 14.7 Retail Sales Tax 
Tanzania 20 2002 4.1 33.8 VAT 
Zambia 17.5 2002 5.0 28.8 VAT 
Zimbabwe 15 2002 7.4 24.1 Retail Sales Tax 
Zimbabwe 15 2004 9.9 30.3 VAT 
 
 
Finally, Table 3.3 gives the dates of introduction of VAT in the ten countries with 
VAT systems.  It also gives the standard VAT rate at the time of introduction and as it 
was then in 2004.  Generally, standard rates are continuing to converge on a rate 
around 15% with the exception of Zimbabwe, which has raised its standard rate from 
15% to 17.5%, but only as a temporary revenue measure during September-December 
2005: 
 
• Lesotho raised its rate from 10% to 14%,  
• Mauritius raised its rate from 8% to 12% and is now charging 15%,  
• Namibia raised its rate from 11% to 15%.  
• South Africa lowered its rate at VAT introduction from 13% to 10%, but 
subsequently raised it to 14%.   
• Malawi has lowered its rate from 30% in 1989 to 20%, and recently in 2005 to 
17.5%, and  
• Zambia has come down to 17.5%  
 
Both the DRC and Swaziland have VATs under preparation.  DRC proposes 
introduction in 2005. 
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Table 3.3:  Date of VAT becoming effective 
     
Country 
Date VAT 
effective 
Date of Fiscal year 
end  
Standard VAT 
rate at 
introduction 
Standard VAT 
rate in 2004 
 
Botswana July 2002 March 31 10 10 
Lesotho  July 2003 March 31 14 14 
Malawi November 1989 at 
manufacturers level 
September 2002 at 
retail level 
March 31  
30 
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Mauritius September 1998 June 30 12 15 
Mozambique June 1999 December 31 17 17 
Namibia November 2000 March 31 15 15 
South Africa September 1991 March 31 10 14 
Tanzania July 1998 June 30 20 20 
Zambia July 1995 December 31 20 17.5 
Zimbabwe January 2004 December 31 15 15 
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IV.  Country descriptions of status of turnover, sales tax and 
VAT in revenue systems of SADC Member States 
 
This Chapter provides a brief description of the broad-based domestic goods and 
services taxes, whether structured as a turnover, sales tax or VAT, in each of the 
SADC Member States.  The structure and role of these taxes is described and any 
changes or developments in these domestic goods and services taxes, such as the 
introduction of a VAT are covered here.  The descriptions provide a context for these 
taxes in terms of the overall fiscal and macroeconomic structure of each economy, 
particularly any developments in the economy that may have had a major impact on 
the development of the tax system over recent years.  This will provide a 
comprehensive picture (or snap shot) of each country that may be particularly useful 
as most of the rest of this study tends to present the tax system of the Member State in 
a comparative fashion focusing on specific issues or features of VAT.  
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Angola  
 
During the 1990s, about 47 percent of economic output came from mining, mainly 
reflecting the large oil sector. Oil production has been the “fuel” of economic growth 
over much of Angola’s post independence history. The rest of the economy, more 
vulnerable to the disruptions of a persistent civil war and the consequences of 
interventionist and hyperinflationary macroeconomic policy, has been less fortunate 
and has remained depressed4.   For a low-income country, Angola has had high 
government expenditures (averaging around 50% of GDP) and overall deficits over 
the 1990s.   See Table 4.1.   Inflationary deficit financing resulted in inflation 
averaging over 100% in the 1990s peaking at 4,146% in 1996.  The inflation rate has 
declined in recent years from 329% in 1999, but was still 106% in 2002.  Government 
expenditures have moderated somewhat, reducing deficits, but remains relatively 
high. 
 
Angola derives over 98 percent of its central government revenue from taxation.  The 
structure of Angola’s tax receipts is also heavily dependant on oil revenues with over 
75 percent of taxes coming from that sector. Oil production is taxed though a 
corporation tax, a transaction tax and a production tax.  Direct taxes in the oil sector 
were close to 40 percent of total direct taxation in 1992, flowing from corporation 
taxes, and increased to 81 percent by 1999.  The tax regime shifted away from 
indirect to direct taxation as transaction taxes were phased out in favor of corporation 
taxes. Production taxes remained close to the average of 24 percent of total oil taxes 
during the 1990s.  
 
Following a comprehensive reform of non-oil taxes in 1992, Angola succeeded in 
collecting an average of 32 percent of its total revenues as indirect taxes in that 
decade, but over two-thirds of these revenues were derived from oil taxes.  Trade 
taxes formed less than 5% of total revenue or less than 2% of GDP.   The trade regime 
is highly protected and does not utilize the harmonized tariff code system useful for 
data analysis comparisons5.  
 
Non- oil indirect taxes on goods and services are mainly excise taxes (imposto de 
consume), which have only formed a small share of Angola total revenues (including 
grants): 2.4 % in 1992-96 and 5.4% in 1997-2001.  Excise taxes have been charged on 
manufacturers’ or producers’ sales and imports.  They have been structured as a series 
of selective excise taxes, but in 1999, the laws and regulations relating to these 
excises were consolidated into a single Excise Tax decree, but special excise decrees 
were retained for alcohol and oil products.6,7  The excises can be viewed as a 
“selective sales tax” at the manufacturers level, but Angola does not have a general 
tax on consumption such as general sales tax or VAT on goods and services with a 
separate set of excises on luxury goods.  The excise decree covers all types of goods, 
but special added decrees apply to alcohol and oil products.   Most recent data for 
2002 show these non-oil selective sales or excise taxes collecting 3% of GDP or 7.7% 
of total revenues. 
                                                 
4 IMF, Angola Recent Economic Developments, Nov 17, 1997 
5 The IMF has estimated the effective rate of protection on consumer goods to be between 135 and 174 
percent compared with the nominal rate of 24 percent. See above reference. 
6 Decree 41/99, December 10, 1999 
7 Tax Information for Angola, SADC member country Tax Law Database, August 2003 
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The Excise Tax or “selective consumption or sales tax” has a standard rate of 10 
percent with a reduced or subsidized rate of 2 percent in place for basic foods, soap, 
and specified equipment for medical services and agriculture, and rates ranging from 
15 to 50 percent for luxury goods.   By June 2003 the subsidized rates were raised to 
5% and the goods subject to higher rates or surcharges were set at 20% and 30%.  
Industrial raw materials and intermediates are subject to tax, but the use of these in 
industrial processes by exempt businesses is also exempted.  Without any general 
input tax exemption or credit system, significant tax cascading occurs. Selected 
services such as hotels, telecommunications, water and electricity are subject to tax.  
Exemptions are constrained mainly to exports, unprocessed primary sector products, 
micro business enterprises and equipment for use in the domestic livestock industry.8 
 
.  
Table 4.1   Angola, Budget aggregates and Revenue Composition, 
Averages for 1992-96 and 1997-2001 
 Percentages 
 1992-96 1997-2001 
Total expenditures (including net lending) as share of GDP  51.0 46.0 
Total Revenue + Grants as share of GDP 35.9 43.3 
Overall surplus (deficit) as share of GDP -15.16 -2.74 
Revenue sources as shares of (Total revenue + Grants)   
Grants 0.7 5.6 
Non-tax revenue 1.4 0.9 
Tax Revenue 97.9 93.5 
Indirect taxes (oil + non-oil) 31.3 32.5 
Indirect taxes (non-oil) 8.2 9.7 
Selective sales/excise tax (non-oil) 2.4 5.4 
 
 
 
                                                 
8 Angola:  Selected Issues and Statistical Appendix, IMF Country Report 3/292, September 2003 
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Botswana  
 
Revenue from taxation averages around 50 percent of total revenue (around 24 
percent of GDP) according to the GFS classification that classifies mineral property 
income revenue as non-tax receipts9. The Botswana economy has grown steadily at 
around 6 percent over the past 10 years, with notable acceleration in the past five 
years.  This has resulted in generating the second highest per capita GDP at US$3,066 
in 2001 among the SADC Member States (see Table 2.2).  Despite the significance of 
the mining sector in overall economic growth, other service sectors including trade, 
transport, utilities and financial services have recorded growth rates higher than the 
overall average reflecting the increasing diversification of the economy.  This strong 
economic performance has allowed Botswana to run an overall fiscal surplus and 
repay foreign debt over the past five years despite government expenditure in the 
higher range for SADC countries (see Table 5.5.).  Inflation has remained under 
control declining from low teens in to single digits over the 1990s to 200110. 
 
Extensive changes were made to the tax system from 1995. The marginal personal 
income tax rate was reduced to 25 percent in 1997 equalizing the top rate with 
company taxes.  New mining tax arrangements made provisions for a Variable Rate 
Income Tax to replace individual and more discretionary agreements.  The mining tax 
rate now varies annually between 25 and 55 percent.  This resulted in increased 
mining revenue being reported as mining taxes from 1997/98 onwards.  The sector 
accounts for 35 percent of GDP, mainly reflecting the significant role played by 
diamond production.  Mineral revenue has declined from 31 percent of GDP (55 
percent of total revenues) to average around 22 percent of GDP (still over 50 percent 
of revenues (50.6%)) over the past decade.   See Table 4.2. 
 
Approximately 20% of tax revenue is derived from indirect taxation.  Indirect taxes 
mainly comprise trade, excise and motor vehicle taxes and a VAT that was introduced 
in July, 2002 to replace the general sales tax (that had been in place since 1982.)  
Customs and excise duties (5.5 percent of GDP or 12.1 percent of total revenue for 
Botswana) are pooled with other SACU members and redistributed according to the 
agreed SACU formula. 
 
Prior to 2002, a single stage, selective sales tax was levied at 10%.  Subsequent 
legislation in 1996 broadened the base of the tax to include selected services, with a 
small corresponding impact on revenues. Sales tax revenues had steadily increased in 
importance as a share of total revenue, from less than 1 percent in the 1980s to 4.8 
percent by 2001/02. As a share of GDP, revenue from the sales tax grew strongly in 
the early 1990s breaking above one percent of GDP in 1993 (possibly reflecting 
improved administration as a separate sales tax department was established that year) 
and steadily increased to average 1.8 percent for the period 1997 – 2002.   
 
The VAT (introduced in 200211) retained a uniform rate of 10 percent on imported 
and locally produced goods and services12. The compulsory registration threshold is 
                                                 
9 IMF classifies all mineral revenue as corporation taxes, raising tax revenues  to over 78 percent of 
total revenue (average 1992 – 2002) Source. IMF Selected Issues and Statistical Appendix 1998 and 
2002.  
10 World Development Indicators 2002 
11 Republic of Botswana, Value Added Tax, 2000, Act No 1 of 2001, Government Printer, Gaborone. 
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BWP 250,000 or about USD 40,000 when introduced13. The VAT structure includes 
exemptions for health, education and welfare services, immovable property, betting 
and gaming, non-profit organizations and financial services14. Exports, select oil 
products and select international services are zero-rated15. Maize meal and sorghum 
are zero rated to protect the poor, while petrol, diesel and paraffin are zero rated as 
they are subject to excise duties.  Although it is too early to assess the impact of the 
VAT, 2003 collections of 3.7 percent of GDP (8.8 percent of total revenues) showed a 
distinct upward shift from the 2002 sales tax revenue levels.  
 
 
Table 4.2.  Botswana, Budget aggregates and Revenue Composition, 
Averages for 1992/93-96/97 and 1997/98-2001/02  
(Fiscal Year beginning April 1) 
 Percentages 
 1992/93-96/97 1997/98-2001/02 
Total expenditures (including net lending) as share of GDP  38.6 51.2 
Total Revenue + Grants as share of GDP 44.5 43.6 
Overall surplus (deficit) as share of GDP 6.0 2.4 
Revenue sources as shares of (Total revenue + Grants)   
Grants 1.8 1.0 
Non-tax revenue1 24.9 17.4 
Tax Revenue1 73.2 81.5 
Indirect taxes (SACU) 16.0 15.2 
General sales tax  3.3 4.3 
Mineral Revenue 46.4 53.6 
Non-mineral income taxes 7.2 8.0 
1. Using IMF classification of all mineral revenues as taxation. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
12 IBFD, March 2003 
13 IBFD, March 2003 
14 Cnossen, 2003 
15 IBFD, March 2003 
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Democratic Republic of Congo 
 
The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is a mainly agrarian economy, deriving 
over half of its economic output from agriculture. Nonetheless, export earnings are 
largely dependant on the mining sector – diamond sales generate over 64% of export 
earnings.16  The country has only recently begun to emerge from a protracted civil 
conflict culminating in the outbreak of war in 1998, and security remains unstable. 
Government institutions and structure are being reformulated and strengthened as part 
of the post-conflict reconstruction, but continue to be hampered by poor infrastructure 
and bureaucracy.  The impact of years of economic disruption is evident in the trend 
of government revenue earnings.  From an average of 12 percent of GDP in the late 
1980s total revenue and grants declined by close to 50 percent during the 1990s. 
Expenditure remained around 20 percent of GDP for the decade from 1985 to 1995, 
but fell sharply in the late 1990s, depressed by central bank losses and slow 
disbursement of foreign financed investment spending after the IMF withdrew in 
1991.17  Even so, government spending was financed mainly through grants and 
foreign financing, which covered over 72 percent of outlays. The overall deficit 
averaged 6.4% for the period 1997 – 2001, the second lowest amongst SADC 
countries in that period.  See Table 4.3.  Hyperinflation in the early 1990s saw price 
increases in the five digits range in 1994. Inflation remains a threat to macroeconomic 
programming at over 300% in 2001.  
 
The DRC collects an average of close to 85% of its revenue from taxation, declining 
only in 1999 to 69%, after the outbreak of war.  Sources of tax receipts in recent years 
were almost evenly split between international trade, goods and services, and income, 
contributing an average of 1.45, 1.4 and 1.24 percent of GDP respectively during 
1997 – 2001. 
 
Taxes on goods and services comprise mainly a turnover tax and selective excise 
taxes.18,19  During 1997–2001, turnover tax revenue was collected evenly from 
domestic goods and services and imported goods, with  each sub-category 
contributing 0.3% of GDP for a total equivalent to 10.7% of total revenues. The tax is 
levied on services, the gross amount of sales of manufactured goods, three quarters of 
the amount on construction works invoice, the CIF value of imports and 
presumptively on small enterprises. The current structure does not protect against 
cascading since input taxes are not deducted. Six rates of turnover taxes are applicable 
depending on the transaction, ranging from 3% for manufactures that have a social or 
cultural consumptive purpose, raw materials, packaging materials and spare parts; 6% 
for transport operations within the DRC (15% for international flights), to the 
standard of 13 percent on the sale of goods and 18% for construction works. The 
highest rate, 30%, applies to non-resident service provision. The 3% tax rate also 
extends to exports of minerals, coffee, timber and unrefined oil, and is withheld at 
source by banks handling payment. Exemptions include sales subject to excise duty, 
locally made arts and craft, and certain service supplies. 
                                                 
16 www.iss.com/drc 
17 IMF April 2004 
18 IMF, Democratic Republic of DRC Selected Issues and Statistical Appendix IMF Country Report 
No. 01/123 July 2001  
19 Tax structure description from International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation, ATS, Supplement No 
119, June 2001 (unless otherwise specified) 
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Major reforms to the tariff and tax system are currently being supported by the World 
Bank and the IMF in preparation for the planned introduction of a VAT in 2005. 
Measures relevant to the turnover tax were legally adopted in March 2003 and are 
expected to be implemented by 2004. These include allowance for the deduction of 
turnover taxes on inputs, the elimination of the tax on exports, consolidation of the six 
rates to two, 3% and 13%, to be applied to investment and agriculture inputs and all 
other products respectively, including products currently subject to the excise tax20. 
  
Excise duties are applied through eight rates between 3% and 40% on selected 
consumer products, both locally produced and imported.  A 15% rate also applies to 
petroleum products. Revenue from selective excises averaged 0.8% of GDP or 14.5% 
of total revenues during 1997 – 2001. Expected reforms to the tax structure in 2004 
include an increase in excises on petroleum products with the elimination of quasi-
fiscal levies and the elimination of excises on sugar, cement and matches. 
 
 
 
Table 4.3   DRC, Budget Aggregates and Revenue Composition, Averages 
for 1992-96 and 1997-20011 
 Percentages 
 1992-96 1997-2001 
Total expenditures (including net lending) as share of GDP  18.1 12.2 
Total Revenue and Grants as share of GDP 5.4 6.4 
Overall surplus (deficit) as share of GDP -15.9 -5.8 
Revenue sources as shares of (Total revenue + Grants)   
Grants  … 
Non-tax revenue 14.2 17.2 
Tax Revenue 85.8 82.8 
Indirect taxes  77.0 56.6 
Turnover Tax 7.0 10.7 
Selective excise tax  15.5 14.5 
1. 1992-1996 averages from GFS, 1997-2001 from IMF  
2. Shares/GDP from ADB 
                                                 
20 IMF April 2004 
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Lesotho 
 
Lesotho is a small, low-income country, geographically landlocked within South 
Africa and heavily dependant on the South African economy for its economic well 
being.21 Fifty eight percent of the population lives below the poverty line with most of 
the employed working as subsistence farmers or as migrant miners to South Africa. 
Remittances from these migrant farmers are a significant source of income, but have 
declined from 50 percent of GDP to around 20 percent in recent years due to the 
declining supply of South Africa mining jobs.22  Growth in the services and 
agricultural sectors has also slowed in the late 1990s.  On the upside, performance and 
investments in textile and garment manufacturing has been positively affected by 
preferential arrangements first with the EU and presently with the US AGOA 
program, making the sector the largest employer23. This growth area has also spilled 
over to construction, which averages around 11 percent of GDP.  
 
From an overall deficit of 16.9 percent of GDP in 1987/88, the overall fiscal balance 
improved steadily to a surplus of 5.4 percent of GDP in 1993/94, but then worsened 
again thereafter becoming a deficit again in 1998/99 through 2000/01.  Government 
spending, including net lending, is the highest of SADC countries at an average of 50 
percent of GDP during FYs 1997–2001.24  Expenditures have moderated in recent 
years. Government revenues increased from around 36 percent in the late 1980s, to 
over 48 percent of GDP by 1996/97, also the highest among SACU countries.  
Revenue has since declined to average around 41 percent since 2000/01.  During 
1997–2001, Lesotho derived a 75 percent share of its revenues and grants, or 34 
percent of GDP, from taxation.  Non-tax revenues averaged 19 percent of total 
revenues during the same period, including water royalties and compensatory 
payments from South Africa for seignorage.  Foreign grants made up around 5.8 
percent of the total revenues and grants or 2.6 percent of GDP.  Table 4.4 summarizes 
Lesotho government financial operations. 
 
Tax revenues are drawn mainly from international trade through custom duties and 
excise, 21 percent of GDP, followed by income, 7.5 percent of GDP, then sales taxes 
on goods and services, 3.8 percent of GDP.  Lesotho tax policy hopes to shift revenue 
dependency away from customs duties, which are pooled as SACU receipts with an 
expected declining share for the country under new SACU arrangements (see Table 
5.3).  Taxes on goods and services currently include trade licenses and petrol levy in 
addition to a value added tax, which has replaced the sales tax.  
 
Lesotho implemented a value added tax in July 200325 to be administered within the 
newly constituted Lesotho Revenue Authority.26,27  Prior to this, a 10 percent single-
staged sales tax with provision for input tax deductions and credits as under a value 
                                                 
21 The Lesotho loti is pegged to the South African rand within the Common Monetary Area (CMA).  
22 IMF Lesotho: Selected Issues and Statistical Appendix, April 2004. 
23 IMF Selected Issues, 2004 
24 Government spending is over 10 percentage points lower when measured as a share of gross national 
disposable income (GNDI) rather than GDP. See Table 4.4. 
25 Value Added Tax Act 2001  and Value Added Tax (Amendment) Act 2003 
26 The originally planned date for implementation was April, 2002. This date was changed to the 
following fiscal year as the government tried to fulfill self imposed preconditions to ensure 
administrative readiness for the tax. www.lesotho.gov.ls/article/2002   
27 Lesotho Revenue Authority Act 2001  
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added structure was in place since 1996 (replacing a prior sales tax regime in place 
since 1982), but still using a system of exemption certificates for registered vendors to 
ensure that the tax was paid only at the retail level.28  Nonetheless, exemption of input 
taxes was selective, exemption certificates were often abused and the sales tax system 
was considered administratively demanding.29  The sales tax was structured to prepare 
the way for the value added tax.  The value added tax introduced is harmonized with 
South Africa at a standard rate of 14 percent and levied on every taxable supply and 
import of goods and services.  Three other rates apply as they had under the sales tax 
structure: 15 percent on liquor, 5 percent on utilities, exports and basic items are zero-
rated.   Revenue collections for 2002/03, which include about 8 months of VAT at 
14% compared to sales tax at 10%, so far show no increase in tax yield from the 4.4% 
of GDP and 2.9% of GDNI in the prior year.   
 
Exemptions under the sales tax structure also continue to apply but exemptions are 
further extended under the VAT. Exemptions include the supply of public, postal, 
transportation, water, medical, financial and education services, cultural activities, 
charitable activities by a permanent establishment, the supply of un-developed land 
and the supply of immovable property where the tenant is a manufacturer and uses the 
property to this end, leased or rented accommodations, and supply for low income 
housing development.30  Government purchases, exempted under the sales tax 
structure are not exempted from the value added tax.  The taxable threshold for 
mandatory registration has been increased from LSL250,000 applicable under the 
sales tax regime to LSL500,000. 
 
Table 4.4   Lesotho, Budget Aggregates and Revenue Composition, Averages 
for 1992/93-96/97 and 1997/98-2001/02  
(Fiscal Year beginning April 1) 
 Percentages 
 1992/93-96/97 1997/98-2001/02 
Total expenditures (including net lending) as share of GDP  46.7 49.3 
Total Revenue + Grants as share of GDP 51.0 45.5 
Overall surplus (deficit) as share of GDP 4.2 -3.7 
Revenue sources as shares of (Total revenue + Grants)   
Grants 9.8 5.8 
Non-tax revenue 14.0 19.0 
Tax Revenue 76.2 75.2 
Indirect Taxes  61.8 58.7 
General sales tax  9.7 8.3 
   
GDNI/GDP 186.7 144.1 
 
                                                 
28 IBFD, December 2002 
29 www.lesotho.gov.ls/article/2002.  
30 IMF Selected Issues, 2004, Summary of the Tax System as at July 2003. 
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Malawi 
 
Overall economic growth in the Malawian economy is heavily driven by the 
agricultural sector, principally smallholder farmers who contribute 70 percent of the 
output31. Since 1994, agriculture has averaged around 34 percent, with agriculture 
becoming an increasingly more important source of national income, earning over 90 
percent of export revenues and employing over 90 percent of the population32. 
Smallholders are the main source of growth in the sector. Agriculture is also the most 
volatile sector due to the vulnerability to recurring droughts33. Economic activity in 
the remaining sectors has been muted over the past decade. The manufacturing sector 
is recording a declining share of GDP, with growth just above 1 percent for 1994–
2000.  Services received a strong boost from financial and professional activities in 
the mid-1990s, but this performance was not sustained through the early 2000s.  
Overall, real growth has been slow and highly unstable.  Over 1990-2001 real growth 
averaged 3.5 percent (about 1.1 per above the population growth rate), but the 
standard deviation in the annual growth rates over this period was 7.4 percent, more 
than double the average growth rate.  
 
Consumption in the private sector has been an increasing share of GDP, from around 
70 percent in the late 1980s to over 84 percent on average in the last half of the 1990s.  
Total consumption has risen from around 90 percent to 100 percent of GDP.   
 
Government revenues remained around 17 percent of GDP in the 1990s despite surges 
and slumps in GDP over the period, possibly reflecting the fact that most of the 
activity in the dominant agriculture sector remains outside the tax net. Government 
expenditures also remained stable at around 30 percent over the same period. Malawi 
received around 6 percent of GDP in grants (close to one-quarter of total revenue and 
grants) over 1997-2001, while it also receives around 5.2 percent of GDP in net 
foreign financing (see Table 5.5).   
 
Malawi obtains around 90 percent of its revenue (excluding grants) from taxation, or 
about 15 to 16 percent of GDP.  The relatively low tax collections (albeit high by SSA 
standards) reflect the negative impact on the tax base of the economic dependence on 
agriculture and the large informal sector relative to the formal sector.34  Tax 
collections have strengthened in recent years since the introduction of new policy and 
administrative measures, including the establishment of the Malawi Revenue 
Authority in 1999.  
 
Direct taxes grew from about 35 to just over 40 percent of total revenues over the 
1990s (7.4 percent of GDP), while indirect taxes increased to over 50 percent during 
the latter 1990s (8.7 percent of GDP).  Taxes on international trade declined from 27 
percent of total revenues or 4.7 percent of GDP in the early 1990s to 14 percent of 
revenues, 2.6 percent of GDP, reflecting the continued reduction of trade tariffs and 
barriers, including on manufacturing inputs and agricultural hand tools. Over the 
corresponding period, taxes on goods and services remained around one-third of total 
revenues.   See also Table 4.5 below. 
                                                 
31 World Bank, Malawi Country Brief, Nov 2003 
32 World Bank, Malawi Country Brief, Nov 2003 
33 World Bank, Malawi Country Brief, Nov 2003 
34 IMF, Malawi: Selected Issues and Statistical Appendix, August 2002 
24 
 
Taxes on goods and services are principally the surtax on manufactured goods, 
imports and selected services (excludes financial services) and a range of excise 
duties and raised 5.7 percent of GDP in the early 1990s increasing to 6.5 percent of 
GDP on average later in the decade to 2001. The credit method surtax, which evolved 
from a single-stage manufacturer’s level sales tax, has been in place since 1989 under 
the Customs and Excise Act.  The credit-method  surtax is effectively a credit-method 
VAT on imports of goods and domestic production through the manufacturing level 
plus a range of services.35   The surtax was extended in September 2002 to the retail 
stage with the introduction of the Surtax Act No. 14 of 2001. Registrants have 
increased fivefold since 1989,36 but with the move to the retail level the minimum 
turnover for compulsory registration was raised from MK 75,000 (about US$1,000) to 
MK 2,000,000 (about US$27,000 in 2002) per annum.   The new threshold is 
expected to have a positive impact on revenue since the former threshold was not 
strongly enforced.37  A standard rate of 20 percent applies with few exemptions, 
notable inputs, food items (including maize), social services and farm produce.  A 
reduced rate of 10 percent applies to the supply of residential electricity, hotel 
accommodation and related services. Zero rated items include exports, pharmaceutical 
products, medical services, fertilizers, and condoms.  
 
Since 2000/01 budget, a number of tax policy changes were made to improve 
efficiency, collections and progressivity in the tax system. Changes to the surtax and 
excise taxes included: the replacement of the surtax on petrol products with excise 
duties, zero rating of milk, salt, exercise books, and capital inputs for manufacturing 
and the extension of the surtax to the retail stage in 200238.  
 
The excise tax structure ranges from 10 to 100 percent.  Excise duties were also 
recently extended to select consumer goods and increased on select motor vehicles, 
alcohol and cigarettes. The measures have led to an increase of over 150 percent in 
excise tax collections from 0.7 of GDP in the 1990s to 1.8 percent of GDP by 2001–
2002. Some of the changes in the tax policy between 2000/01 and 2002/03 reflect 
reversal of measures, for example rates on alcoholic beverages were raised by 20% in 
FY2000 and then lowered by 25% the following year and increased again in the next 
year. 
 
 
                                                 
35 IMF, August 2002 
36 ref vat workshop doc.. 
37 IMF, August 2002 
38 IMF, August 2002 
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Table 4.5.   Malawi, Budget Aggregates and Revenue Composition, Averages 
for 1992/93-96/97 and 1997/98-2001/02  
(Fiscal Year beginning April 1) 
 Percentages 
 1992/93-96/97 1997/98-2001/02 
Total expenditures (including net lending) as share of GDP  31.1 29.8 
Total Revenue + Grants as share of GDP 22.6 23.6 
Overall surplus (deficit) as share of GDP -8.6 -6.2 
Revenue sources as shares of (Total revenue + Grants)   
Grants 25.3 27.7 
Non-tax revenue 7.3 6.6 
Tax Revenue 67.4 65.7 
Indirect Taxes  46.7 36.8 
Surtax 22.6 21.8 
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Mauritius 
 
Mauritius has developed from a small island economy overly dependent on the sugar 
industry for employment and export earnings to a diversified economy with strong 
performances in tourism, financial services, and textile manufacturing.    It has 
emerged as the economy with the highest per capita GDP at US$3,751 in 2001 among 
the SADC Member States (see Table 2.2.).  Real economic growth was particularly 
strong in the late 1980s at an average of close to 8 percent annually.  Investments in 
export processing zones proved to be successful and this sector soon rivaled 
government and the sugar industry as one of the leading employers in the economy, 
employing around 18 percent of the total employed population in 1999 compared to 7 
percent for sugar workers.39  Though growth slowed during the 1990s, it remained 
around 5 percent, benefiting from preferential trade arrangements for its main exports, 
sugar and textiles.  After a slump in 1999/2000, the economy seems poised to rebound 
once again, though uncertainties in the sugar and textile markets can dampen the 
outturn.  Imports are a high, but declining share of GDP over the past decade, 
recording just over 50 percent of GDP in the last five years.  Private consumption is 
relatively low as a share of income compared to other SADC countries, just over 60 
percent of GDP.   Despite the success of the government’s economic strategy, 
including the containment of inflation to single digits over the past two decades, 
unemployment has been increasing over the past ten years, reaching close to 10 
percent by 2002, partly reflecting a mismatch between available skills and the skills 
demanded in the changing economy.40  
 
Fiscal performance has been stable for the past decade or so, but has begun to slip 
since the late 1990s, partly reflecting increases in capital spending.  Overall fiscal 
deficit including grants averaged 5.5 percent of GDP.  Total revenue and grants for 
fiscal years 1998–2002 were 21.4 percent of GDP, of which grants were only 0.2 
percent of GDP. Revenue actually declined from around 22 percent on average during 
1985 to 1995, averaging 19.5 percent of GDP during 1997 - 2001. Government 
expenditure has remained around 22 percent of GDP throughout the 1990s. Including 
net lending, government expenditures have averaged over 25 percent of GDP in the 
five years before 2002.   
 
Mauritius drew 90 percent of its revenues from taxation during 1985–1995, but this 
share declined to 85 percent in the late 1990s and up to 2001. Non-tax revenues 
average around 2.5 percent of GDP, of which 70 percent represents property income. 
Tax revenues averaged 19 percent of GDP in the late 1980s and increased to 20 
percent in the early 1990s. However average tax collections has declined to just over 
17 percent of GDP in the late 1990s through 2001.  
 
A declining share of government’s revenues has been sourced from international 
trade, down from 41 percent during the late 1980s to 25 percent in 2001. Import 
duties declined from an average of 8.6 percent of GDP during 1985-1995 to 6.3 
percent in the last five years through 2001, and are down to 5.1 percent of GDP in the 
FY 2002. The pattern of collection of taxes from income, however, showed an 
increase, rising to 2.8 percent of GDP in the first half of the 1990s (12.8 percent of 
                                                 
39 IMF, Mauritius: Selected Issues and Statistical Appendix, October 2003 
40 IMF, October 2003. 
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total revenues) before declining to 2.5 percent of GDP (12.4 percent of total revenues) 
in more recent years.  Mauritius had a sales tax at 5% in 1983 and raised the rate to 
8% in 1996.  In contrast with the movements in international taxes, taxes on goods 
and services have been growing in importance in Mauritius from 14 percent of 
government revenues in the early 1990s to over 40 percent by 2000.  As a share of 
GDP, they have increased from about 2 percent in the early 1990s to over 5 percent 
by 2002 after the VAT was introduced in 1998 at 8%.  The VAT appears to being 
used as a revenue substitute for import duties.  
 
Taxes on goods and services include a value added tax, excise taxes on alcohol and 
tobacco products, as well as locally manufactured motor vehicles, taxes on gambling, 
company registration fees and motor vehicle taxes. Excises taxes on diesel and several 
license fees were increased in 2002.  
 
Value added tax was introduced in 1998 and replaced the sales tax on goods with a 
standard rate of 8 percent previously in place since 1983.  The VAT is currently 
chargeable at a standard rate of 15 percent on the domestic supply of goods and 
services as well as the importation of goods (except for imports into the free port 
zone).41  The rate was only recently increased from 12 percent in the 2002/03 Budget.  
Exports are zero rated, as is water and electricity since October 2000.  Other zero-
rated items include basic food items (wheat flour, wheat bran, edible oils, margarine, 
sterilized liquid milk, curdled milk and cream, yoghurt and common salt), sugar, live 
poultry, fertilizers, electricity, water and sewage services, books and other printed 
matter, transport of goods by sea or air.  Exempted goods include basic foodstuff, 
medical supplies, fishing vessels and aircrafts services, agriculture inputs such as 
fertilizer and animal feed, air and sea passenger transportation, educational and 
training services, financial services, sale of land and residential buildings and 
companies with turnover below Rps 3 million.   
 
Further changes to the value added tax structure were introduced in 2003/04 Budget, 
broadening the base to include previously zero-rated or exempted items and 
activities.42 Categories where the tax will be applied include a number of food items, 
including cereals, cooking oils, agriculture and horticulture produce, medical services 
and pharmaceutical produces, education services, water and electricity. The revenue 
impact of these measures is estimated at 1.2 percent of GDP.43 
 
 
                                                 
41 IBFD, September 2002 
42 IMF, Mauritius, Article IV Consultations and Staff Report, October 2003 
43 IMF, Mauritius, Article IV Consultations and Staff Report, October 2003 
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Table 4.6.  Mauritius, Budget Aggregates and Revenue Composition, Averages 
for 1992/93-96/97 and 1997/98-2001/02  
(Fiscal Year beginning July 1) 
 Percentages 
 1992/93-96/97 1997/98-2001/02 
Total expenditures (including net lending) as share of GDP  25.8 26.9 
Total Revenue + Grants as share of GDP 20.6 21.4 
Overall surplus (deficit) as share of GDP -5.2 --5.5 
Revenue sources as shares of (Total revenue + Grants)   
Grants 1.0 0.8 
Non-tax revenue 13.4 14.7 
Tax Revenue 85.6 84.4 
Indirect Taxes  53.2 55.8 
Sales Tax/ VAT 9.6 22.1 
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Mozambique 
 
After emerging from a 15-year civil war in the early 1990s, Mozambique was set to 
become the next success story in Southern Africa.  Despite extensive damage to their 
economic infrastructure as a result of the war, the country has managed to maintain 
growth rates averaging around 8 percent during 1993–2002.  The economic progress 
made was mainly a result of far reaching economic reforms on the legal and 
regulatory side as well as market based economic policies under IMF/World Bank 
agreements that boosted foreign investment and exports.  Inflation has declined from 
averaging over 50 percent in the mid 1980s to mid 90s to 14 percent during the last 
half of the 1990s. The country’s major growth sectors are agriculture, which occupies 
over 80 percent of the population, coal mining and construction.  Agriculture has 
nonetheless been declining as a share of GDP in favor of industry.  Private 
consumption has also declined from over 100 percent of GDP before 1994, to 68 
percent by 2001.  
 
Overall fiscal performance has been generally commendable reflecting the 
government’s prudent approach to economic management.  Nonetheless, the cost of 
reconstruction has placed a heavy burden on the country’s fiscal resources.  The fiscal 
deficit worsened over the 1990s, widening from an average of 10 percent of GDP 
between 1993 and 1997 to an annual average of 12.6 percent over next five years.  
See Table 4.7.  Total revenues and grants averaged of 22 percent of GDP over the past 
decade, with grants forming 46 percent of these revenues, which is the highest grant 
to revenue proportions in the region (see Table 5.5.)  Expenditures on the other hand 
has averaged 22 percent of GDP during 1993-1997, increasing to 27 percent in the 
past five years, of which close to 55 percent is externally financed (See Table 5.5), the 
largest external financing proportion of the SADC countries.  A significant part of the 
expenditure (12 percent) reflects workers’ compensation as the government has 
increased wages and salaries and increased public employment in the social sectors as 
part of the poverty alleviation policies. 
 
Grants have sharply increased in recent years, now close to the level of total revenues 
at 10 percent of GDP for the decade, 1998–2002, compared to revenues, which are 12 
percent of GDP.  
 
Mozambique derives over 91 percent of their own-source revenues from taxation. 
Over half of tax revenues are sourced from taxes on goods and services and this 
proportion has been increasing in recent years. In contrast, taxes on income as well as 
on international trade have been a declining share of revenues during the 1990s, 17 
percent to 16 percent and 22 percent to 16 percent, respectively comparing the 
averages for 1993–1997 and 1998-2002.  Non-tax revenues have increased over the 
1990s to reach over 11 percent of revenues after 2000, reflecting proceeds from 
privatization and increased social security contributions.  See Table 4.8. 
 
Taxes on goods and services are a major source of revenue for Mozambique and have 
increased from an average of 49 percent of revenues during 1993–1997 (5.8 percent 
of GDP) to 56 percent of revenues (6.9 percent of GDP) during 1998–2002.  Taxes 
collected included the turnover and consumption taxes until June 1999, when they 
were replaced by a value added tax. Other taxes on goods and services include 
selective excise taxes, including taxes on petroleum products. 
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The VAT is levied on the sale of goods and services in Mozambique by entrepreneurs 
and on the importation of goods at a standard rate of 17 percent.  Zero-rated items, or 
items exempt with credit are exports, imports of ships and aircraft for international 
trade, chartering services, international travel44. Exemptions are granted without credit 
in respect of certain transactions including select passenger vehicle services, purchase 
of motor vehicle fuel and half the cost of automobile diesel, travel and entertainment 
expenses of the entrepreneurial activity, and purchase of second-hand goods and art 
objects for resale.45  Other exempt activities include health, education and welfare 
related activities; supplies of NGOs; copyright and art objects by creators or heirs; 
stamps and paper, burial services, garbage removal; finance, immovable property, 
insurance, betting and gaming transactions; basic foodstuff; agriculture and fisheries 
supplies.  
 
Excise duties are charged on the sales price plus other taxes of listed goods including 
alcohol and tobacco products, perfumes and cosmetics, precious stones, animal skins 
and furs, cars, pleasure vessels, firearms and ammunition.  Collections have averaged 
1.2 percent of GDP or 10 percent of revenues in the past decade.   
 
The government and IMF have reported that the revenue impact since 1999 has been 
in line with expectations.46  Collections of VAT since its introduction has averaged 5 
percent of GDP compared to the average collection of turnover taxes of 3 percent 
from 1993 – 1999.  Nonetheless, the tax administration and taxpayers continue to face 
difficulties in effecting the refund system.  For example, only about 30 percent of 
refunds were paid in 2003.47 
 
Reforms since 2002 included a new code on the personal and corporate tax structure, 
new elements in the fiscal incentive structure and a new vehicles tax.  In 2003, the 
specific tax on domestic petroleum products was increased to adjust for inflation. A 
new measure is to be introduced in 2004 to make this adjustment automatic.  
 
 
                                                 
44 IBFD June 2002 
45 IBFD June 2002 
46 IMF, Republic of Mozambique, Article IV Consultation – Staff Report, March 2004. 
47 IMF, March 2004 
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Table 4.7.  Mozambique, Budget Aggregates and Revenue Composition, Averages 
for 1993-97 and 1998-2002  
(Fiscal Year end December 31) 
 Percentages 
 1993-97 1998-2002 
Total expenditures (including net lending) as share of GDP  22.1 27.4 
Total Revenue + Grants as share of GDP 21.9 23.1 
Overall surplus (deficit) as share of GDP 0.2 -2.0 
Revenue sources as shares of (Total revenue + Grants)   
Grants 46.3 45.9 
Non-tax revenue 4.5 5.1 
Tax Revenue 49.2 49.0 
Indirect Taxes  40.0 40.4 
Turnover Tax/ Value Added Tax 3.4 4.5 
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Namibia 
 
Namibia is a middle-income country with real economic growth of 4.7 percent in the 
decade to 2001.  For a relatively young country, only gaining independence in 1990, 
Namibia has grown rapidly benefiting from favorable relations with South Africa, a 
rich natural resource base and strategic location on the coast. The economy is 
dominated by the tertiary sector, 55 percent of GDP, particularly services related to 
trade, tourism and transportation, and the primary sector activities of commercial 
livestock farming, fishing and mining, over 21 percent of GDP.  Namibia is a member 
of the Common Monetary Area and SACU and is dependant on the South African 
economy for over 85 percent of it imports.48  Final consumption averaged 88 percent 
of GDP over the 10 years to 2002, while imports amounted to 55 percent of GDP.49  
 
Total revenue and grants remained stable through the 1990s to 2001 at an average of 
33 percent of GDP.  Expenditures were also fairly stable at around 36 percent of GDP 
for the decade. The pattern of government spending has however shifted in favor of 
current expenditures, although development spending continues to average around 5 
percent of GDP or 14 percent of total expenditures. The overall deficit has improved 
in recent periods as a result of the relatively better revenue performance, mainly, and 
has declined from 3.9 percent of GDP during 1992 – 1997 fiscal years to 3.1 percent 
in the five years to 2001. Grants declined through the 1990s from 1.6 percent of GDP 
at independence to 0.2 percent by 2001.  
 
Over the 1990s, Namibia has increased the proportion of its revenues sourced through 
taxation, from 87 percent in the first half of the decade to over 90 percent by 1998. 
Tax revenues are almost evenly sourced across income, international trade, and goods 
and services. Income taxes have remained strong at around 10 percent of GDP, rising 
from 27 percent of revenue and grants in 1992 to 36 percent by 2002. Concurrently, 
indirect taxes have been declining somewhat as a share of total revenues, but the 
introduction of the VAT in 2000 boasted the sales tax revenues. Non-tax revenues 
declined from 11 percent of GDP to 9 percent between the first to the second half of 
the 1990s.  See Table 4.8. 
 
As a member of SACU, Namibia pays over customs and excise duties to the SACU 
pool. Duties levied in South Africa are applicable in Namibia. Namibia’s revenue 
from SACU totals 9.9 percent of GDP or one-third of total revenue collections. This 
proportion is expected to decline under the new revenue sharing arrangements (see 
Table 5.5.) 
 
The sales tax, previously in place since 1992, had been levied at 10 percent at the 
retail stage on goods and services, including imports. Exemptions were applied to 
basic foods, mainly maize and millet meal; sales intended for resale by certified 
buyers; water, postal, telecommunication and transport services; certain land and 
building transactions; exports of goods; and select services. Firms with annual sales of 
more than N$50,000 were required to register. Additional sales levies were introduced 
in 1996 to broaden the base and increase revenues and these succeeded in increasing 
sales tax revenues to 20 percent of revenues from 18 percent (an increase of one 
                                                 
48 http://www.mti.gov.na/econvnv_text/macroeconomic_overview.htm 
49 Institute for Public Policy Research, http://www.ippr.org.na/database.HTM 
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percent of GDP). The additional levies were applied at four rates, 5, 10, 15 and 25 
percent and the threshold for registration increased to N$200,000. The highest rate 
applied to alcohol and tobacco products and the lowest to foods.   The high rate was 
dropped as of October 1, 2002 
 
A multiple-rate value added tax replaced both of the former sales structures in 
November 2000, but the effective tax rate was designed to be comparable with the 
former rates, but the standard rate was raised to 15%.  The high rate of 30% was 
subsequently dropped in 2002.  VAT collections for climbed from 4.9 percent in 
1999/2000 for the sales tax to 5.8 percent in 2000/01 to 6.9 percent in 20001/02, but 
have subsequently moderated to 6.4 percent of GDP in 2002/03.  This compares 
favorably to the average of 4.6 percent of GDP for the sales taxes and additional 
levies between FY1995–1999.50  Overall the VAT appears to have resulted in about a 
39% increase in revenues compared to the sales tax and levies, but with a 50% 
increase in the standard tax rate which suggests a price elasticity of demand of about –
1.2 for the tax base.  Three main rates are levied, a standard rate of 15 percent, a 
higher rate of 30 percent and a zero rate.  Zero rated items included electricity and 
sanitation services, fuel, international transportation and cargo services.  Exempt 
supplies, in addition to most of those previously exempted, but not zero rated under 
the sales tax, include medical and educational services, nursing homes and residential 
accommodation, public transport services, financial services and services by trade 
unions. Certain imports were also exempt including supplies to EPZ enterprises. 
 
Table 4.8.   Namibia, Budget Aggregates and Revenue Composition, Averages 
for 1992/93 - 96/97 and 1997/98 – 2001/02  
(Fiscal Year beginning April 1) 
 Percentages 
 1992/93–96/97 1997/98–2001/02 
Total expenditures (including net lending) as share of GDP  35.8 36.1 
Total Revenue + Grants as share of GDP 32.5 33.0 
Overall surplus (deficit) as share of GDP -3.3 -3.2 
Revenue sources as shares of (Total revenue + Grants)   
Grants 1.5 1.1 
Non-tax revenue 11.2 8.6 
Tax Revenue 87.3 90.3 
Indirect Taxes  57.5 54.3 
General sales tax/VAT 15.3 16.2 
   
 
                                                 
50 IPPR, http://www.ippr.org.na/database.HTM 
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South Africa 
 
The South African economy has grown in real terms at an annual average of 3 percent 
since 1995, remaining one of the largest economy in Africa and one of the larger 
economies in the world,51 with economic output in 2001 twice the total of all the other 
member countries of SADC (see Table 2.2 above), though ranking behind Mauritius 
and Botswana in per capita GDP.  The structure of the economy has also evolved 
from agriculture (now less than 5 percent of GDP) and mining towards manufacturing 
(close to 20 percent of GDP) and financial and tourism services, with the largest share 
of GDP, 64 percent, sourced from the service sector. The mining sector however 
continues to account for a significant share of exports, and the mining and agriculture 
sectors employ around 17 percent of the working population.52  Total consumption 
through the 1990s has averaged 83 percent of GDP, with private consumption 
growing at an average of 3.3 percent between 1995 and 1999, compared with the 
average growth of 1.25 percent in the first half of the decade. Inflation has slowed 
significantly over the decade from an annual average of 16 percent during the last half 
of the 1980s to 8 percent by the corresponding period in the 1990s. Economic 
development is challenged, however, by an unemployment rate of close to 30 percent 
and challenges to social structures caused by HIV/aids prevalence.  
 
Overall deficit has declined through the 1990s, averaging less than 3 percent of GDP 
in the late 1990s and down to about one percent by fiscal 2002, with just only about 3 
percent of the financing coming from foreign sources. Total revenues and grants 
initially declined in the first half of the 1990s then increased by 2.5 percent to 27 
percent on average from 1998 to 2002. Government expenditures and net lending 
followed an opposing pattern, first increasing then decreasing by 2 percent to 29 
percent of GDP in the corresponding periods. Expenditure on wages and salaries has 
declined most sharply from close to 12 percent in the late 1980s to around 5 percent in 
the latter half of the 1990s, but subsidies and transfers have increased to mitigate 
close to 70 percent of the decline in personnel spending. Foreign financing of 
government spending has also increased in recent years, from 1.5 percent to over 4 
percent between the first half to the last half of the period 1992–2001.  Grants, at 0.1 
percent of GDP, are a declining proportion of foreign financing.  
 
Average annual tax revenues totaled just over 22 percent of GDP in the early 1990s, 
but increased to 25 percent during 1997 to 2001. Over eighty percent of the increase 
came from increased collections of income taxes. In fact, income taxes increased from 
12 to 14 percent of GDP over the comparative period.  Similar to other middle and 
higher income economies, income taxes are a major source of tax collections at an 
average of over 54 percent of total revenues since the 1980s, 59 percent in the most 
recent five years to 2001.  International taxes comprise a declining share of total 
revenues, from close to 7 percent in the late 1980s (1.6 percent of GDP) to 3.5 percent 
in 2001 (0.8 percent of GDP). Taxes on domestic consumption of goods and services 
have averaged around 37 percent of total revenues, or 8.6 percent of GDP, in the ten 
years before 2001.  
  
                                                 
51 Based on World bank Development Indicators 2005, using GDP measured in 2000US$, South Africa 
ranked 29 and based on purchasing power parity GDP measures, it ranked 19 in the world. 
52 http://www.economist.com/countries/SouthAfrica/profile.cfm 
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Taxes on goods and services comprised a consumption-type value added tax since 
1991, specific and ad valorem excise duties, and levies on fuel and financial 
transactions.  A small turnover tax (01% tp 0.2%) is also levied by the District and 
Joint Service Councils.53  The value added tax is levied by the central government at a 
standard 14 percent rate on goods and services except for items selected for zero-
rating.  Zero rated items include exports, several unprocessed food items, petrol and 
diesel, several agricultural input, and international transport services.54 Domestic 
exemptions include mainly interest based financial services, residential rents, 
passenger transport and educational services. VAT collections have increased as a 
share of GDP from 5.5 percent in the five-year period to 1996 to 5.9 percent on 
average in the five years before 2001. VAT collections, however, have declined in 
importance as a share of total revenue due to the increase share coming from income 
taxes, from an average of 25.3 percent from 1987–1991 to 24.9 percent during 1997-
2001.  
 
Excise duties are assessed at mainly specific rates against alcohol, tobacco and 
petroleum products, with specific rates being adjusted annually for inflation.  Ad 
valorem duties are applied to various cosmetic and perfume products, and a range of 
other consumer products. Specific excises tax collections average around 1 percent of 
GDP while ad valorem excises are 0.1 percent and declining. Excise taxes are also a 
declining share of total revenues during the 1990s although still close to 5 percent.  
Fuel levies on the other hand have increased from 1.2 to 1.7 percent of GDP from the 
late 1980s to the 1990s, reaching 1.5 percent in 2001.  
 
Customs and excise duties form part of the SACU pool and comprise just 4.3 percent 
of South Africa’s revenues or 1.1 percent of GDP, the lowest share for SACU 
members. 
 
  
Table 4.9.  South Africa, Budget aggregates and Revenue Composition, 
Averages for 1992/93-96/97 and 1997/98-2001/02  
(Fiscal Year beginning April 1) 
 Percentages 
 1992/93-1996/97 1997/98-2001/02 
Total expenditures (including net lending) as share of GDP  31.0 29.0 
Total Revenue + Grants as share of GDP 24.1 26.6 
Overall surplus (deficit) as share of GDP -6.9 -2.4 
Revenue sources as shares of (Total revenue + Grants)   
Grants 0.9 0.4 
Non-tax revenue 6.6 5.8 
Tax Revenue 92.5 93.8 
Indirect taxes 37.7 36.2 
General sales tax /VAT 22.8 21.1 
   
 
                                                 
53 IMF, South Africa, Selected Issues, March 2000, Country Report 00/42 
54 IMF, March 2000 
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 Swaziland 
 
Swaziland is a small, middle-income country landlocked mainly by South Africa and 
dependant on it for most of its trade. The economic structure has diversified away 
from being agriculture-based in the 1980s, and manufacturing and services are 
increasingly important in driving economic growth. Nonetheless agriculture, 
particularly subsistence farming, continues to employ much of the population with 
65% of the population living in rural areas.  Agro-industry contributes more than 70 
percent of export earnings of which sugar exports account for 80 percent. The 
manufacturing sector accounts for over 27 percent of GDP while services account for 
a further 32 percent share.  
 
While overall revenue and grants have remained around 30 percent of GDP over the 
1990s, expenditures have declined from an annual average of 33 percent of GDP 
during 1992 to 1996, to 29 percent in 2001. As a result the overall deficit has 
improved in recent periods from an average of 4 percent of GDP earlier in the decade 
to less than 0.5 percent of GDP in the five years before 2001. The overall balance in 
fact became positive during 1997 to 1999, reaching a high of 3.3 percent of GDP in 
1999.  
 
Around 93 percent of total government revenues were derived from taxation in the 
1990s. Taxation is applied to income, sales of goods and services and trade. Taxes on 
income declined over the 1990s mainly reflecting reduced collections of corporate 
taxes and non-resident income and interests. Individual income tax payments actually 
increased over the same period. Indirect tax collections in contrast increased over the 
1990s, growing from 61 percent of revenues on average, during 1992 – 1997, to 66 
percent by 2001. Taxes on goods and services increased over the 1990s, reflecting 
increased collections in most of the sub-categories. Nonetheless, SACU declined as a 
proportion of indirect revenues from close to 77 percent of GDP on average during 
1992 – 1996FYs to an average below 75 percent during 1997 – 2001FYs.  
 
Taxes on goods and services comprise sales tax, selective excises, business and 
professional licenses, motor vehicle licenses and a fuel levy on petroleum products. 
The sales tax has been in place since 1983 and was levied at 12 percent until 2000 
when it was increased to 14 percent on goods and select services imported or 
manufactured in Swaziland. A higher rate of 25 percent (previously 20 percent) 
applies to most alcoholic and tobacco products55. Exemptions include food necessities 
and intermediate inputs for manufacturing, inputs for farming and forestry purposes, 
certain medical supplies, temporary imports and imports of personal effects, 
electricity56. Exports as well as imports and manufactured goods for diplomatic and 
central government personnel are also exempt. Collections of sales tax has remained 
fairly steady at 14 percent of GDP over the past decade, equivalent to 12.6 percent of 
total revenues in the five years before 2001.  
 
                                                 
55 IBFD, 2002 
56 IMF January 2003 
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Excise duties are levied at specific rates on un-manufactured tobacco, pure alcohol 
and petrol57. Excise and customs duties receipts are determined through SACU 
arrangements. 
 
Table 4.10.   Swaziland, Budget Aggregates and Revenue Composition, 
Averages for 1992/93 - 96/97 and 1997/98 – 2001/02 
(Fiscal Year beginning April 1) 
 Percentages 
  1992/93–96/97 1997/98–2001/02 
Total expenditures (including net lending) as share of GDP  33.1 29.6 
Total Revenue + Grants as share of GDP 29.9 33.0 
Overall surplus (deficit) as share of GDP -3.2 -0.5 
Revenue sources as shares of (Total revenue + Grants)   
Grants 2.5 3.0 
Non-tax revenue 5.0 6.5 
Tax Revenue 92.5 90.5 
Indirect Taxes  61.0 65.1 
General sales tax/VAT 11.9 12.7 
      
 
                                                 
57 IBRD, December, 2002 
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Tanzania 
 
Tanzania is a low-income country with an average GDP per capita of USD183 over 
the past ten years, but with a growth rate that has improved in the past five years in 
the wake of economic reform, averaging around 4 percent annually. Since 2000, 
inflation has declined to single digits, averaging 6 percent during 2000 - 2002. The 
economy is heavily dependant on agriculture, particularly subsistence farming, and is 
vulnerable to adverse weather variations. Agriculture output contributes 43 percent of 
GDP and makes up around 75 percent of exports; though a significant portion of 
output is informal (monetary GDP is around 70 percent of total economic activity58). 
Growth in tourism over the latter 1990s led to increased economic activity in related 
service sectors, such as hotels, transport, communication and financial services. 
Imports are around 24 percent of GDP, while private consumption is 86 percent of 
GDP59. 
 
Over the decade to 2001, the overall deficit averaged 2 percent of GDP, higher in the 
latter five years than the former. Revenues declined from an average of 12.4 percent 
of GDP during the fiscal years of 1992 – 1996, to 11.8 percent during 1997 – 2001, 
one of the lowest rates in the East African region60. The decline reflects the erosion of 
the tax base as the government privatized and became more dependent on the private, 
mostly informal sector, for income tax receipts61. At the same time, tax incentives and 
exemptions to the mining and tourism sectors remain significant62. The government 
however had successfully constrained recurrent spending, which declined by over 2 
percent of GDP over the same period, owing to the system of cash budgeting63. Civil 
service reform and the disciplines of IMF programs resulted in a decline in wages, 
goods and services. Interest payments also declined in part due to the increase in grant 
and foreign financing of development programs (over 90 percent of the capital budget 
is foreign financed). Grants at close to 4 percent of GDP, are equivalent to over 33 
percent of total revenues.  
 
Around 90 percent of Tanzania’s revenues are drawn through taxation.  Tax revenues 
averaged 11 percent of GDP during 1992 – 2001, with increases from the taxes on 
goods and services compensating for declines in trade and income tax receipts and 
non-tax receipts as shares of GDP. The growth in the value added tax has been mainly 
on the import side, specifically non-petroleum imports, which have an equivalent 
share of total revenues compared to VAT on domestic supplies; both are around 13 
percent. VAT makes up over 25 percent of revenues, 29 percent in the five years 
before 2002. Excise taxes make up another 14 percent; import taxes around 10 percent 
and income taxes, 25 percent. 
 
The Value Added Tax Act 1997 defines the structure of VAT in mainland Tanzania, 
and is payable on taxable supplies of goods and services and on imports. It replaced 
the multi-rate turnover tax in 1998. The VAT rate is applied at 20 percent, on the 
                                                 
58 January 2003;  IMF Selected Issues and Statistical Appendix, Country Report 03/2 
59 WDI 2003, World Bank 
60 January 2003;  IMF Country Report 03/2 
61 January 2003;  IMF Country Report 03/2 
62January 2003;  IMF Country Report 03/2 
63 The Economist Intelligence Unit; 
HTTP://db.eiu.com/report_dl.asp?mode=pdf&valname=CRTZD701  
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mainland and in Zanzibar, except for those goods and services to which a zero rate is 
applied. Items which are zero rated include exports, the supply of goods for 
consumption on passenger vessels, transportation and shipping related services, local 
supply of human medicines, drugs and equipment64. The law provides that tax could 
be applied on imports from Zanzibar to bring the Zanzibar VAT rate in line with the 
rate on the mainland65. VAT exemptions on petroleum products were eliminated in 
2000/0166. Three taxes apply to petroleum products: VAT, excises on VAT inclusive 
base and a fuel levy. Petroleum taxes, from which the mining is exempt, accounted 
for around 1.6 percent of GDP on average during FY1997 – FY2001.  
 
The overall VAT efficiency rate of 0.2 still compares less than favorable with the 
average of 0.27 for Sub-Saharan Africa and mainly reflects the size of exemptions67. 
Exemptions are granted on 21 listed items including food, crop and livestock supplies 
(not for catering); pesticides and fertilizers; medical and health related supplies; 
educational supplies (including capital goods to government-registered 
establishments), printed matter; transport services (financial and insurance services; 
water and tourism68. See Tables 6.6 and 6.9 below. Relief is also granted to a number 
of exempt organizations, including government entities and NGOs, as well as inputs 
by entities previously exempt under the sales tax structure69. The government has 
since 2000 commenced efforts to streamline exemptions and reduce the revenue loss 
through customs and VAT reliefs70.  
 
An excise tax structure also applies to certain luxury manufactured products, 
including alcoholic products, cigarettes, petroleum products, motorcars exceeding 
2000 cc and soft drinks71. Most rates are ad valorem except on motor vehicles, where 
a 10 percent rate applies and on mobile phone services which attracts a 5 percent tax 
rate.  Excises were significantly simplified since 1999/00 from 52 to 6 rates and 
collections have remained around 9 percent of revenues on domestic goods and 
services during 1997 to 2001 fiscal years72.   
 
                                                 
64 IBRD, March 2003 
65 IBRD, March 2003 
66 January 2003;  IMF Country Report 03/2 
67 IMF Country Report 03/2 
68 IBRD, March 2003 
69 IMF Country Report 03/2 
70 January 2003;  IMF Country Report 03/2 
71  January 2003;  IMF Country Report 03/2 
72 IMF Country Report 03/2 
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Table 4.11.   Tanzania, Budget Aggregates and Revenue Composition, 
Averages for 1992/93 - 96/97 and 1997/98 – 2001/02 
(Fiscal Year ending June 30) 
 Percentages 
  1992/93–96/97 1997/98–2001/02 
Total expenditures (including net lending) as share of GDP 17.7 17.4 
Total Revenue + Grants as share of GDP 15.4 15.7 
Overall surplus (deficit) as share of GDP -2.3 -1.7 
Revenue sources as shares of (Total revenue + Grants)   
Grants 19.9 24.9 
Non-tax revenue 8.9 7.6 
Tax Revenue 71.2 67.5 
Indirect Taxes  51.5 49.8 
General sales tax/VAT 19.6 24.7 
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Zambia 
 
The Zambian economy has grown in real terms at an average of 2.4 percent annually 
over the past five years to 2002 compared to the average of -1.1 percent in the prior 
five-year period.  More recently growth has increased to average 4.6% over the five 
years through 2005.  The main exports are minerals, particularly copper. Zambia is 
the world’s fourth largest copper producer and derives 68 percent of its export 
earnings from this mineral but just 8 percent of real GDP73. The agriculture sector 
contributes just 19 percent of GDP but employs the majority of the workforce. 
Manufacturing has declined since the early 1990s; from 33 percent of GDP in 1991 to 
just 10 percent by 2001.  The services sector contributes over half of GDP, mainly 
from wholesale and retail activities, which also attracts a large amount of informal 
economic activity. 
 
Private consumption has also grown as a share of GDP from around 65 percent in the 
latter half of the 1980s, to close to 80 percent annually during 2000 – 2001. Inflation 
has slowed from triple figures in the mid 1990s, but remains around 24 percent 
annually during 1997 – 2001. The main causes of the high inflation are lax fiscal 
policy, weak exchange rates, and weather related fluctuations in food harvests and 
prices. The overall budget deficit has remained around 4 percent of GDP during 1997 
– 2001, an improvement from the average of 6 percent in the previous five years. 
Year to year fluctuations in the deficit are usually very sharp reflecting poor fiscal 
planning and a consistent over-budgeting of donor assistance74. High tax rates leave 
little scope for increasing revenue collections although the government hopes to 
achieve this through improved administration by the semi-autonomous Revenue 
Authority. 
 
Revenue and grants have declined over the past ten years from 29 percent of GDP in 
the first half of 1992 -2001 to 25 percent in the second half of that decade, mainly 
reflecting lower receipts of grants since revenues were stagnant around 19 percent of 
GDP throughout the period. Tax revenues increased as a share of total revenues over 
the comparative period from 94 percent to 97 percent. This increase is attributable to 
substantial increases in personal income, which rose from 20 percent of total revenues 
(3.9 percent of GDP) during 1992 – 1996 to 30 percent by 2001 (5.7 percent of GDP). 
Company income taxes lost some significance over the decade, as did trade taxes, 
though the latter remains important to revenues at close to 30 percent of total 
collections.  
 
Taxes on goods and services include the Value Added Tax since 1996, ad valorem 
excises on alcoholic beverages, tobacco products, hydrocarbon oil, mineral water and 
soft drinks, tires and the fuel levy, a specific excise on the wholesale price of 
gasoline75. The VAT in Zambia is applied at a standard rate of 17.5 percent, except 
for items scheduled to be zero-rated. Exemptions include the standard exemptions of 
food items, educational and health services as well as financial, residential real estate 
and transport services.  Diplomatic and other foreign missions are also exempt from 
both VAT and excises.  
                                                 
73 Zambia Economic Structure; http://www.sunvil.co.uk/africa/zambia/guidebook 
74 EIU Zambia Country Profile, 2003; 
http://db.eiu.com/report_dl.asp?mode=pdf&valname=CPZMD801 
75 Zambia, Summary of the Tax system as at July 1, 1997; Annex 1 
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From a sales tax to VAT during the 1990s, revenue collections were around 15.5 
percent of the total or 3 percent of GDP. Excise tax collections are also around 3 
percent of GDP but while VAT collections declined somewhat in recent periods, 
excises have strengthened (albeit by a difference of less than .1 percent of GDP). It is 
not clear as yet whether this is a new trend in collections.  
 
 
Table 4.12   Zambia, Budget Aggregates and Revenue Composition, 
Averages for 1993 - 97 and 1998 – 2002 
(Fiscal Year ending Dec 31) 
 Percentages 
  1993–97 1998–2002 
Total expenditures (including net lending) as share of GDP  33.1 27.8 
Total Revenue + Grants as share of GDP 27.5 23.5 
Overall surplus (deficit) as share of GDP -5.6 -4.3 
Revenue sources as shares of (Total revenue + Grants)   
Grants 29.6 25.9 
Non-tax revenue 4.5 1.7 
Tax Revenue 65.9 72.4 
Indirect Taxes  45.0 45.0 
General sales tax/VAT 14.4 21.9 
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Zimbabwe 
 
Zimbabwe is a low-income country with average per capita income of USD620 in the 
decade to 2002. However, income has been declining since 1998, with negative 
growth rates deepening each year, reaching 12.8 percent in real terms in 2002. After a 
steady decline in the early 1990s, inflation has begun to speed up since 1995 reaching 
over 70 percent by 2001. Private consumption is lower than most countries in the 
region at around 67 percent of GDP in the latter 1990s to 2001.  
 
Zimbabwe’s total revenues including grants increased from an average of 27.5 percent 
of GDP during the fiscal years of 1991 to 1995 to 31.2 percent of GDP during 1996 to 
2001. Notwithstanding this improvement, total expenditures increased more than 
proportionately over the corresponding period resulting in a widening of the overall 
deficit before grants from 8.8 percent of GDP to 12.2 percent. Even as grants declined 
in the latter 1990s, Zimbabwe began to accumulate foreign interest arrears. The latter 
averaged 0.6 percent of GDP during 1996 – 2001, covering close to 2 percent of the 
deficit.  
 
Tax revenues comprise over 93 percent of total revenues in Zimbabwe, up from 90 
percent in the first half of decade to 2001. Individual income tax have increased by 
close to 9 percentage points since 1991 to reach over 40 percent of total collections, or 
11.5 percent of GDP, by 2000. In contrast income tax from companies has fallen to 10 
percent of revenues (around 3 percent of GDP) from over 17 percent (4.6 percent of 
GDP) in 1992.  
 
Indirect taxes averaged over 11 percent of GDP over the decade 1991 – 2001, mostly 
reflecting sales taxes on domestic goods. Customs duty collections declined by 0.7 
percentage points of GDP comparing the first to the latter half of that decade. Sales 
taxes and excise duties increased steadily over the decade averaging around 5 percent 
of GDP over the decade (18.7 percent of total revenues) and reaching close to 6 
percent of GDP by 2001, (22 percent of total collections). Other taxes collections 
received a boast of 0.5 percent of GDP from the collection of tobacco levy from 
1995FY.  
 
The single-staged sales tax in Zimbabwe had been in place since 1976.  In 2004 it was 
replaced by a Value Added Tax. The sales tax was applied on all goods sold locally, 
as well as services, at a standard rate of 15 percent. A 25 percent rate applied to motor 
vehicles whole a 10 percent rate applied to commercial vehicles listed and the supply 
of electricity. Registration was compulsory on all auto dealers, auctioneers and 
financial agents, service traders with over Z$500,000 in turnover and goods traders 
with turnover over Z$2.5 million; it was voluntary for traders below Z$2.5 million but 
over Z$250,000. Registered traders in the ‘ring’ system are exempted from payment 
of sales taxes. Exemptions could be granted through discretion by the Minister and 
also included exports, agriculture output by select farmers, goods for resale, goods for 
manufacturing input or packaging, goods for use by a miner in mining, and 
construction material. Certain food items were also exempt including bread, milk, 
maize, paraffin oil and livestock.  When the VAT replaced the sales tax, the minimum 
annual turnover for compulsory registration was set at Z$250 million and voluntary 
registration was allowed for turnovers over Z$200 million. 
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Table 4.13.   Zimbabwe, Budget Aggregates and Revenue Composition, 
Averages for 1993 - 97 and 1998 – 2002 
(Fiscal Year ending June 30 till 1997, December 31 from 1998) 
 Percentages 
  1992/933–96/97 1998–2002 
Total expenditures (including net lending) as share of GDP 33.6 41.3 
Total Revenue + Grants as share of GDP 27.1 31.3 
Overall surplus (deficit) as share of GDP -6.5 -10.0 
Revenue sources as shares of (Total revenue + Grants)   
Grants 6.2 2.5 
Non-tax revenue 10.4 6.0 
Tax Revenue 83.4 91.5 
Indirect Taxes  39.1 39.6 
General sales tax 16.6 20.6 
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V.   Identification of fiscal problems in more detail 
 
Consumption taxes, and the VAT in particular supported by selective excise taxes 
represent a major source of central government revenues in SADC countries.  What 
are some of the dimensions of the revenue challenge that VAT may be expected to 
meet?  As outlined above, governments face a range of fiscal challenges arising from 
changes in trade tax regimes, the need to eventually substitute for aid flows, and the 
need to bring deficits under control.  What is the nature and height of these fiscal 
hurdles? 
 
 Consumption taxes as a substitute for trade taxes:  expected efficiency and 
revenue gains   
 
VAT is ultimately a tax on final consumption.  It does not tax capital investment and 
intermediate goods.   If VAT is used as a substitute for import taxes on final 
consumption goods, then to the extent that these goods are also produced domestically 
the tax base of the VAT is larger than that on imports.  In addition, the price of these 
tradable goods will be determined by the world market such that if VAT replaces the 
import duty at an equal rate no change in the price will be faced by domestic 
consumers.  With the larger tax base, the VAT can collect more taxes without raising 
the consumer price.  At the same time the effective subsidy to domestic producers 
from trade protection in the product market is removed along with the economic 
efficiency losses caused by this protective subsidy.  Therefore, higher revenues can be 
raised at a lower economic efficiency cost per unit of revenues.  This describes the 
typical economic efficiency and revenue gains expected from using consumption 
taxes to substitute for trade taxes.   
 
By contrast to this typical situation, it is common for reforms in trade regimes to 
result in situations where the changes in the import taxes do not lower the domestic 
prices of tradable goods faced by consumers.  For example, when the VAT is imposed 
at a rate higher than the customs duty it is replacing as a source of revenue, the prices 
faced by consumers increase and the consumption base is reduced, making it more 
difficult for the VAT to replace the forgone revenues.  This situation arises variously 
for SADC Member States.   
   
Changes in trade tax regimes: SADC and SACU 
 
As outlined above, SADC has a timetable to achieve a Free Trade Area (FTA) by 
2008, a Customs Union by 2010, a Common Market by 2015 and Monetary Union by 
2016. SACU is already a customs (and excise) union. 
 
SADC countries face a range of different types of revenue risks from these anticipated 
changes in their trade tax regimes. 
 
Revenue losses resulting from establishing a common market 
One type of revenue loss arises from the creation of trading blocs (free trade areas or 
customs unions or common markets) in which the customs duties on internal trade 
between member countries is foregone. The creation of the SADC FTA will result in 
revenue losses for the Member States.  The implementation of the new SACU 
agreement also poses a different set of revenue risks to some SACU (also SADC) 
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members, particularly the Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland (BLNS) 
countries.   
 
Revenue losses resulting from tariff changes 
Another type of loss comes about with the trade liberalization in the external tariff.  
Such changes in the tariffs on final and intermediate goods, however, can be more or 
less easily substituted for by consumption taxes.   
 
Loss in revenues from lowering internal tariffs, however, poses a more challenging 
problem than losses from lowering external tariffs.  When internal tariffs are lowered, 
but external tariffs remain unchanged, then the price level within the common market 
relative to the prices in rest of the world remains unchanged, and therefore, increases 
in consumption taxes will raise domestic prices causing consumption to be squeezed.  
In addition, creating a free trade area behind external trade barriers causes trade 
diversion away from imports charged at the external tariff towards goods produced 
within the area that do not pay trade taxes, increasing revenue losses.   To some extent 
these are recaptured through higher income taxes on expanded production within the 
region. 
 
By contrast, when external tariffs are lowered on final consumption goods, domestic 
prices fall, allowing room to raise consumption taxes to recoup the revenues without 
raising prices above their prior level.  This is not the case when tariffs are lowered on 
imports of intermediate inputs as the consumption tax, such as a credit-method VAT, 
is deductible on intermediate inputs so such the customs revenues have to be replaced 
by consumption taxes on final goods which raises domestic prices, squeezing demand. 
 
SADC free trade area (FTA) agreement 
 
Under the SADC Trade Protocol signed in 1996, the establishment of a free trade area 
has been agreed.  The internal tariffs are to be eliminated in a phased manner by 
2012.76  SACU markets are generally expected to be open to non-SACU members by 
2008, and the reciprocal arrangement by 2012.  Table 5.1 shows some of the SADC 
non-SACU members are heavily dependent on revenues customs duties.    
 
The highest customs dependence among non-SACU members is Mauritius, but it has 
been gradually reducing its dependence, that is import duties have dropped from 9.5% 
of GDP or 42% of total revenues in 1992 down to 5.1% of GDP or 25% of total 
revenues in 2002.    The VAT introduced in 1998 has been systematically used to 
replace the customs revenues.     
 
Amongst the other non-SACU countries, only the countries of Malawi, Mozambique, 
Zambia and Zimbabwe have significant import duty revenues at over 2% of GDP.   
These countries also import large shares of the imports from South Africa and can 
expect to lose a third or more of their customs revenues, or from about 0.7% to 1.3% 
of GDP.  The other non-SACU countries can expect to lose less than 0.5% of GDP. 
 
                                                 
76  World Trade Organization, Trade Policy Review: Southern African Customs Union, Report by the 
Secretariat, WT/TPR/S/114, 24 March 2003, pp 13-14. 
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The SACU members are highly dependent on customs revenues, except for South 
Africa and to a lesser extent Botswana.   Given SACU imports from the other SADC 
members are relatively small, SACU members will not suffer much as a result of the 
lowering the internal tariff within SADC.  The BLNS countries have already long 
since lost any internal trade protection within SACU.  
 
Conclusion 
As illustrated above it is important to distinguish between the losses of revenues that 
arise from reduction of tariffs on internal trade, from those which arises from external 
tariff liberalization.  In the latter case, where the tariff reduction results in reductions 
in the domestic prices of final consumption goods, it is easier to raise consumption 
taxes to replace import duties.  Where trade agreements reduce internal trade tariffs, 
domestic price do not necessarily fall, and hence, replacing customs revenues with 
consumption taxes, such as VAT, is more difficult. 
 
New SACU agreement:  effect on revenue income 
 
Under the new SACU Agreement signed in October 2002 (but still awaiting 
ratification by all member countries), the revenue sharing formula will change.  Under 
the current formula, which has been used since 1969 with the addition of a 
stabilization formula in 1976, customs and excise revenues have been collected into 
one SACU pool managed by South Africa.  The BLNS countries have each been paid 
a share of the pool based on their gross-of-tax imports both from other SACU 
members and non-SACU member countries.  The BLNS countries each receive 
revenues based on an adjusted duty rate equal to 1.42 times the effective duty rate for 
the overall SACU pool.  In addition, the stabilization formula guarantees the adjusted 
effective duty rate falls between a minimum of 17% and maximum of 23%.  This has 
resulted in the BLNS countries in nearly all years receiving 17% of their gross-of-tax 
imports.   South Africa has retained the balance after payments to the BLNS 
countries.     
 
Table A.1 in Appendix A shows the customs and excise collections received by the 
SACU pool and the shares paid out to the BLNS countries over 1989/90 through 
2000/01.  On average over the last five years BLNS countries were receiving about 
40% of SACU revenues, but this constituted only 8.4% of SACU GDP.  The weights 
in favor of the BLNS country shares of SACU revenues have reflected the loss of 
revenues suffered by these countries given the trade imbalance between South Africa 
and the BLNS countries.  This disproportional share of revenues has been appropriate 
for sharing customs duties, but not excise duties.  In addition, Table A.1 shows an 
increasing share of SACU revenues coming from excise duties, rising from below 
40% to about 55% of revenues.   
 
In the new revenue sharing formula the SACU pool is split into a separate customs 
pool and an excise pool.  The customs revenues will be shared in proportion to the 
imports from SACU countries as a share of all intra-SACU trade, while 85% of the 
excise pool will be shared in proportion to GDP and the remaining 15% will be split 
between the SACU members with a small adjustment of 2% of the of the relative 
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difference of the per capita GDP from the SACU average.77  A recent WTO review of 
SACU trade policy estimated the revenue shares based on 1998/99 data trade and 
GDP data.  See Appendix A.   Table 5.2 shows the impact of the new formula using 
these weights and comparing the results with the actual shares under the current 
formula on average during the five years of 1996/97-2000/01. 
 
Table 5.1:  Revenues from Customs Duties for SADC Member States as 
Share of GDP and Share of Total Revenues, Average for Fiscal 
Years, 1997- 2001 
       
          
Customs 
duties as 
share of GDP
Customs 
duties as 
share of total 
revenues 
   Percentage 
Non-SACU members      
 Angola    1.7 4.5 
 DRC    1.6 26.1 
 Malawi    2.7 18.7 
 Mauritius    6.0 29.5 
 Mozambique    2.1 17.0 
 Tanzania    1.5 12.3 
 Zambia    2.4 13.1 
 Zimbabwe    3.9 14.0 
SACU members  
SACU revenue as 
share of GDP 
SACU revenue as share 
of total revenue     
 Botswana  5.5 12.7 2.4 5.5 
 Lesotho (%GDP)  21.4 48.6 9.4 21.3 
 Lesotho (%GNDI)  14.8  6.5  
 Namibia  9.9 30.6 4.3 13.4 
 Swaziland  14.3 49.8 6.2 21.7 
       
  South Africa   1.1 4.3 0.5 1.9 
 
 
Implications of the new SACU formula 
The new revenue sharing formula will more than double the share that the BLNS 
countries receive from the customs duty pool compared to the current combined 
SACU pool, but will lose more than half their share coming from the excise revenue 
pool.  Correspondingly, the share that South Africa will receive from the customs 
pool will decline from 59.7% to 20.5% (based on 1996/97-2000/01 data) and the 
share from the excise pool will rise from 59.7% to about 81.7%.  In combination, the 
gains and losses from the two pools are somewhat offsetting compared to the current 
formula.  Using 1998/99 import and GDP data, Table 5.3 compares the revenue shares 
of the SACU countries under the current and new formulas assuming different shares 
                                                 
77 Each of the five countries will get 20% of 15% of the excise pool.  The 20% will be adjusted for 
deviations in the per capita income from the average of all SACU countries.  A country with double the 
average per capita income will have its share reduced by 2 percentage points, while a country with half 
the average per capita income will have its share increased by 1 percentage point. 
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of SACU revenue coming from excises and customs duties.  With an average of 55% 
of SACU revenues being collected from excise duties, compared to the average shares 
during 1996/97-2000/01, the share received by South Africa will fall by 5.6 
percentage points with the BLNS countries sharing the corresponding gains. (The 
shares have to add up to 100%.)   Given SACU revenues form a relatively small share 
of the South Africa budget (about 4 to 5%), this shift will not be disruptive in the 
short term.  In the long term, however, the share of SACU revenues coming from 
excise duties can be expected to increase as incomes grow and trade liberalization 
reduces the importance of customs revenues. 
 
Table 5.2   Estimated shares of SACU revenue pool under current and new formula 
        
  
Internal 
import 
share GDP share 
85% of 
excise 
share GDP per capita
Development 
share 
15% of 
excise share
Current shares of 
SACU pool 
Country 1998/99 1998/99   1998/99     Average 96/97-00/01 
     (Rand)      
Botswana 26.6% 3.5% 3.0% 17,968 18.7% 2.8% 12.7% 
        
Lesotho 13.4% 0.6% 0.5% 2,395 21.5% 3.2% 7.4% 
        
Namibia 24.9% 2.1% 1.8% 9,615 20.3% 3.0% 12.8% 
        
Swaziland 14.6% 0.9% 0.8% 7,024 20.7% 3.1% 7.3% 
        
South Africa 20.5% 92.8% 78.9% 17,587 18.8% 2.8% 59.7% 
        
Average    10,916    
 
 
Table 5.3.  Estimated changes in revenue shares of SACU revenue pool under new 
sharing formula and different shares of excise revenue in SACU pool 
       
  
Current 
shares of 
SACU pool 
Combined 
new formula 
shares with 
55% excise 
Change in share 
(new minus 
current) with 
55% excise 
Combined 
new formula 
shares with 
70% excise 
Change in share 
(new minus 
current) with 
70% excise 
Change in total 
revenues under 
new formula and 
70% excise 
Country 
Average 
96/97-00/01 1998/99   1998/99     
            
Botswana 12.7% 15.2% 2.4% 12.0% -0.7% -0.7% 
       
Lesotho 7.4% 8.1% 0.7% 6.6% -0.7% -4.9% 
       
Namibia 12.8% 13.9% 1.1% 10.9% -2.0% -4.7% 
       
Swaziland 7.3% 8.7% 1.4% 7.1% -0.2% -1.4% 
       
South Africa 59.7% 54.2% -5.6% 63.3% 3.6% 0.3% 
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If the share of excise duties increases, this will benefit South Africa significantly as it 
expects to get about 80% of its SACU revenues from the excise revenue pool.  If the 
share of SACU revenues increases from 55% to 70%, for example, and weights from 
the import and GDP shares stay about the same as in 1998/99, then Table 5.3 shows 
that the share of the pool received by South Africa would increase by 3.6 percentage 
points rather than decrease by 5.6 percentage points.  The BLNS countries would 
experience corresponding cuts in their total SACU revenue shares.   As changes in the 
shares of the pool, these look modest, but as relative changes in SACU revenues they 
are large, particularly for Lesotho and Namibia. For Lesotho, which receives about 
49% of its total revenues from SACU (see Table 5.1 above), this would represent a 
5% cut in its total revenues.  Namibia would experience similar relative losses in total 
revenues.    
 
The new formula uses GDP of the member countries as a proxy of consumption to 
distribute the excise pool of revenues.  For some countries GDP is not a good proxy 
for consumption as the Gross National Disposable Income (GNDI) that determines 
the consumption possibilities of the country differs markedly from the GDP because 
of significant Net Foreign Income and Net Transfers.  Where GNDI is approximately 
equal to GDP, consumption typically falls in a range of about 60% to 80% of GDP.  
Lesotho is an extreme case, where GNDI exceeds GDP by about 50%, and hence, 
consumption actually exceeds GDP.  For similar, but not so extreme reasons, 
consumption in Swaziland is about 95% of GDP.   If consumption is used to share the 
excise pool rather than GDP, Table 5.4 shows that Lesotho and Swaziland would get 
increased shares, while Botswana would get a lower share and South Africa and 
Namibia would remain about unchanged.   For Lesotho, it would increase its SACU 
revenues by about 1 to 2% of its total revenues. 
 
Table 5.4.  Impact of using consumption rather than GDP to divide SACU 
excise revenue pool 
       
Country 
Consumption 
share GDP share 
Difference in 
shares 
(consumption 
minus GDP)
Combined new 
formula shares 
with 70% excise 
based on 
consumption 
Change in 
share (new 
minus 
current) 
Change in total 
revenues 
under new 
formula and 
70% excise 
 
Average 
96/97-00/01 
Average 
96/97-00/01         
Botswana 2.7% 3.7% -1.0% 11.5% -1.2% -1.2% 
       
Lesotho 0.9% 0.6% 0.3% 6.8% -0.5% -3.5% 
       
Namibia 2.4% 2.4% 0.0% 11.0% -1.8% -4.2% 
       
Swaziland 1.1% 1.0% 0.2% 7.2% -0.1% -0.7% 
       
South Africa 92.8% 92.3% 0.5% 63.3% 3.6% 0.3% 
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Overall, in the early years of introducing the new SACU revenue sharing formula, the 
BLNS countries are expected to gain in revenues, but with further reductions of the 
external SACU tariff over time, possible increases in excise yields as incomes rise, 
and/or excise rate increases, the BLNS countries could experience significant revenue 
losses compared to current SACU revenues.   These revenue losses, largely from 
lower customs duties, would be accompanied by decreases in domestic prices that 
would open up opportunities to increase consumption taxes, such as the VAT, to 
replace these revenue losses. 
 
 
5.2 Foreign aid dependence 
 
A number of countries in SADC are receiving a high level of foreign aid.  Table 5.5   
gives the reported Official Development Assistance (ODA) as a share of the recipient 
country GDP between 19997-2001 from the Organization of Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC) countries.   
 
Four countries have been in excess of 10%, namely:  Zambia (31.6%), Malawi 
(27.0%), Mozambique (25.0%) and Tanzania (12.0%).  Six countries received 2% or 
more of GDP as ODA during 1997-2001, namely: Angola, DRC, Lesotho, Namibia, 
Swaziland and Zimbabwe.  This leaves only Botswana, Mauritius and South Africa 
receiving less than 2% in ODA.  Actual grants reported in central government budgets 
during this period are lower.   Three countries report more than 5% of GDP in grants: 
Zambia (6.2%), Malawi (6.0%) and Mozambique (10.3%), while a further seven 
report grants received of 1% or more.   In addition, six countries report net foreign 
financing flows (mainly concessional loans from development agencies) in excess of 
2% of GDP namely:  Malawi (5.2%), Zambia (4.2%), Mozambique (3.9%), DRC 
(3.4%), and Lesotho (2.2%). 78  
 
While it is not expected that any significant aid cut backs will occur in the medium 
term, since the early 1990s aid flows in real terms have been declining and in the 
long-run countries are expected to grow and graduate out of aid dependency.  High 
aid dependency also exposes countries to the risks of short-term disruptions in aid 
flows.  Among the SADC Member States, the central government budgets of six 
countries show a combined grant and net foreign financing of over 3% of GDP, 
namely:  Mozambique, Malawi, Zambia, DRC, Lesotho and Tanzania.   Except for 
Lesotho, these aid flows form more than 25% of the total expenditures of the other 
five SADC countries.  Hence, these countries face significant long-run challenges to 
increase their revenues or cut expenditures to replace these resource flows.   
 
Conclusion 
It is important to note that the order of magnitude of the fiscal challenge of replacing 
aid revenue is larger than that arising from the implementation of trade agreements 
and external trade liberalization.   VAT as a broad-based consumption tax can play a 
role over the long run in reducing aid dependence.   
                                                 
78 Official Development Assistance (ODA) includes grants (in cash and kind) and net concessional 
loan disbursements as reported by the donor countries.   Actual grants and net foreign financing 
receipts reported in the central government budgets is typically less (sometimes by wide margins) than 
the ODA given a significant share of ODA may flow outside of the government budget and is not 
effectively captured by in the government accounts.   
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Table 5.5:  Official Development Assistance, Grants, Deficits and Net Foreign Financing 
as Share of GDP, SADC Member States, Average 1997-2001 
    
Total Expenditure 
(including net 
lending) 
Official 
Development 
Assistance Grants 
Overall 
Deficit  
Net Foreign 
Financing 
Grants and 
Net Foreign 
Financing as 
share of Total 
Expenditure 
  Percentage of GDP Percentage  
Angola  46.0  4.5  2.4  (2.7) (2.3) 0.1  
Botswana  39.8  1.6  0.5  4.5  (2.8) (5.7) 
DRC  9.4  3.7  3.4  (6.4) 3.4  72.9  
Lesotho (%GDP)  50.4  6.0  3.0  (3.0) 2.2  11.0  
Lesotho (%GNDI)  35.0  4.2  2.1  (2.1) 1.5    
Malawi  27.9  27.0  6.0  (5.0) 5.2  40.2  
Mauritius  23.3  0.8  2.9  (2.6) (0.2) 11.7  
Mozambique  26.0  25.0  10.3  (3.7) 3.9  54.6  
Namibia  36.6  4.6  0.3  (3.5) Na na 
South Africa  29.5  0.4  0.1  (3.3) 0.8  3.2  
Swaziland  29.6  2.0  0.7  (0.2) 0.4  3.7  
Tanzania  16.9  12.0  3.8  (1.0) 0.7  26.6  
Zambia  29.2  31.6  6.2  (4.1) 4.2  35.8  
Zimbabwe   41.5  3.4  1.0  (10.2) (0.7) 0.8  
 
 
5.3 Government expenditures and overall deficits and macroeconomic 
convergence in SADC 
 
Closely related to the fiscal issue of aid dependence, is the issue of the fiscal demands 
of high total expenditures of most of the central governments of SADC Member 
States along with high overall budget deficits.  Table 5.5 shows that except for DRC 
and Tanzania, the total expenditures exceed 20% of GDP during 1997-2001.  In two 
cases, Angola and Zimbabwe, it is over 40%.  In three cases, Botswana, Lesotho,79 
and Namibia it is over 30%.  In the remaining six countries, five are over 25% and 
only Mauritius is over 20%, but under 25%.  At the same time, seven of the SADC 
countries maintained average deficit levels during 1997-2001 of over 3% of GDP, and 
except for South Africa, Namibia and Zimbabwe, these deficits were largely being 
covered by net foreign financing.   Under the SADC Memorandum of Understanding 
on Macroeconomic Convergence (that similar to the SADC Tax MOU was signed in 
2002, and also will be subsumed into the SADC Finance and Investment Protocol) 
member countries will in the long run have to maintain inflation and deficit to GDP 
ratios at or below about 3%.  In addition, stocks of public and publicly guaranteed 
debt will have to be kept below 60% of GDP.  A combination of revenue and 
expenditure measures, including indirect taxes on consumption such as VAT will 
need to be used achieve these macroeconomic targets 
 
                                                 
79 In the case of Namibia, Gross National Disposable Income exceeds GDP by 44% over 1997-2001.  
Hence, it is more reasonable to report the size of government relative to the total expenditure 
possibilities of Lesotho at 33.3% of GNDI rather than 47.9% of GDP. 
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Large size governments need to be financed and this creates a revenue problem. This 
can be solved either by reducing the size of government or by raising additional tax 
revenues, for example through consumption taxes such as VAT or by other means.  
Table 5.7 shows some international comparisons of total expenditures and revenues 
(non-tax plus tax revenues) for different income and regional groupings of countries 
over 1997-99.  As shown in Table 2.1 above, SADC countries, except for Botswana 
and Mauritius, are low and lower middle-income countries.  Table 5.7 shows 
internationally that, while expenditures and revenues as share of GDP tend to rise 
with income level on average, central government expenditures and revenues fall 
below 20% of GDP.   This contrasts expenditures with 10 out of the 13 SADC 
countries falling above 25% of GDP.   Table 5.7 also shows that governments in Sub-
Saharan African countries (which are mainly low and lower middle-income countries) 
have expenditures and revenues in excess of 20% of GDP.  SADC countries have 
similar, but somewhat larger governments than the Sub-Saharan average.  This 
contrasts with the countries in East Asia and the Pacific Region where government 
expenditures and revenues tend to fall below 20% of GDP.  At the same time, it is 
recognized that many of the countries that have sustained high growth rates in recent 
decades are in this region.   This suggests that consideration needs to be given to 
solving the fiscal demand challenges of loss of customs duties, reduction in aid and 
deficit control, at least in part, through reducing government expenditures as opposed 
to raising government revenues. 
    
 
Table 5.7.  Total Expenditures and Tax and Non-Tax Revenue by 
Income Group and Region, 1997-99 
   
Country Group 
Total expenditure 
(excluding net lending) 
Tax and Non-tax 
Revenue 
 Percentage of GDP 
Low income 17.7 14.7 
Lower middle income 19.6 15.8 
Upper middle income 23.9 22.3 
   
Sub-Saharan Africa 26.1 23.3 
East Asia & Pacific 13.7 10.8 
World Bank Development Indicators 2003 
 
 
Table 5.7 also illustrates a basic issue that needs further detailed analysis.   
Government revenue tends to increase as per capita income levels rise in a country.   
It is recognized that the capacity to raise revenues in low-income countries is limited 
by many structural factors such as large informal or non-monetary productive sectors.  
As economies grow and develop, these structural constraints decline and the ability to 
collect revenues efficiently and effectively increases.  To some extent, countries can 
be expected to “grow out” of their revenue problems as the structural constraints on 
revenue capacity are relaxed with growth and economic development.  This change in 
the structural features of an economy will also impact the effectiveness of the 
implementation of a VAT system.  Accordingly, the next Chapter analyzes the issues 
relating to tax capacity and effort across the SADC Member States. 
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VI.  Tax capacity and efficiency 
 
6.1  Introduction   
 
The size of government (or total government expenditures as a share of the economy) 
is a matter of public choice, but this choice is constrained by the characteristics of an 
economy that affect the feasibility and costs of raising revenues to finance 
government operations.  Certain features of an economy make for more or less cost-
effective revenue raising efforts.   
 
Features that lower the administrative and compliance costs of revenue collection are 
typically referred to as “tax handles.”  Good tax handles include imports forming a 
high of the economy, most imports entering through well-controlled sea, air or rail 
ports, large formal sector mining operations and a large share of business activities 
being conducted in large formal sector corporations.   
 
By contrast, other features of an economy can make for difficult tax collections.  
These include a large non-monetary or subsidence agriculture sector, a large informal 
or micro-business sector with poor books and records, a weak accounting profession, 
and low levels of literacy and numeracy which undermine the ability of the private 
sector to self-assess taxes such as income tax or VAT.   
 
These types of structural characteristic affect the “tax capacity” of a country or the 
feasibility of a country to administer different types of tax. 
 
This Chapter first sets out to explore the nature of the tax capacity and how this is 
evidenced in the actual tax performance of SADC Member States.   The role of 
various structural features of the SADC countries in explaining differences in tax 
yields will also be analyzed. This understanding helps with the understanding of the 
limits on the ability of a country to solve its public finance problems through higher 
tax yields such as from VAT and other taxes over the near and medium terms.    It 
also helps to explain differences in tax efficiency of the VAT and sales taxes across 
SADC Member States.  Tax efficiency is a measure of the effective tax base relative 
to estimates of the maximum tax base.   The constraints on the effective tax base will 
then be used to discuss the effects of limits on the relative size of the tax base on the 
price responsiveness of that tax base to increases in the VAT rate. 
 
 
6.2  Tax capacity  
 
Introduction 
The impact of the structural tax capacity features of a country shows up strongly when 
the level and composition of central government revenues is compared across 
different groupings of countries at different per capita income levels.  Table 6.1 gives 
the level and composition of central government revenues from the World Bank 
World Development Indicators (WDI) for 1997 or 1998 for groupings of countries 
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according to per capita income.80  These results show that overall central current 
revenues rise from the low-income group at 13.4% of GDP to the high-income group 
at 28.4% of GDP (and 36.9% of GDP among the European Monetary Union 
countries) in 1997-98.  Tax on international trade at 25.8% of current revenues is 
important among low-income countries, but is negligibly small among high-income 
countries.  Taxes on goods and services are important among country groupings.  
Taxes on income, and especially social security taxes (which are generally payroll or 
employment taxes), however, rise sharply from the low-income countries to the high-
income countries.  Combined income and social security taxes form only about 20% 
of current revenues among low-income countries to nearly 50% among high-income 
countries and about 64% among the European Monetary Union countries.   
 
  
Table 6.1.  Level and composition of central government revenues by country 
groups, 1997-8 
     Shares of current revenue 
Country Group Year    
Current 
revenue 
as share 
of GDP 
Tax 
revenue 
as share 
of GDP 
Tax 
revenue 
Taxes 
on 
trade 
Taxes on 
goods 
and 
services 
Taxes on 
income, 
profits, 
etc 
Social 
security 
taxes 
Other 
taxes 
Non-tax 
revenue 
   Percentages 
Low income 1998 
As 
reported 13.4 11.0 82.2 20.9 27.9 16.2 0.0 1.5 13.2 
Lower middle 
income 1998 
As 
reported 18.5 16.0 86.6 9.7 36.6 19.5 4.0 2.6 13.6 
Low income 1998 Adjusted 13.4 11.0 82.2 25.8 34.5 20.1 0.0 1.9 17.8 
Lower middle 
income 1998 Adjusted 18.5 16.0 86.6 11.6 43.7 23.3 4.7 3.2 13.4 
Upper middle 
income 1997 
As 
reported 19.9 17.7 88.9 4.3 39.5 16.2 28.2 3.6 10.5 
High income 1997 
As 
reported 28.4 25.9 91.2 0.04 27.3 28.6 19.7 15.5 8.6 
High income 
OECD 1997 
As 
reported 28.4 26.0 91.6 0.003 26.6 29.8 25.0 10.2 7.3 
European 
Monetary Union 1997 
As 
reported 36.9 33.6 91.1 0.0 26.0 29.7 33.4 2.0 6.4 
World Development Indicators 2004; author calculations 
 
 
Table 6.2 shows the pattern of levels and sources of revenues of all levels of 
government for Organization of Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
countries over time from 1870 through 1995.  These patterns of change are very 
similar to those observed across countries of different income levels in Table 6.1.  
Revenues rise from about 10% of GDP (even lower than amongst current low-income 
countries) in 1870 to about 43% of GDP in 1995.  The share of revenues from 
                                                 
80 Note that the shares of current revenue for different groupings of countries as reported in the WDI 
database do not necessarily add up to 100 per cent, particularly in the low income and lower middle 
income groups because of missing data and weighting problems in aggregating the data.  As a result, 
adjustments have been made to the shares of revenue by source to scale them such that they add up to 
one hundred percent. 
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international trade falls from about 17% of total government revenues (the share of 
central government revenues would have been higher) to negligible levels in 1995.  
Indirect taxes on goods and services remain important over the whole period.   Direct 
income taxes, including social security contributions rise dramatically over time, 
particularly after World War II, from 2.4% of GDP or 22.6% of revenues to 26.1% of 
GDP or 60.2% of revenues in 1995. 
 
 
 
Table 6.2.  All Levels of Government Revenues as a Share of GDP in 
OECD Countries, 1870-1995   
  Percentages 
                    
  
Share of 
revenues 
in 1870 
About 
1870 1913 WWI 1920 1937 WWII 1960 1980 
About 
1995 
Share of 
revenues 
in 1995 
Indirect taxes, 
customs 17.0 1.8 1.7  1.6 2.2    0.5 1.2 
Indirect taxes, 
domestic 28.3 3.0 3.0  3.4 4.9  11.6 11.8 13.5 31.1 
            
Direct taxes 22.6 2.4 2.6  3.2 3.4  9.5 13.5 14.0 32.3 
Social security 
contributions        7.1 10.5 12.1 27.9 
            
Other receipts 32.1 3.4      3.4 3.6 3.3 7.6 
Total 
revenues 100.0 10.6 11.8  19.2 21.6  28.7 40.1 43.4 100.0 
Vito Tanzi and Ludger Schukenecht, Public Spending in the 20th Century 
Items do not always add to total in year due to missing values for member countries in some years  
 
 
These patterns reflect the need for low-income countries to rely on tax handles such as 
border collections on trade as well as the difficulties of collecting direct taxes that 
require both formal business accounting practices and income levels of individuals to 
be high enough above some minimum threshold to be subject to tax.   Low-income 
countries are often characterized by factors that make the collection of tax infeasible, 
expensive and/or unproductive.  These include:  
 
(i) significant non-monetary sectors (or subsistence agricultural sectors);  
(ii) a large share of the economic activity in the agricultural sector resulting in 
widely dispersed business activity with much of it conducted by small 
scale farmers with poor books and records;  
(iii) large numbers of informal businesses in small scale agriculture, 
manufacturing, trade and services that mainly operate without books and 
records;  
(iv) large unskilled labor force with wages levels that are largely income-tax 
exempt or only in falling in the lowest tax brackets;  
(v) weak accounting standards and relative few professional accountants to 
maintain books and records for tax purposes; and  
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(vi) low educational attainment or relatively high illiteracy rates that make 
compliance with self-assessed taxes such as the income tax or VAT 
difficult.   
 
Even in a low-income country, however, there may be some tax handles that raise its 
revenue raising potential such as a relatively large volume of imports flowing through 
a well-managed port, or large mining operations of multinational corporations that are 
make significant profits and exporting most of their product.  As per capita incomes 
grow in most economies, however, many of the adverse factors on tax administration 
and compliance decline and at the same time the share of workers with higher and 
taxable incomes grows.  Growth in per capita income and income taxes on this 
income has proved to be the major source of revenue across countries.  
 
While central government tax revenues from indirect consumption taxes grow around 
4% of GDP to a range of 9% to12% of GDP moving from low to high-income 
countries in Table 6.1, tax revenues from the income taxes (including social security 
taxes) rise rapidly across the income levels of countries:  low, 3%; lower middle, 5%; 
upper middle, 9%, and high, 14% of GDP.  Amongst the high-income countries, 
income and social security taxes are 16% of GDP for OECD countries, and 23% of 
GDP for the European Monetary Union Countries.  At all levels of government, 
OECD countries averaged some 26% of GDP in direct income and social security 
taxes in 1995.   
 
Structural features constrain the ability of low income countries to collect taxes on 
income, but as income levels grow and the middle class becomes a high share of the 
economy in the middle income countries, income taxes, particularly payroll taxes, 
become more feasible for more persons and the base grows rapidly as individuals both 
become taxable and also move up into higher tax brackets.  At higher income levels, 
the issue becomes one of choice of the size and role of government rather than the 
constraints on revenue collections in a country deciding on a target yield for taxes.   In 
addition, once top tax rates have been set, tax revenues as a share of the economy are 
limited by these rate choices and will approach maximum shares as the efficiency of 
any tax rises (or the share of the economy subject to these maximum rates approaches 
its maximum potential.)    
 
As shown in Table 2.1 above, SADC Member States range from low to upper middle- 
income countries.  The issues of the importance of structural features of the economy 
limiting the tax yield are still important, but greater degrees of freedom in taxation 
exist for the upper middle-income countries.   
 
Explanation of economic analysis 
To analyze the importance of structural features in limiting tax yields (tax revenues as 
a share of GDP) across countries, comparisons of the tax yield across SADC Member 
States will be made taking into account the effects of a number of structural 
characteristics such as per capital income, the importance of imports, the relative size 
of the agricultural sector and the level of literacy of the adult population.   These 
comparisons will be achieved using standard economic regression techniques, but this 
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analysis will introduce a number of innovations not included in previous studies, 81 to 
account for the changes in incentives to governments to collect taxes when other 
sources of revenue such as foreign aid grants or non-tax revenues are available and 
the external imbalances of the economy that affect the size of consumption tax bases, 
such as net inflows of foreign factor income or transfers.    
 
The basic model that will be estimated is  
 
T/Y   =  α + β1lnYpc + β2 (Ypc)2 + β3X3  + …..+ βiXi  + βi+1Zi+1  + …..+ βjZj   + βkT   + ε 
 
The elements of this model are explained in more detail below.  In general: 
  
• T/Y is the tax yield (or tax effort) that make up the tax revenues of a central 
government as share of GDP,   
• Ypc is the per capita income of each country expressed in a quadratic of the 
natural logarithm of per capita income to allow for the changing impact of per 
capita income at different income levels,  
• X i  are the structural features of the economy that affect the capacity to raise 
tax revenues,  
• Zj  are the characteristics of other revenue sources affect the incentives to 
collect taxes, and 
• T is time, which is included to capture the net affect of all omitted variables 
that have a systematic affect on the tax yield over time, and ε is random 
normal variable that captures the unexplained variations in the tax yield.   
 
This linear specification is the usual specification used and is appropriate as it allows 
for the independent effects of different structural features.  A relationship of the 
logarithm of tax effort explained by the logarithm of the structural variable assumes 
that they have multiplicative effects on the tax yield such that improvements in any 
one structural feature has a larger impact the more favorable are all other structural 
features.  (See Piancastelli (2001), Ebrill et al (2001), and Katusiime (2003))82.  
 
While some synergies no doubt exist, it is not necessarily true in all and certainly not 
in many important cases.  For example, large mining sectors or large share of imports 
in countries with otherwise unfavorable tax collection characteristics under a 
multiplicative model would make relatively low impacts on revenue collection 
performance, but in countries with good revenue collection characteristics they would 
make large impacts on its revenue yield.  While to some extent this may be the case, 
                                                 
81 A.R.Prest “ The Taxable Capacity of a Country” in Toye J.F. (ed), Taxation and Economic 
Development, London,1979; Richard Goode, Government Finance in Developing Countries, 
Brookings Institution, Washington DC (1984), Chap 4.  
 
82  Piancastelli only presents estimates of tax yield as log-log specification, while Katusiime presents 
the log-log as an alternative specification.   Ebrill et al explain the log (θ/(1−θ), where θ is a measure of 
the revenue ratio, in terms of the logs of explanatory variables. 
Marcelo Piancastelli, Measuring the Tax Effort of Developed and Developing Countries, Cross 
Country Panel Data Analysis –1985/95, IPEA, Rio Janeiro, Brazil, 2001   
Liam Ebrill, Michael Keen, Jean Paul Bodin and Victoria Summers, The Modern VAT, International 
Monetary Fund (2001) 
Frank M. Katusiime, “Measuring Tax Performance among Esat African Countries’” URA Fiscal 
Bulletin, Vol 2 (no 1) June 2003, pp 1-50 
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an economy with generally poor revenue capacity is likely to focus its limited revenue 
collection resources on the mining sector or import flows, whereas a higher capacity 
economy may put a more modest effort into collecting from the mining sector or 
imports given its range of alternative sources.   Good tax handles can clearly benefit 
low-income countries despite otherwise unfavorable tax collection characteristics. 
 
The range of structural features that can be used to explain the tax yield in a country is 
limited by the availability of data across countries.   For example, data on the number 
and quality of accountants is not generally available across countries.  Typically, the 
value added in the agricultural sector as a share of the economy is used to capture the 
importance of the unfavorable characteristics of this sector on tax collections.  The 
structure of agricultural sectors across countries, however, may vary in ways that 
impact tax collections.   For example, an agricultural sector dominated by large 
corporate farms producing cash crops is different, tax-wise, from one dominated by 
small farmers producing food crops.   These limitations in the data have to be 
recognized in making cross-country comparisons. 
 
Annual data is used in this analysis that covers the fiscal years of SADC Member 
States ending in 1990 through to 2001 and is drawn from the best available data on 
the fiscal operations and national economy.  The fiscal operations data is typically 
drawn from the IMF Government Financial Statistics and the country reports of the 
IMF published on the internet from time to time.   
 
In a few cases, gaps in data were filled directly from country data where these were 
available.  In calculating ratios of taxes or other variables to GDP care was taken to 
ensure that the GDP was adjusted to cover the same time period as the taxes or other 
revenues.  It is noted that a number of studies that rely on the World Bank data in the 
World Development Indicators (WDI) data sets have systematic biases affecting 
cross-country comparisons.  For example, a country with a fiscal year end of June 30 
such as Tanzania, and national accounts reported for a calendar year, WDI will report 
the tax yield for the fiscal year end using the GDP measure for the prior year giving 
an upward bias to the yield compared to a country that has its fiscal and national 
accounts covering the same period (such as both reported for the calendar year as for 
Zambia.)    Socio-economic data are generally captured from the WDI database or the 
United Nations statistics.    The average values and available observations for the key 
variables of the revenue yield and economic structure for the SADC Member States 
are shown in Table 6.3 below. 
 
Non-monetary, informal sectors and agricultural sectors 
One feature of an economy that affects the potential tax yield is the size of the non-
monetary sector.   This is typically characterized by subsistence agriculture and self-
supplied housing.   In economies such as Malawi and Tanzania, these are estimated to 
be significant shares of GDP, and hence, raise issues of comparability of tax capacity 
across countries.   Malawi national accounts report the self-consumed production of 
smallholder farmers as an estimate of the non-monetary sector valued in GDP.  
Between 1994-2003, the non-monetary sector in Malawi is reported by the National 
Statistical Office to have grown from 18.5% to 27.4% of GDP as the relative size of 
the smallholder-farming sector has grown.  National accounts reported by the Central  
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Table 6.3.  Average values of tax yield and other explanatory variables for SADC Member States for 1990-2001 
(Percentages unless otherwise specified) 
   Angola  
 
Botswana  DRC   Lesotho   Malawi   Mauritius  Mozambique  Namibia   South Africa Swaziland  Tanzania  Zambia   Zimbabwe 
Per capita income (Ypc) 
(1995 constant US$) $  492 $ 3,161 $ 135 $ 505 $ 155 $ 3,461 $ 169 $ 2,156 $ 3,952 $ 1,368 $ 183 $ 418 $ 639 
Tax revenues over GDP (T/Y) 37.8 21.6 3.5 35.6 15.4 18.5 11.0 28.8 23.6 26.8 11.1 18.2 24.5 
Non-tax revenue over GDP 
(NT/Y) 0.4 22.8 0.6 7.4 1.5 2.6 1.0 3.5 1.6 1.9 3.1 0.8 2.4 
Total Revenue over GDP 
(TR/Y) 38.2 44.3 4.1 42.9 14.2 21.1 12.0 32.4 25.2 28.7 14.2 19.0 26.8 
Grants over GDP (G/Y) 2.3 1.0 2.2 5.4 6.0 0.2 10.4 0.9 0.2 0.8 2.8 8.4 1.3 
Net Factor Receipts plus Net 
Transfers over GDPO 
((NTr+NFR)/Y) (9.5) 2.0 (7.5) 81.5 0.9 2.4 6.3 14.8 (4.5) 12.2 5.9 (2.7) (2.0) 
Gross National Disposable 
Income (GNDI/Y) 90.5 102.0 92.5 181.5 100.9 102.4 106.3 114.8 95.5 112.2 105.9 97.3 98.0 
Tax revenue over GNDI 
(T/GNDI) 42.5 21.1 3.8 19.9 15.3 18.1 10.4 25.1 24.7 23.9 10.5 19.0 25.0 
Agriculture sector value 
added over GDP (Ag/Y) 8.8 4.3 48.8 15.9 33.6 9.2 28.4 10.2 3.7 11.6 42.8 18.9 9.4 
Mining sector value added 
over GDP (Min/Y) 54.4 37.4 9.0 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.3 11.6 6.7 6.2 0.8 8.5 2.9 
Manufacturing sector value 
added over GDP (Manuf/Y) 20.6 4.8 6.3 7.4 14.4 20.6 9.7 11.4 19.0 26.6 7.2 17.4 20.7 
Imports over GDP (M/Y) 53.7 43.7 18.8 102.2 33.2 55.2 31.5 44.0 19.1 76.6 24.7 24.1 51.8 
Exports of gods and services 
over GDP (X(G&S)/Y) 72.6 50.5 23.6 22.9 26.9 62.4 16.7 49.6 24.6 57.8 18.1 34.5 32.1 
Money supply (M2) over GDP 
(M2/Y) 17.6 17.7 13.4 33.5 19.1 75.5 26.4 33.3 53.1 35.7 21.1 18.8 72.1 
Adult  illiteracy rate n.a. 29.6 44.8 19.5 44.5 17.6 59.3 21.2 16.5 21.4 30.4 26.3 14.9 
Fiscal years with T/Y data 1992-2001 1990-97 1990-2001 1990-2001 1990-2001 1990-2001 1993-2001 1990-2001 1990-2001 
1990, 
1993-2001 1990-2001 1990-2001 1990-2001
Observations with T/Y 10 8 12 12 12 12 9 12 12 10 12 12 12 
Fiscal years with T/Y data 
and adult illiteracy  1990-97 1996-2001 1990-2001 1994-2001 1990-2001 1993-2001 1990-2001 1990-2001 
1990, 
1993-2001 1990-2001
1990-1, 
1996-2001 1990-1999
Observations with T/Y and all 
explanatory variables - 8 6 12 8 12 9 12 12 10 12 7 10 
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Bank of Tanzania show the non-monetary agricultural sector at 30% of GDP at factor 
costs in 1986, then falling to 26.1% in 1990 and rising again to 29.9% by 1999.   
 
While all the economies of SADC country members contain some share of non-
monetary production and consumption, even if small in the case of the middle-income 
countries, unfortunately the member countries outside of Malawi and Tanzania do not 
report the non-monetary share of GDP.  Ideally, a measure of the size of the non-
monetary sector included in the GDP in each country would be an important variable 
to explain tax capacity.  Here it is assumed that all countries are providing estimates 
of GDP inclusive of the non-monetary sector even if they are not explicitly measured.  
Given that the bulk of the non-monetary sector is in the agricultural sector, the 
agricultural sector value added as a share of GDP (Ag/Y) becomes an important 
variable to capture the impact of the non-monetary sector.    
 
A high agricultural sector share is also expected to indicate the presence of a high 
concentration of informal farmers on smallholdings as well as indicate relatively high 
costs of tax administration and compliance.   The agricultural sector share is expected 
to be strongly but negatively related to the tax yield across countries.  In fact, it shows 
up as the single most important variable, and taken alone, it explains 50% of the 
variance in the tax yield across countries.  The impact of an increase of one 
percentage point in the agricultural sector share when taken alone is –0.47, but this 
effect moderates to –0.3 when in a more complete specification (see Table 6.4).   The 
agricultural sector ranges from about 4% of GDP in Botswana and South Africa up to 
34% in Malawi, 43% in Tanzania and 49% in DRC.  A range of 45% of GDP in the 
share of agricultural value added explains a variation of 13.5 percentage points of 
GDP in tax yield.83  Other comparable studies also find significant negative impact of 
the agricultural sector share on tax yields: Katusiime (2003) estimated a coefficient of 
–0. 2 for East African countries over 1991-98 and Stotsky et al (1997)84 estimated –
0.17 for Sub-Saharan African countries over 1990-95. 
 
Mining sector and trade 
The mining sector is a standard target for government revenues given that it is 
generally concentrated in terms of location and corporate ownership and has a 
measured output that is typically exported.  The mining sector is important in many 
SADC Member States and plays a dominant role in a few, such as Angola and 
Botswana.  Estimates in Table 6.4, show a one-percentage point increase in the share 
of the mining sector adding 0.2 to 0.3 percentage points out of GDP to the tax 
revenues.  As will be noted below, the mining sector can also be a significant source 
of non-tax revenues, which is expected to reduce the pressure on governments to raise 
its tax effort.   
                                                 
83 Another approach to estimating the impact of the non-monetary and informal sectors is to uses 
measures of the depth of the financial sector.  For example, the higher the ratio of the broad money 
supply (say, M2 over GDP or M2/Y), the smaller is the expected the role of the non-monetary and 
informal sectors in the economy.  M2/Y is expected to be positively related to T/Y.  In fact, when T/Y 
is regressed on M2/Y alone, a small but statistically significant coefficient of 0.072 is found.   The 
explanatory power of M2 disappears, however, when over economic structural variables are included. 
84 Janet G. Stotsky and Asegedech WoldeMariam, “Tax Effort in Sub-Saharan Africa”  IMF Working 
Paper (WP/97/107) September 1997 
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Not all other studies of tax capacity have included the effects of the mining sector, 
particularly more recent studies.  Earlier studies by Chelliah (1971), Chelliah et al 
(1975) and Tait et al (1979)85 based on data for the late 1960s and early 1970s, 
however, found strong impacts of mining sector share in GDP with coefficients in the 
range of 0.36 to 0.57.    Similar results are obtained if oil and other mineral export 
values as a share of GDP are used as explanatory variables.   In these studies, other 
exports have the mineral exports removed.  This study shows the mining sector being 
somewhat less important in explaining tax yields across countries in the 1990s. In 
Stotsky et al (1997), the effect of the mining sector for Sub-Saharan African countries 
is surprisingly negative at –0.26, but the export share is positive in the range of 0.25 
to 0.34, offsetting the negative mining sector coefficient.  In this SADC study, 
interestingly, exports as a share of GDP is either not significant or has an 
unexpectedly negative sign, and when the export share is included the coefficient on 
the mining sector share increases to offset the negative effect of exports.  It is 
important to recognize that in most countries exports are not taxed directly.  Hence, 
when exports are included they act as a proxy for indicating the relative size of the 
formal sector, which typically produces and/or manages most export trade.   
 
Imports  
As emphasized elsewhere in this study, imports form an important tax handle for both 
import duties and for capturing the import component of consumption taxes such as 
sales tax, VAT and excise duties.  A higher share of imports in GDP offers the 
opportunity for improved taxation efficiency, if not higher final taxes.  In addition, in 
countries with large informal sectors, taxation of imports that are inputs into informal 
sector production or trade, allows taxes to be collected on the inputs into informal 
sector production and trade, if not the final sales.   If the import share in GDP is used 
as the only explanatory variable, it has a coefficient of 0.26 and explains some 44% of 
the variance in tax yields.  When a more complete set of explanatory variables are 
included, Table 6.4 shows that the share of imports is still significant, but the 
coefficient is much smaller in the range of 0.02 to 0.07.86 These results are similar to 
those for Sub-Saharan Africa reported by Stotksy et al (1997), but lower that the 
0.126 found by Katusiime (2003) for East African countries. 
 
Gross National Disposable Income. 
GDP is a good measure for estimating the potential of taxes based on domestic value 
added or production, but it can be misleading for estimating potential consumption 
where a country has significant net transfers and net factor receipts (NT+NFR) from 
the rest of the world.  These can either raise or lower the consumption potential of a 
country relative to GDP.  As mentioned above and will be discussed in more detail 
below, consumption in some countries (Lesotho being an outstanding example) can 
                                                 
85 R.J. Chellliah, Trends in taxation in Developing Countries, IMF Staff Papers, No 18, 1971 
 R.J. Chellliah, H.J. Baas and M.R. Kelly, Tax ratios and tax effort in developing countries, 1969-71, 
IMF Staff Papers, No 22, 1975 
A. Tait, W.L.M. Gratz, B.J. Eichengreen, International Comparisons of Taxation for Selected 
Developing Countries, 1972-76, IMF Staff Papers, No 26, 1979 
 
86 The apparent strong effect of the share of imports as a single explanatory variable arises because its 
strong correlations with a number of the other omitted explanatory variables such as the share of 
agriculture (negative correlation) and share of net foreign transfers and factor income (positive 
correlation) biases its value upwards.  When these explanatory variables are included, the coefficient on 
the share of imports declines.  
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exceed GDP.  Hence, net transfers (NT) plus net factor receipts (NFR) over GDP is 
included to adjust for the potential differences in revenue potential.  In fact, Table 6.4, 
shows that tax yields increase by about 0.19 percentage points of GDP per one-
percentage point increase in NT plus NFR over GDP.   This impact is not taken into 
account in other studies. 
 
Table 6.4.  Estimates of tax yield as function of economic structural variables, 
alternative revenue sources and per capita income for SADC 
Member States, 1990-2001 
         
Explanatory variables Coefficient t-stat. Coefficient t-stat. Coefficient t-stat. Coefficient t-stat 
            
Constant -549.77 -2.65 -250.92 -1.25 -634.27 -3.34 -461.54 -2.47 
Agriculture sector value 
added over GDP (Ag/Y) -0.31 -10.39 -0.27 -8.55 -0.30 -4.58 -0.28 -4.54 
Mining sector value added 
over GDP (Min/Y) 0.32 11.56 0.19 2.96 0.28 10.83 0.17 2.89 
Imports over GDP (M/Y) 0.07 3.08 0.05 2.46 0.02 0.70 0.001 0.05 
Net Factor Receipts plus 
Net Transfers over GDP 
((NTr+NFR)/Y) 0.19 8.14 0.17 7.55 0.19 9.27 0.19 9.28 
Grants over GDP (G/Y) -0.41 -3.66 -0.19 -1.33 -0.54 -3.99 -0.49 -3.34 
Non-tax revenue over GDP 
(NT/Y) -0.55 -7.71 -0.32 -3.16 -0.44 -6.73 -0.29 -3.10 
Adult illiteracy rate   -0.11 -2.50   -0.02 -0.38 
Ln(Per capita income) 
(Ln(Ypc)) (1995 constant 
US$)     25.54 4.13 25.74 3.90 
Ln(Per capita income) 
squared (Ln(Ypc)2) (1995 
constant US$)     -1.96 -4.56 -1.96 -4.29 
Year 0.29 2.76 0.14 1.37 0.29 3.13 0.20 2.25 
 Adjusted R-squared 84.8%  84.5%  88.2%  87.9%  
 F-statistic 98.7  80.5  102.8  86.2  
 Observations 124  118  124  118  
 
 
Table 6.5.  Estimates of tax yield as a non-linear function of per capita income 
for SADC Member States, 1990-2001 
      
Explanatory variables Coefficient t-statistic   Coefficient t-statistic 
 Constant -1.962 -1.00  Constant -228.12 -11.79 
 Ypc # 375:  Y1 = Ypc, otherwise 375 0.077 8.98  ln(Ypc) 74.59 12.35 
 375 < Ypc # 750: Y2 = Ypc - 375, otherwise 375 0.011 1.10  ln2 (Ypc) -5.39 -11.76 
 750 < Ypc # 1500: Y3 = Ypc - 750, otherwise 1500 -0.004 -1.00    
 Ypc > 1500: Y4 = Ypc - 1500 -0.003 -3.26     
 Adjusted R-squared 61.1%   59.5%  
 F-statistic 57.5   106.8  
 Observations 145    145  
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Grants and non-tax revenue 
When the determinants of tax revenue are being estimated, it is important to recognize 
that where a government has other sources of revenue, the tax effort can be expected 
to decline to the extent these substitute for tax revenue.  A number of countries in 
SADC either received significant grants through foreign aid (such as Lesotho, 
Malawi, Mozambique and Tanzania) and/or have significant non-tax sources of 
revenue (such as Botswana and Lesotho).  Table 6.4 shows that increases in grant 
revenues reduces taxes by about 19% to 54% of the amount received as governments 
partially substitute grants for tax effort.  It is recognized that foreign aid is also 
received in the form of concessional loans with a large grant component to the loan.  
If the net flows of foreign financing are added to grants the coefficient drops to about 
0.22, but the data on foreign loans do not distinguish between the concessional and 
commercial components of the foreign loans.   
 
Non-tax revenues, particularly where these are not user charges covering incremental 
expenditures, can also depress the tax effort of a country.  Table 6.4 shows non-tax 
revenues reducing tax revenues by 29% to 55% of the revenues received.  Katusiime 
(2003) recognizes the effect of non-tax revenue in the study of East African countries 
and finds that it reduces tax revenues by 32%.  Other studies to recognize the problem 
caused by grants and non-tax revenues include Embrill et al (2001) where total 
revenues from taxes, non-taxes and grants become the determinant variable, but this 
estimate of the aggregate excludes the possibility of estimating the degree of 
substitution between types of revenue. 
 
Time 
Given the data used are annual data for 1990 through to 2001, the variable of the 
fiscal year of the data is included to pick up any trends resulting from trends in the 
effect of the explanatory variables not included in the study.  Table 6.4, shows a 
significant positive effect of between 0.14 and 0.29 percentage point increase in tax 
yield per year. 
 
Adult illiteracy rate 
Education, especially a basic level of literacy, is critical to the compliance and 
administration of taxes, especially self-assessed taxes such as income tax and VAT.  It 
is, therefore, expected that that high adult illiteracy rates will lead to lower tax yields.  
Table 6.3 shows, illiteracy rates across SADC Member States during the 1990s 
averaging from a low of 14.9% in Zimbabwe to a high of 59.3% in Mozambique.  (No 
data was available for Angola for this period.)  Education, however, is also an 
important and strong explanatory variable of per capita levels.87  When used as an 
explanatory variable on its own, it has a large and significant coefficient of –0.457 
and explains 46% of the variance in tax yields.  When other structural explanatory 
variables are included the coefficient drops to –0.11, and when per capita income is 
also included its impact becomes insignificant. 
                                                 
87 An estimate of per capita income (constant 1995 US dollars) across the SADC countries in terms of 
adult illiteracy gives the following result:  Per capita income = $3,048 - $58*(adult illiteracy rate, in 
percentage points) with a t-statistic of –7.2 for the coefficient of adult illiteracy and 27% of the 
variance explained.   This implies that a country with 50% illiteracy would have a reduction in per 
capita income of $2,900 compared to one with 100% literacy, or a per capita income of $148 compared 
to $3,048 at 0% illiteracy. 
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Per capita income  
As discussed at the beginning of this Chapter, growth in per capita income in a 
country is expected to a have a significant effect on tax yields, particularly through 
the taxation of income and payrolls and particularly as the share of middle-income 
earners in an economy increases.   It is important to recognize, however, as just 
discussed for the adult illiteracy rate, per capita income is highly correlated with a 
number of the economic structural variables that have just been discussed as being 
important for tax yields.  For example, as economies grow the share of the agricultural 
sector and imports as a share of GDP tend to decline.   Foreign aid grants also decline 
with rising per capita GDP.  Aside from the interaction with adult illiteracy rate just 
described, Table 6.4 also shows the coefficient on the import share declines when the 
income level is included.  
 
Typically, only the level of per capita income has been used an explanatory variable 
in previous studies of tax capacity.  As tax history, cross-country experience and 
economic logic argue, however, the impact of rising per capita income is expected to 
be non-linear.  Tax yields are expected to grow very rapidly as the formal sectors and 
middle class grow with growing per capita income levels.  This growth is expected to 
slow down as the share of middle-income earners increases.  In addition, once the 
structural constraints on tax collections become weaker and the capacities of private 
sector partners to deliver public services become stronger, governments have more 
latitude to choose the size of government.  It is possible that the size of government 
will not necessarily continue to increase with a growth in the size of the economy.  At 
a minimum, with a constant set of ad valorem (by value) tax rates covering a broad 
base of the economy, the tax yield is expected to flatten out as it approaches a 
theoretical limit set by the highest ad valorem rates and any ceilings on taxable 
income as are often imposed on social security contributions. 
 
Two specifications are used to illustrate the non-linear relationship between tax yield 
and per capita income in Table 6.5.  The first is to use a “piece-wise linear 
specification” and the second is a quadratic of the logarithm of per capita income.   
The piece-wise linear approach breaks down the relationship into different line 
segments over different ranges of per capita income.  Here the effect of income over 
the first $375 bracket, the next $375 bracket up to $750, the next $750 up $1,500, and 
then all per capita income over $1,500.   This specification shows a strong positive 
relationship over the first $375 of per capita income, a weak positive relationship over 
the next $375, and then weak negative relationships over the next brackets of income.   
 
Overall this implies, tax yields rising to 27% by $375 of per capita income, and 31% 
by $750 and then falling to 28% by $1,500 and 23.6% by $3,000.    The quadratic 
specification in logs gives 74.59log(Ypc) –5.39log2 (Ypc), which implies a similar 
pattern of strongly rising tax yield in the low per capita income range, but slowing 
down to reach a maximum tax yield at $1,018 and then gradually falling.88   
 
                                                 
88  For the relationship y = α + β1 logx + β2log2x, with β1>0 and β2<0, y reaches a maximum at  
x = exp(-β1/2β2) 
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Given both specifications explain about 60% of the variance in the tax yield, but the 
quadratic log specification uses less degrees of freedom, it is used in the full 
specifications shown in Table 6.4.   When per capita income is included with the other 
economic structural features of the SADC Member States, the implied maximum 
impact of per capita income occurs at $670.   Adding per capita income to the 
specification raises the share of the variance in the tax yield explained from 84.8% to 
88.2%. 
 
Summary 
The analysis presented above confirms the diversity of the economies within the 
SADC region and the systematic impact of many of their economic features on their 
capacity to collect tax revenues.  Many of the structural features that have negative 
impacts on tax collection capacity, particularly large non-monetary, informal and 
agricultural sectors, will not be overcome in the short or even medium terms.  Some 
countries have tax capacity features such as large corporate mining sectors or large 
volumes of imports amenable to customs control which can be exploited in the 
medium term.  In addition, any country can enhance its administrative efficiency in its 
use of available tax bases.  Growth and development of the economies is the longer-
term solution to solving the structural problems of tax collection from broad tax bases.  
In terms of the VAT, these structural constraints are evidenced in a narrow effective 
tax bases.  This issue is addressed in the next section on VAT efficiency. 
 
 
6.3.  VAT and sales tax efficiency 
 
The efficiency of a VAT or sales tax is a measure of the share of the potential base 
that is effectively used.  It is measured by working backwards from the actual 
collections which given the tax rates applied indicate the effective tax base which can 
be compared to the potential tax base.  If taxes are collected at different tax rates, 
ideally the revenue collections would be subdivided by tax rate to estimate the 
effective base.  In the case of broad-based consumption taxes, where most (if not all) 
of the revenues are collected at the standard rate, the convention is to estimate the 
effective tax base using the standard sales tax or VAT rate.  Ideally, a detailed 
analysis of the structure of the economy based on national accounts and input-output 
relationships to estimate the theoretical or potential sales tax or VAT base.89  Here the 
focus is on more qualitative and comparative analysis across countries.  To achieve 
this two efficiency measures are typically calculated:  one is the GDP-efficiency; the 
other is the consumption-efficiency.   
 
GDP-efficiency of a sales tax or VAT is the effective base over GDP.   While GDP is 
not the potential base of a consumption tax, this measure is useful to get an estimate 
of  
(i) how much added revenues will a 1% growth in GDP yield, or  
                                                 
89 For methods for estimating the potential base of a VAT, see for example, Howell H. Zee, “Value-
Added Tax” in P. Shome (ed), Tax Policy Handbook, Fiscal Affairs Department, International 
Monetary Fund (1995), and Anthony J. Pellichio and Catherine B. Hill, “Equivalence of the Production 
and Consumption Methods of Calculating the Value Added Tax Base:  Application in Zambia,” IMF 
Working Paper (WP/97/67), June 1996 
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(ii)  how many percentage points will the VAT rate need to be raised to yield 
an added 1% of GDP in revenue.   
 
For example, if the GDP efficiency is 0.3, then a 1% growth in GDP yields about 
0.3% in tax revenues.  Alternatively, the VAT rate will need to be raised by at least 
3.3 (or 1/0.3) percentage points to raise an added 1% of GDP in revenues.  
 
Consumption or C-efficiency is typically measured as the effective tax base over final 
consumption by the private sector (Cprivate  - as measured in national accounts) or  
 
C-efficiency = (GDP efficiency)/(Cprivate/GDP).   
 
This is a better proxy for the effective use of the consumption tax base.  Alternative 
measures are to use  
 
(a) total consumption (private plus government consumption) (or C) under the 
assumption that government consumption is taxable, or  
(b) total consumption reduced by the government wage bill (C – Government 
Wages) which recognizes that only purchases of goods and services are the 
potentially taxable.   
 
The latter measure is theoretically closest to the true measure of a VAT or sales tax 
base before making adjustments for exemptions and other inclusions. The traditional 
C-efficiency measure can be an overestimate of efficiency, while the total 
consumption efficiency measure can be an underestimate, particularly where 
government consumption expenditures are a large share of GDP. 
 
Table 6.6 gives the averages of the four sales tax and VAT efficiency measures for 
1997-2001 for the SADC Member States, while Table 6.9 gives the year-by-year 
estimates through 2003 (where available) and distinguishes between sales tax and 
VAT efficiencies.    
 
Generally, sales tax and VAT efficiencies for SADC Member States averaged 29% 
relative to GDP, 34% relative to total consumption, 38% relative to consumption less 
government wages, and 44% relative to private sector consumption.   These are 
similar to the VAT efficiency measures estimated by the IMF for countries in Sub-
Saharan Africa with VAT as shown in Table 6.8, but lower than countries in most 
other regions where GDP-efficiencies averaged in the range of 35% to 38% and 
Cprivate efficiencies ranged from 57% to 64%.   
 
Among the SADC Member States, however, the range of sales tax and VAT 
efficiency is large, from a low GDP-efficiency of 3.2% in DRC to a high of 46.2% in 
Namibia,90 and from a low Cprivate-efficiency of 4.6% in DRC to a high of 75.5% in 
Namibia. Some of the variance in C-efficiency comes from the variance in 
consumption (C) over GDP, some of the variance in consumption over GDP comes 
                                                 
90 Namibia charges a 30% VAT rate on a range of luxury goods including some major categories such 
as motor vehicles, tobacco products, wines, entertainment equipment, perfumes, toiletries, etc.  This 
will arise the apparent efficiency of the tax which assumes all goods are taxed at the standard rate of 
15%.   Zimbabwe also charges a luxury goods tax rate of 25% on motor vehicles tax raises the apparent 
tax efficiency somewhat.  
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from variations in GNDI over GDP, and some of the variance in Cprivate efficiency 
comes from the variations in government consumption as a share of GDP. 
 
Table 6.7 gives the average GNDI/GDP and C/GDP for SADC Member States 
between 1992-1996 and 1997-2001.  Lesotho and to lesser extent Mozambique, 
Namibia and Swaziland have had GNDI exceed GDP by a wide margin because of 
positive net transfer and net foreign factor receipts, while Angola and DRC have had 
GNDI below GDP by significant margins.  GNDI is the basis of consumption and 
saving in a country.   When GNDI is significantly higher than GDP, it is likely that C 
can exceed GDP.  Hence, even if C-efficiency were the same across countries, GDP-
efficiency would vary because of the variation in C/GDP.  On average GNDI tends to 
exceed GDP among SADC country members and C/GDP at 88% (Table 6.7) and 
Cprivate/GDP at 72% (Table 6.6) are higher than in the non-Sub-Saharan African 
regions in Table 6.8, which are in the range of 58% to 65% of GDP.    
 
Cprivate measures of VAT and sales tax efficiency can be biased upwards where 
government consumption is large and government wage bills are large relative to 
GDP.  Table 6. 6 shows Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland with large shares 
of government consumption as a proportion of GDP.   This results in large upward 
biases in Cprivate-efficiency measures, particularly in Namibia and Botswana. 
 
Cross-country comparisons from Table 6.6 for C-efficiency adjusted for government 
wages for 1997-2001 show that Mauritius, Namibia, South Africa and Zimbabwe had 
efficiency ratios significantly above the average of 38%, while the DRC, especially 
and to a lesser extent Tanzania and Malawi have been significantly below average.  
Botswana, Swaziland, Mozambique and Zambia were somewhat below average, 
while Angola and Lesotho were somewhat above average.   
 
 
 
 
Table 6.6.   Average VAT/sales tax efficiency, SADC Member States,  
1997-2001 
Percentages 
 VAT efficiency relative to      
  GDP C C-gov wages C private Cpriv/GDP Cgov/GDP 
Angola 21.0 36.7     
Botswana 17.7 29.6 35.0 57.0 31 29 
DRC 3.2 4.0 4.1 4.6 71 10 
Lesotho 44.8 36.0 41.6 46.2 97 27 
Malawi 26.7 27.1 28.8 31.6 84 14 
Mauritius 38.0 49.5 54.9 59.9 63 13 
Mozambique 29.3 32.4 34.9 36.6 80 10 
Namibia 46.2 51.0 62.6 75.5 61 29 
South Africa 41.6 50.3 53.1 65.5 63 19 
Swaziland 26.4 27.6 32.3 35.7 74 22 
Tanzania 16.2 16.2 16.9 17.5 93 8 
Zambia 31.3 33.3 35.6 39.0 80 14 
Zimbabwe 37.8 43.8 50.5 55.7 68 18 
Average 29 34 38 44 72 18 
69 
 
 
 
Table 6.7.  Gross National Disposable Income (GNDI) 
and Consumption (C) as share of GDP, SADC 
Member States, averages 1992- 96 and 1997-2001 
 GNDI/GDP C/GDP 
  1992-1996 1997-2001 1992-1996 1997-2001 
 Percentages 
Angola 96.6 84.3 78.4 61.0 
Botswana 100.9 100.9 62.1 60.3 
DRC 92.8 92.7 87.5 85.6 
Lesotho  186.7 144.1 136.8 122.1 
Malawi 102.0 97.7 100.1 98.8 
Mauritius 102.6 102.7 75.7 76.9 
Mozambique 112.1 102.8 111.4 92.7 
Namibia 114.5 114.8 90.0 88.4 
South Africa 97.5 97.0 82.2 82.8 
Swaziland 119.4 112.4 98.2 95.7 
Tanzania 108.5 104.6 99.4 95.0 
Zambia Na 96.5 99.9 103.3 
Zimbabwe 98.2 97.5 82.1 86.8 
Average 111 104 93 88 
 
 
Table 6.8.   VAT efficiency by region 
Percentage 
 VAT efficiency relative to  
Region GDP Cprivate Cprivate/GDP 
Sub-Saharan Africa 27 38 71 
Asia and Pacific 35 58 60 
Americas 37 57 65 
European Union (including Norway and Switzerland) 38 64 59 
Central Europe, Russia, Baltic and Other States 36 62 58 
North Africa and Middle East 37 57 65 
Small Islands 48 83 58 
IMF Staff estimates, The Modern VAT (2001) Table 4.1   
 
 
Table 6.9 gives year-by-year efficiency rates for 1997-2003, and differentiates the 
sales tax years from the VAT years.  For those countries switching to a VAT over this 
period, they generally show an improvement in tax efficiency (C- government wages).   
 
Mauritius shows an increase from 53% to 68%, and Tanzania from 15% to 23%, but 
Namibia has shown no significant change or possibly a decline based on preliminary 
estimates.  Preliminary data for Botswana for 2003 suggest a massive increase in tax 
efficiency from 38% to 70% indicating the switch from a selective sales tax to a 
broad-based VAT including large public sector consumption base.   Mozambique 
switched in from a turnover tax in 1999 from a turnover tax at a standard rate of 5% 
collecting about 3.3% of GDP to a VAT at 17% collecting 5% of GDP.  Given the 
difficulty in estimating the effective tax rate under a turnover tax because of potential 
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tax stacking as goods and services move through multiple stages of production and 
trading, it is difficult to estimate the effective consumption base of the turnover tax.   
 
For the countries with a somewhat longer VAT history (Malawi, Zambia and South 
Africa), the experiences were similar to the post-1997 cases just discussed with the 
exception of South Africa.   
 
• In Malawi, the tax efficiency rose from 16% to 22% in the early 1990s after 
VAT was introduced in 1989, and then rose to around 30% by the late 1990s, 
but it dropped significantly to 24% by 2002 with the exemption of petroleum 
products and the imposition of excise duties on these items in place of VAT. 
•  In Zambia, tax efficiency increased from around 20% under the sales tax to 
over 30% after the VAT was introduced in 1995 and has subsequently risen to 
40% in 2002.   
• In South Africa, by contrast, when the 10% VAT replaced the 13% sales tax in 
1991, the C-efficiency (adjusted for government wages) dropped from 70% to 
61% by 1993, and then dropped further to 54% when the rate was raised to 
14% in 1994, but has subsequently recovered somewhat to around 58% by 
2003.   
 
To some extent the switch from sales tax to VAT would have removed some tax 
stacking under the sales tax that would have raised the effective tax rate above the 
statutory rate and resulted in an overestimate of the effective tax base under the sales 
tax.   
 
With the exception of South Africa, which already had a broad-based sales tax prior 
to conversion to the VAT, SADC Member States have experienced significant 
increases in tax efficiency as their effective consumption tax bases have broadened 
under the VAT.  It is important to note, however, that the effective tax bases remain 
relatively small among the lower-income countries such as DRC (3%), Malawi 
(24%), Mozambique (35%) and Tanzania (23%).  Lesotho, Swaziland and Zambia 
also remain below 50%.  These relatively narrow sales tax and VAT bases reflect a 
combination of the structural features of the economies that constrain the tax capacity, 
limitations in the effectiveness of tax administration, and choices in the exemptions in 
the tax structure (which are reviewed in Chapter VI below.)  The obvious impacts of a 
narrow base have already been discussed above - namely, lower tax revenue increases 
from economic growth, and higher tax rate increases being required to achieve any 
targeted revenue increase.  There is also a less obvious, but important negative impact 
on the price responsiveness of the tax base to rate increases that are now discussed. 
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Table 6.9.  VAT/Sales Tax efficiency relative to GDP, Consumption, Consumption less 
Government Wages, and Private Consumption, SADC Member States, 1997- 2003 
 
   Financial year ending in        
  Type of tax Efficiency basis 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
     Percentages 
 Angola Non-oil excises GDP 15.4 24.1 19.3 18.0 28.0 30.0  
    C (Consumption) 21.0 29.5 32.8 48.8 51.5   
 Botswana Retail Sales Tax  GDP 14.7 16.8 18.9 19.8 18.5 19.6 35.2p 
  VAT from July 2002 C (Consumption) 25.5 29.2 30.8 32.2 30.5 32.1 57.7p 
   C - Govt Wages 30.0 34.4 36.5 37.9 36.3 38.9 69.9p 
    C private 47.4 55.0 60.2 63.5 58.9   
 DRC Producers Turnover GDP 6.7 2.5 2.9 1.6 2.5   
   C (Consumption) 9.1 3.0 3.5 1.7 2.6   
   C - Govt Wages 9.5 3.1 3.7 1.8 2.7   
    C private 11.3 3.3 3.9 1.8 2.7   
 Lesotho Retail Sales Tax GDP 46.0 46.9 45.9 41.2 43.9   
   C (Consumption) 35.8 37.4 36.4 33.5 36.9   
   C - Govt Wages 40.3 42.6 41.9     
    C private 44.8 47.9 48.0 43.6 46.9   
 Malawi Manufacturers  VAT GDP 22.7 28.5 26.7 28.6 26.8 24.0  
   C (Consumption) 23.2 29.0 28.1 28.6 26.8 22.8  
   C - Govt Wages 24.4 31.3 29.8 30.1 28.3 24.3  
    C private 26.6 33.3 32.6 33.1 32.2 27.1  
 Mauritius VAT from Sept 1998 GDP 36.5 36.1 36.4 41.5 39.6 47.1  
   C (Consumption) 48.1 47.8 48.1 53.4 50.3 57.9  
   C - Govt Wages 52.7 52.1 52.6 59.9 57.1 68.0  
    C private 58.2 57.8 58.0 64.5 60.9 69.9  
Mozambique VAT from 1999 GDP    30.1 28.4 29.1  
   C (Consumption)    33.0 31.8 32.8  
   C - Govt Wages    35.4 34.3 35.3  
    C private    37.2 36.0 37.1  
Namibia Retail Sales Tax GDP 43.0 43.8 47.0 49.1 48.2 46.2 44.6 
  VAT from 2002 C (Consumption) 46.3 49.1 51.4 54.3 53.7  49.7p 
   C - Govt Wages 56.6 60.5 63.6 66.5 65.6  60.7p 
    C private 69.2 74.1 76.3 78.4 79.3  73.4p 
 South Africa VAT GDP 40.4 40.9 41.7 42.2 42.6 43.3 45.0 
   C (Consumption) 49.2 49.3 50.1 51.0 51.7 52.8 56.1 
   C - Govt Wages 52.9 52.6 52.9 53.8   57.5p 
    C private 64.6 64.7 65.7 66.1 66.5 68.7 73.0 
 Swaziland Retail Sales Tax GDP 26.7 25.5 27.4 26.6 25.6   
   C (Consumption) 27.6 26.5 28.5 28.0 27.4   
   C - Govt Wages 32.5 30.9 31.8 33.3 33.0   
    C private 34.3 37.1 35.0 36.8 35.5   
 Tanzania Sales Tax GDP 14.4 13.4 17.3 16.3 19.5 20.5  
  VAT from 1999 C (Consumption) 14.7 13.6 18.5 17.9  22.1p  
   C - Govt Wages 15.3 14.2 19.3 18.7  23.1p  
    C private 16.0 14.7 19.9 19.2  23.8p  
 Zambia VAT GDP 29.9 28.7 32.8 32.6 32.2 28.6  
   C (Consumption) 33.0 29.9 32.4 35.6 35.7 36.2  
   C - Govt Wages 35.5 31.7 34.2 37.8 38.6 40.3  
    C private 40.9 35.8 37.1 39.7 41.7 42.9  
 Zimbabwe Retail Sales Tax GDP 36.1 41.9 39.1 32.8 39.2 49.4  
   C (Consumption) 42.3 48.8 46.4 38.5 43.1 55.3  
   C - Govt Wages 50.4 48.8 55.1 48.2 50.2 64.4  
    C private 52.5 61.0 56.6 53.8 54.6 68.2  
Note:   Sales or turnover tax in italics        
  VAT in bold         
p preliminary estimate         
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6.4.  Limits on revenue increases from higher tax rates 
 
One of the attractions of a broad-based consumption tax is that the moderate reduction 
in the tax base that occurs when a tax rate is increased.  Any tax base becomes 
problematic if the base contracts by a large share to any increase in the price as may 
be caused by an increase in the tax rate.  The tax base may shrink in response to the 
tax rate increase such that only a relatively small revenue increase is achieved, or in 
more extreme cases the revenues even fall as the rate is increased if the base contracts 
rapidly.   
 
Typically, when all the prices increase of a large collection of goods and services 
forming a high share of expenditures of consumers, the price elasticity of demand of 
all the goods and services taken together will be close to –1.  This means that if all the 
prices increase by 1%, the quantities purchased will contract by 1%, which also leaves 
the total value of expenditures constant through the quantity contraction offsetting the 
price increase.  When a broad base of goods and services are taxed and the total 
expenditures of the taxpayers are constant, therefore, the overall quantity response to 
an increase in the standard tax rate on this broad base is expected to be consistent with 
a price elasticity of demand of approximately –1.  This is a common assumption in 
analyzing the revenue effects of tax rate changes on a broad-based consumption tax. 
 
Within this broad collection of goods and services, however, are both essential items 
such as basic food, water, shelter and clothing as well as non-essential, optional and 
luxury consumer goods and services.  The essential items are typically less price 
responsive, while the non-essential ones are more price responsive.  From the analysis 
of tax capacity and tax efficiency, it was observed that in many of the SADC Member 
States less than half potential tax base is effectively taxable.  This raises the question 
of which types of goods and services are being excluded, the more or the less price 
responsive items?  If the less price responsive items are excluded, then the actual 
narrow base of taxable goods and services can be expected to be more price 
responsive than the potential broad tax base. 
 
In low-income economies a large share of consumption of the population is met 
through the non-monetary and informal sectors.  In addition, expenditure studies 
typically show that the poor will spend a high share of their income on essential items 
such food, water, and shelter.  If these essential items are being self-supplied as in the 
non-monetary sector or where items are being purchased from small and informal 
sector businesses outside of the consumption tax system which typically excludes 
businesses with small turnovers.  Some governments, for reasons of both equity and 
feasibility of administration, also explicitly exempt items such as unprocessed food or 
agricultural sector outputs.  This results in the less price-responsive goods and 
services being left in the tax base.  Hence, the narrow tax base is not only smaller, but 
also more price responsive.  This limits the tax revenues that can be achieved by 
raising the standard tax rates of a sales tax or VAT.  As it happens, Malawi has 
provided a useful actual tax experiment the 10-year period from the mid-1980s to 
1990s when it raised its standard surtax rate in steps from 20% to 35% and then 
lowered it back to 20%.  The tax yield response to this major change in tax rates is 
studied in the next section. 
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Malawi:  A case of ineffective high standard surtax rates 
The VAT is often viewed as a major source of potential revenue enhancement to 
replace revenues as trade taxes are reduced and, even more generally, to reduce 
government deficits.  While a broad-based VAT in developing countries can be 
expected to increase its tax yields over time as tax compliance improves and the 
formal sector expands as a share of an economy raising the effective size of the VAT 
base, in the medium term, increased VAT rates have to be considered as a method of 
enhancing VAT yields.  Currently, standard VAT rates among SADC Member States 
range from 10% to 20%.  Raising VAT rates in the countries with standard rates at the 
lower end of this range represents a credible way of gaining significantly increased 
yields, but for countries at the top end of the range, raising rates can be expected to 
yield only limited additional revenues. 
 
Malawi provides an interesting case study of the revenue effects of varying the 
standard tax rate in the range above 20%.   Malawi, in the latter part of the 1980s, 
raised its sales tax rates significantly in an attempt to close its budget deficit.  It also 
undertook a major tax reform program, which included the conversion of its sales tax, 
known as the “surtax,” to a destination-based, credit-method VAT in 1989.  It retained 
the name of the tax as the “credit-method surtax” and kept the point of the tax at the 
manufacturing level.   Prior to the introduction of the credit method structure, Malawi 
had raised its standard surtax rate from 20% to 25% in 1984/85 and again to 30% in 
1985/86.  See Table 6.10.  At that time, the surtax rate on imports was also 20% 
higher than the surtax rate on domestic supplies (for example, a 20% domestic rate 
was charged at 24% on imports), but the large majority of the surtax revenues were 
collected on domestic sales given imported raw materials and capital equipment 
where exempt inputs by registered traders before the credit method was introduced.  
As part of the tax reforms, in 1987 the standard rate on imports and domestic supplies 
was made uniform, but raised again to a peak of 35%.   With the introduction of the 
credit method in 1989/90, however, the surtax rate was lowered to 30%, and then 
furthered lowered every two years subsequently back down to 20% by 1993/94.   
 
Table 6.10.  Surtax rates and revenues,  
Malawi 1982/83-1993/94 
Fiscal yearsa 
Standard 
Surtax Rate 
(Rate on 
imports) 
Average Surtax 
Revenueb/GDP 
From  To     
1982/83 1983/84 20% (24%) 4.56% 
1984/85   25% (30%) 5.31% 
1985/86 1986/87 30% (36%) 5.54% 
1987/88 1988/89 35% 5.90% 
1989/90c 1990/91 30% 5.96% 
1991/92 1992/93 25% 5.44% 
1993/94 2000/01 20% 4.95% 
a.  Fiscal year is ends on March 31 
b.  Includes Accommodation and Refreshment Tax which was 
incorporated into Surtax in 1993/94 
c.  Credit method surtax introduced in 1989/90 
Source: Ministry of Finance data   
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The remarkable feature of this roller-coaster tax rate ride that was that the revenue 
yield as a share of GDP only rose modestly from about 4.6% prior to the rate 
increases to a peak of about 6%, and then only declined to 5% as the standard surtax 
rate dropped from 35% back to 20%.  Interestingly, the revenue yield stayed in a tight 
range of 5.3% to 6% of GDP as the rate varied between 25% and 35%.    
 
This suggests that the price responsiveness of the surtax base was high.  In fact, it 
appears that the standard surtax rate rose into the range of the maximum revenue 
yielding tax rate for the surtax base.   
 
These observations can be analyzed somewhat more formally by considering the price 
effects of raising sales tax rates on the size of the effective tax base of a consumption 
tax.  Considering the case of constant cost supply, the revenue yield can be expressed 
in terms the tax base, the tax rate and the price elasticity of demand 91 as follows: 
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For the revenue yield to fall from 6% to 5% of GDP as the tax rate is reduced from 
35% to 20% requires a high price elasticity of demand of around –1.5.   Typically for 
a broad-based tax such as a VAT, where most of final consumption is targeted, the 
price elasticity of the bundle of all taxable goods is expected to be close to –1, as this 
implies that total consumption will remain at the same expenditure value as the tax 
rate or price increases.  If the price elasticity of demand for taxable goods had been 
about –1 in Malawi, then the surtax revenues would have risen to about 7% of GDP 
(rather than 6%) when the standard rate was raised to 35%.   It is also of interest to 
note that at the high price elasticity of demand of –1.5, the maximum revenue yield 
would be reached at a tax rate of 33%.   The tax rate yielding the maximum revenues 
is given  -1/(2η).   This is consistent with the revenue yield in Malawi remaining 
nearly invariant as the surtax rate was varied in the range of 30% to 35%. 
 
What are some possible reasons for the price elasticity of demand being high and, 
therefore, variations in the revenue yield being dampened as the Surtax rate changed?  
First, if the tax base exempts a large share of consumption, particularly unprocessed 
foodstuffs that make up a high share of consumption particularly of the poor, then the 
elasticity of demand for the remaining taxed goods can be higher than one.  Similarly, 
exemption of a wide range of services and the prevalence of a large informal sector, 
                                                 
91 Price elasticity of demand (η) is defined at the prices and quantities that be traded without the tax in 
place as given by p and Q.  The demand curve is assumed to be approximated by a straight line over the 
range of tax rates applied.  If a less price responsive demand curve than a straight line were assumed, 
then a higher price elasticity of demand would be required to get the same lack of revenue response 
observed in Malawi.  For example, a constant price elasticity of demand would require a price elasticity 
of demand of about –3.2.  This is not reasonable.  It would also imply maximum revenue yielding tax 
rate of 50%.  This is not consistent with observed revenue performance in Malawi.     
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with turnover rates falling below the minimum turnover level, and large non-monetary 
sector further restrict the taxable base of sales.    
 
The smaller the tax base and with more “luxury” goods that were included in the base 
(as opposed to the exempted necessities such a unprocessed food), the feasibility and 
expectation of a high price elasticity of demand rises with the significant possibilities 
for consumption substitution to untaxed goods and services.  Moreover, a small share 
of luxury goods were subject to high tax rates above the standard surtax rate.  If these 
high-tax rate items are substitutes for goods at the standard rate, then the price 
elasticity of goods at the standard rate would be higher, as when the standard rate was 
raised increased luxury surtaxes would be collected masking the decline in revenues 
from goods at the standard rate.  Furthermore, tax compliance is expected to decline 
as the incentives for tax evasion rise with the very high standard tax rates of 30% and 
above.  This would result in an increase in the effective price elasticity of demand for 
taxable goods being observed.   
 
It is important to recognize that the Malawi surtax rate changes occurred without any 
systematic reduction in the average tariff rates charged on imports that would have 
resulted in lower domestic prices and offset the increases in the surtax rates.  Tariff 
rates during the late 1980s and early 1990s were both decreased and increased.  
Effective import duty collections averaged around 3% of GDP throughout this period.  
If tariffs are systematically being reduced and replaced with higher consumption tax 
rates, then it is less certain that any increased consumption tax rates will cause any 
increase in prices.  The squeezing of the tax base in response to tax-induced price 
increases, as discussed above, will not occur if the duty rate reductions offset the 
surtax or VAT rate increases. 
 
Summary 
High price elasticity of demand in conjunction with a narrow tax base (less than 50% 
C-efficiency, for example) can lead to tax rate increases being an ineffective tool to 
achieve significant revenue increases when the standard rate is already high.  Both tax 
base widening and effective administration are required to enhance revenues directly 
and indirectly to support higher revenue yields from tax rate increases.  The direct 
revenue effects will arise from the effective base broadening.  The indirect effects will 
come from the lower price elasticities of demand of a broader tax base.  
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VII.  Selective Tax Structure Issues 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
The credit-method VAT based on the destination principle has two interrelated and 
powerful features.   
 
• The first is that it results in the intended statutory tax rate being charged on 
final consumption of goods and services by the private and public sectors.   
This feature allows more precision in designing the intended effective tax rates 
on final consumption, including not charging tax on exports (by zero–rating) 
and on investment (by allowing input tax credits).  This feature is often not 
achieved by alternative turnover, sales and excise taxes. 
 
• The second is the “self-enforcing” aspect of the credit method where the buyer 
requires a VAT invoice from the seller in order to obtain the input VAT 
deduction or credit.  This enhances compliance with the VAT.   
 
Both of these features arise out of the chain of output taxation and input deductions 
(or taxation and credits) that occur as goods and services flow through the various 
stages of production and trade until they reach final consumption.  At the point of 
final consumption or use, the tax becomes final at the rate charged at that final stage.   
 
This ideal “VAT world” is undermined when this chain of taxes and credits gets 
broken.  Breaks in the chain arise because of exemptions of certain businesses, sales 
to certain persons, or certain goods or services from the VAT, or because of failure to 
pay credits at all or on time for the VAT included in the costs of production.  Another 
problem in the chain of production arises from government-supported producers 
where decisions have to be made about whether they are fully-fledged commercial 
members of the chain or not, and if not, become exempted.   
 
The causes of these breaks in the chain of VAT taxation and credits are the main 
focus of this Chapter.  It first lays out the broad causes of these breaks and their 
revenue and economic consequences, and then reviews the actual structures of the 
VAT systems of SADC Member States.  For member countries with sales tax 
systems, the comparable features will be noted. 
 
Breaks in the chain of VAT output taxes and input taxes or credits arise because of  
 
i. Businesses not being required to register for VAT because of  
a. Businesses having turnover below a specified minimum level (which 
excludes small and micro, often informal businesses from the VAT); 
b. Specified output supplies of businesses being exempted (such as 
financial and insurance services); or 
c. The type of business or activity being exempted or outside the scope 
of the VAT (such as registered schools, diplomats, armed forces, 
public defense, national security and other non-commercial central 
government activities) 
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ii. Specified goods or services being exempted, which may result in 
businesses not registering as in “i.b.” above, or registered businesses that 
also produce taxable supplies, not receiving input deductions on the inputs 
purchased to produce exempt supplies. 
 
iii. Non-payment of refunds, or long or unpredictable delays in gaining credits 
or refunds for input VAT that is in excess of output VAT. 
 
The tax revenue and economic consequences of non-registration, exemptions, and no 
or delayed refunds are as follows: 
 
i. A second tax base is created when the input VAT paid by businesses is 
not deductible or creditable, but instead becomes a final tax.  Where the 
exempt trade or unregistered business is at the final stage of sale to final 
consumers, tax revenue on the mark-up at this final stage of production is 
lost and only the input VAT is collected. This decreases the effective 
VAT base.  Where the exempt trade or business is at an intermediate 
stage of production or trade, however, taxes are still collected at the 
final stage of production in addition to the input taxes paid on 
purchases by the exempt or unregistered business.  This increases the 
effective VAT base, and hence the VAT revenues also increase, but it 
causes tax stacking or cascading as these input taxes get built into the costs 
of subsequent production.    
 
ii. Tax stacking from exemptions at intermediate stages of production 
results in complex and somewhat unpredictable results in the effective 
taxes that actually become built into the prices of final consumption 
goods and exports.  This clearly undermines the major attribute of the 
VAT of predictability of the effective tax rate on final consumption items 
and exports.  This has unintended economic efficiency costs.  It will cause 
economic allocation consequences in the economy because of the changes 
in relative prices arising across goods and services in the economy. 
 
iii. Exemptions result in negative trade protection for producers of 
tradable goods and services.  While exemptions cause domestic 
producers to include the input VAT in the costs of production of an 
exempt good or service, an importer of the same good or service pays no 
import VAT.   This results in the competitiveness of the domestic producer 
being reduced relative to the import competition or border price of the 
export, in the same fashion as if the domestic producer had import duties 
charged on the inputs to production.  This situation arises in many 
circumstances.  For example, if domestically produced item such as 
fertilizers or pharmaceuticals are exempted, the domestic producers of 
these items will be at a disadvantage relative to VAT free imports because 
the domestic producer will pay VAT on all raw materials and capital 
equipment used in production.  Another example arises where supplies to 
specified persons (such as diplomats, the government or some special 
industry such as the mining sector) are exempted.  In these cases, the 
specified persons have a price incentive to import VAT free rather than 
buy from domestic producers that pay VAT on their inputs.  
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This illustrates that differences in VAT-induced negative protection 
for businesses across countries can have consequences for business 
location decisions in the same fashion as income tax incentives or 
import protection. 
 
iv. Delays or failure to refund input VAT that is not offset by output VAT 
results in the same tax and economic consequences as exemptions.  
Revenues are increased, tax stacking raises effective tax rates and negative 
protection is felt by the domestic producers of tradable goods and services.   
Refunds situations, however, tend to be concentrated in a few situations: 
 
 (a)      businesses with a high share of exported or other zero-rated      
            supplies, and  
(b)       businesses undertaking investments in inventory or plant and    
            equipment.   
 
As a result the negative consequences are concentrated on the very 
activities (exports and investment) that the VAT structure is intended to 
alleviate.  If this situation pertains in one country as opposed to another it 
could affect investment location decisions.   
 
Non-payment or delays in payment in refunds can arise because of tax 
administration problems or because of legal or policy structures restricting 
the payment of refunds.  This Chapter will focus on the legal structures 
affecting the rights to refunds of input VAT by businesses in different 
situations.  It is also of interest to note that in some countries exemptions 
have been used to avoid the problems of delayed refunds, but the revenue 
and economic consequences are the same – only exemptions guarantee that 
they happen. 
 
Two further observations on the causes and consequences of chain breaking are 
important to note.   
 
• First, the revenue and incentive consequences will be scaled up the higher 
the standard VAT rate.  These effects of exemptions are higher in the 
countries with the higher VAT tax rates.  Unfortunately, the higher rates also 
tend to prevail in the countries with the lower tax capacities, and hence, 
narrower effective bases.  
 
• Second, it is important to distinguish between the reasons a country is not 
registering or exempting certain types of business.  The core reasons for not 
requiring registration are: 
(a) the tax administration and compliance costs are too high relative to the 
revenues, such as may be the case with small businesses, or  
(b) the measurement of the output supplied is difficult or infeasible, such 
as is the case with such financial services (particularly financial 
intermediation and insurance) or public goods (such as defense) where 
the supply is difficult or impossible to trade in a market place.   
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• Where the VAT administration is feasible and the costs of administration and 
compliance are reasonable, then some policy reason relating to reducing the 
tax burden on the poor or providing some development incentive may be the 
motivation.  In this case the tax structure choices are then broader.  These 
reasons and their related economic effects become the major concern in 
reviewing VAT structures. 
 
Government supported activities 
Exemptions are also used to clarify the scope of the VAT.  VAT is targeted at final 
consumption, and hence, is charged on all supplies leading up final consumption by 
households or government.  Even though the government may be producing public 
goods or services, by their very nature, pure public goods cannot command a market 
price, and hence, are not self-financing and have to be financed out of tax revenues.   
 
VAT laws typically target business or commercial activities (whether for profit or 
not), or supplies of goods or services for a consideration by all persons, individuals 
and legal entities.  The consideration or sales revenues received by business or 
commercial activities are expected to cover the costs of production.   Under this legal 
construct of the VAT, governments and their corporate entities are not in principle 
excluded from being taxable suppliers unless their supplies are made for no 
consideration.  For many public services this is not an issue, but for many the 
government or its agencies may be collecting fees or user charges in full or part 
payment for the service, such as health, education or printing and publishing services.   
 
Where only part payment of costs is being collected, the government is obliged to 
finance or subsidize the residual uncovered costs.  The extent of the subsidy may be 
explicit where the supplier is a separate legal entity, but may be implicit where the 
supply is by a government department.  Such services may be in competition with 
private suppliers, for example, public schools in competition with private.  A gray 
area emerges about which public sector supplies should be taxable, and how to 
determine the taxable value and which input taxes should be deductible.   
 
Where government subsidized services are being supplied, output tax is only charged 
on a partial price and the full market value is not bearing tax.  Consequently, input 
taxes will be deducted that relate to the subsidized (exempt) portion of the supply.   
 
Three solutions are possible to correct this:  
 
i. require tax to be charged on the market value, which could be estimated as 
the sum of the user-charges plus subsidies received if these result in full 
cost recovery, or  
ii. disallow input tax deductions in proportion to the subsidized costs (which 
loses the tax on the subsidized share of the value added), or  
iii.  exempt the supplies (which loses the tax on the full value added.)    
 
If tax is only charged on the user charge and not on the subsidized share of the full 
value, but all input taxes are fully deductible, then the overall taxes may become 
negative.  This can be illustrated as follows  
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If an entity receives a subsidy at the rate of “s” on its user charge, “u”, then the market 
price can be estimated as the costs covered by the user charge plus subsidy or u(1+s).   
If VAT is charged at rate, “t”, on this full cost, and if the share of inputs that paid 
VAT is “α” of the full cost, then the VAT collections are: ut(1+s)(1-α).    
 
If VAT is only collected on the user charge, but all the input VAT is deductible, then 
the VAT collection becomes ut(1-(1+s)α).  This latter amount of VAT can be 
negative if (1+s)α > 1, which can be the case if, for example, α > ½ and s > 100% of 
the user charge (or the subsidy is more than 50% of the full cost.)    This could be the 
case in a highly subsidized school, for example.  It is also notable that as the subsidy 
gets larger, the output tax owed actually becomes larger than the user charge if s > (1-
t)/t.  
 
The approach of grossing up user charges by the subsidy received to get an estimate 
of the market value makes sense for the taxation of subsidized outputs if (i) the 
subsidy is modest, and (ii) the entities receiving the subsidy are competing in the 
market place, and (iii) the desired after-tax market price is still achieved for the 
subsidized good or service.   
 
Where large subsidies are offered, however, and/or the share of input costs paying 
input tax are high, or if the market value is difficult to determine, then exemption may 
be the preferred option.  In fact, if the government is subsidizing the service across all 
suppliers for policy reasons to lower the market price or user charge below the full 
cost, then charging VAT offsets some of the subsidy and undermines the policy 
intent.  A VAT exemption and a lower subsidy would have the same fiscal effect.  
The subsidy would also need to offset the input VAT costs if the entity is exempted 
and needs to cover its full costs (including input taxes.)  Notice that this is the same 
result that would arise if either:  
 
(a) the entity was zero rated and the government had to credit the entity with 
the input VAT instead of paying a higher subsidy, or  
 
(b) the entity was given the right to buy inputs at a zero tax rate from 
suppliers, in which case the government needs to monitor the correct 
application of such zero rating.   
 
Exemption and a higher subsidy rate is a simpler solution administratively. Where an 
entity is conducting commercial activities as well as government subsidized activities, 
then the commercial activities should be taxable, while the government subsidized or 
supported supplies should be exempted. 
 
A parallel situation exists with donation-supported charitable organizations where 
partial user charges are applied on some of its outputs.  Is this output competing with 
for-profit organizations?  Is there a public policy purpose in the supply being at a 
subsidized price?  The former would argue for taxation and the latter for exemption  
(unless the input taxes are large offsetting the benefits of any donation.) 
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7.2 Selected Features 
 
The following features of VAT systems across the SADC countries are reviewed in 
this Chapter: 
 
i. Minimum turnover level for registration, and whether voluntary 
registration is permitted 
ii. Exemptions of goods, services and supplies to specified or privileged 
persons 
iii. Zero rating of goods, services and supplies to or by specified or privileged 
persons 
iv. Any legal restrictions or privileges in the payment of VAT refunds 
 
This review will allow some summary comments to be made on the treatment of 
certain important sectors, namely: small business, agriculture, and the public sector.  
It will also reveal differences across countries that may be of concern in coordinating 
tax policies causing differential investment incentives. 
 
For countries with sales taxes or turnover taxes, the distinction between zero and 
exemptions does not exist.  A turnover tax offers no input tax offsets.  Under a sales 
tax, inputs into a taxable business are either purchased tax exempt or input tax credits 
or deductions are offered in a similar fashion to the credit method VAT.  The 
minimum turnover for registration, the structure of exemptions and the treatment of 
inputs into business will be identified for these countries.   
 
Minimum turnover 
 
VAT systems generally have a minimum turnover limit of taxable supplies for 
compulsory registration.  Most countries with VAT systems also allow voluntary 
registration of small businesses at the discretion of the Commissioner or Director of 
VAT.    Table 7.1 shows that in the SADC region the minimum turnover for 
compulsory registration varies from a low of about $11,000 per year in Mozambique 
to a high of around $107,000 in Mauritius.   Given the high variation in incomes 
across the countries (see Table 2.2), it is useful to standardize these turnover amounts 
against GDP per capita to get an estimate of the relative real sizes of business at this 
minimum turnover level across countries.  Table 7.1, shows that when expressed in 
terms of the per capita GDP units, that Lesotho and Malawi have the highest “real” 
minimum turnover rates, followed by Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia and 
Zimbabwe, and then the countries with the highest income levels, Botswana, 
Mauritius, Namibia and South Africa, have the lowest “real” minimum turnover rates.   
Countries such as Mauritius also specify some types of business that have to register 
irrespective of their turnover rates. 
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Table 7.1.  Minimum turnover of taxable supplies for compulsory registration 
in SADC Member States with VAT systems 
Minimum turnover of taxable 
supplies for compulsory registration 
Year Voluntary 
registration 
permitted? 
Country Tax type 
Local currency US$ GDP pcc   
Angola Selective 
sales/excise tax at 
manufacturers’ 
level 
No lower limit   n.a n.a 
Botswana VAT P250,000 a US$53,000 
in 2003/04 
17 2003 Yes, at 
Director’s 
discretion 
DRC Turnover n.a. n.a.  n.a. n.a. 
Lesotho VAT M500,000 a US$66,000 170 2003 Yes 
Malawi VAT K 2,000,000 US$20,800 125 2003 Yes 
Mauritius VAT Rs 3,000,000, 
but no limit for 28 
specified 
businesses 
US$106,700  28 2003 Yes 
Mozambique VAT Normal 
M250,000,000 
Simplifiedb 
M100,000,000 
 
US$10,700 
 
US$4,300 
 
54 
2003  
Namibia VAT N$200,000 US$26,000 15 2003 Yes 
South Africa VAT R 300,000 US$39,500 15 2003 Yes, if 
turnover more 
than R20,000 
Swaziland Sales Tax  E 20,000 US$2,600 2 2003 Yes 
Tanzania VAT Tsh 20,000,000 
Tsh 40,000,000 
US$18,800 
US$35,000 
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138 
2003 
2005 
Yes 
Zambia VAT ZK100,000,000 US20,200 57 2003 Yes 
Zimbabwe Sales Tax 
 
 
 
 
VAT 
Z$2,500,000 for 
goods;  
Z$500,000 for 
services 
 
Z$250,000,000 
US$4,300 
 
US$870 
 
 
US$50,000 
6 
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2003 
 
 
 
 
2004 
 
 
 
 
 
Yes, if 
turnover more 
than Z$200 
million 
a. Includes turnover of related or associated businesses 
b. Small businesses under simplified registration pay 5% turnover tax 
c. Minimum turnover as a multiple of GDP per capita 
 
 
In its 2004 Budget, Zambia doubled the turnover limit for compulsory registration to 
ZK200,000, but also removed voluntary registration, and has since introduced a 
presumptive tax for small businesses outside of the VAT.  While raising the minimum 
turnover limit should make VAT collections more cost-effective (by reducing 
administrative and compliance costs of collecting from small businesses), the removal 
of voluntary registration puts small businesses at a competitive disadvantage if they 
are exporting, investing or supplying intermediate inputs to registered businesses.  
The short-term gains in simpler tax administration may be offset by the slow 
economic growth and job creation over the long run.  
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The high “real” minimum turnover level in the low-income countries exacerbates the 
impact of the adverse structural features in these countries identified in Chapter VI 
(such as large informal and non-monetary sectors), leading to low tax efficiencies, and 
high price responsiveness of the remaining tax base.  This leaves a challenge of how 
to expand the tax base and improve the tax efficiency characteristics of these 
economies.   
 
A further point of interest is that Mozambique has two turnover registration levels.  A 
higher one for the normal VAT and a lower one for small businesses that have to pay 
a lower flat turnover tax rate.  This allows for indirect tax collections from small 
businesses without the higher compliance and administrative costs of a VAT.  
Tanzania actually also has a similar turnover tax structure for small unincorporated 
business with turnover below the VAT minimum turnover level, but in this case the 
turnover tax is an elective housed in the income tax rather than the VAT.  The 
turnover tax is also an elective and has a complicated structure involving increasing 
turnover rates over three brackets.  It also had effective presumptive taxes on small 
traders under its stamp duties as well having a range of business license fees.  
Tanzania, however, has recently doubled its minimum turnover level and restructured 
and rationalized its presumptive taxes on small business.  Zambia introduced a 
presumptive tax in 2004.  Mauritius is also considering implementing a presumptive 
tax on small businesses.  
 
The use of a simple turnover tax of around 2% for small unincorporated businesses in 
place of both the VAT and income taxes is sometimes referred to a as a “unified” tax.  
For informal micro businesses, which generally do not issue invoices or maintain 
books and records, even turnover taxes are difficult to apply, as the sales values 
cannot be objectively determined.  In these cases lump sum taxes (typically annual 
payments of a fixed sum) can be used.  These fixed amounts can be scaled by market 
size and physical indicators of business size.92   
 
Chapter VI showed that many countries in the SADC region have low tax efficiencies 
(see Tables 6.6 and 6.9 above) indicating that large portions of the potential tax bases 
are excluded from the VAT, turnover or sales tax.  Much of this missing economic 
activity is in the small and informal business sectors and small-scale farmers below 
the minimum turnover levels for a VAT and below the minimum income level at 
which individual are required to pay income tax.  The concept of a unified 
presumptive tax is to target this small and micro-business activity in a cost-effective 
and equitable manner to expand the tax base, and to make for a smoother transition as 
businesses grow and graduate from the informal to formal sectors, and from small 
business operations to full VAT and income taxpayers.   
 
These types of presumptive tax structure should be pursued across all SADC countries 
to expand the VAT base to a broader base given the low VAT efficiencies observed.  
This base expansion will reduce the pressures to increase the VAT rates on effectively 
narrow bases, which, in turn, tend to further restrict the base as consumption shifts 
away from taxed goods and businesses resort to more tax evasion.   
                                                 
92 Typical physical indicators of business activity include seating capacity of a restaurant or bus, rooms 
in a hotel, floor space of a business, etc 
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These types of presumptive taxes, however, are more suited to administration by local 
authorities than central revenue agencies, which are typically designed to administer 
self-assessed taxes using high technology approaches.  Presumptive taxes require 
more low-skilled and more labor-intensive enforcement methods, better suited to local 
authorities.  Typically, local authorities also administer all property related services 
and taxation, allowing for the easier identification of all local business activities on a 
continuous basis.  Nevertheless, co-ordination of presumptive taxes would be 
necessary between local and central authorities, particularly in regard to taxpayer 
identification and registration, if these are to act as a unified tax of business activity 
below the minimum compulsory turnover level of a VAT.   Arguably, in small 
countries (by size and population), the central tax administration may be able to cost-
effectively administer a presumptive tax, but this is less likely in larger countries. 
 
 
Exempt and Zero Rated Items and Persons 
 
See Appendix B for listing of exempt and zero-rated items and persons for each 
SADC Member State. Data in Appendix B shows certain consistent patterns, but also 
significant variations in the use of VAT exemptions and zero rating.  All countries 
zero rate exports and most transportation and ancillary services related to international 
travel.  All countries exempt financial and insurance services, but not all define them 
exactly the same way.  Most countries exempt public education services, public health 
services and either exempt or zero rate pharmaceuticals and medical equipment.  
Some zero rate a range of public transportation services.  Most countries exempt a 
range of public utilities – piped water or water supplied to domestic sector, certain 
local government services, electricity supplied to domestic sector and some 
telecommunication services.  A number of countries exempt or zero rate oil products 
and only make them subject to import and/or excise duties.   
 
The lower income countries tend to exempt unprocessed agricultural outputs to avoid 
the difficulties of administering the VAT in the agricultural and rural areas and to 
lower basic food prices, while the higher income ones tend to zero rate a range of 
basic foodstuffs to avoid any tax burden from these products.  Where agricultural 
products are exempted, typically either zero rating or exemptions will be provided for 
a range of key inputs in the agricultural sector to minimize the costs of input VAT 
being included in the price of basic foodstuffs. 
 
All countries exempt for VAT a range of imports normally exempted from import 
duties, such as goods in transit, passenger personal baggage, personal possession of 
people changing residence, temporary imports and exports, containers, etc.   
Typically, countries exempt imports for diplomats, aid agencies, emergency relief, 
and various charitable organizations.  The VAT treatment of domestic supplies to 
these privileged persons differs across countries from being eligible for refunds to 
being exempt or zero rated or taxable.93   
 
                                                 
93 In the case of Tanzania, certain supplies and imports are eligible for tax “relief”.  It is unclear 
whether this means such supplies are exempt or zero rated.  Tax exemptions in taxation usually mean 
the specified item is excluded from the tax base, but relief from tax usually means the rate of tax has 
been reduced fully or partially. No clear definition of VAT relief is provided.    
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In a few countries, purchases by the government and selected sectors (such as the 
mining sector in Tanzania) are exempt from VAT.   This results in a situation of 
negative trade protection for domestic suppliers of goods competing with imports.   
 
A number of countries differentiate the treatment of imports from domestic supplies.   
In a few of these countries, zero rating or exemptions are only provided to domestic 
suppliers of selected items, while imports are taxable.   This results in VAT providing 
positive trade protection for domestic producers. 
 
Overall, the variation in the specification of exempt and zero-rated items and persons 
across countries is large and poses a major challenge for VAT harmonization across 
SADC Member States. 
 
 
Treatment of input taxes into business activities: input tax deductions 
and refunds   
 
For countries with VAT 
Under credit method VAT, a registered business typically is permitted to deduct input 
VAT paid where the purchased good or service is an input into the supply of a taxable 
good or service.  This input VAT is typically offset against the output VAT.  Where 
the input VAT exceeds the output VAT, the business is in a VAT credit position.  The 
focus here is on how does the business get access to the value of this tax credit.  Is 
payment by the tax authorities (normally referred to as a “refund”) automatic for all or 
do some taxpayers require specific application or meeting of specific conditions 
before payment, or require carry forward until new output tax is generated?   Any 
delay in capturing the value of the VAT credit (either through a delayed refund or 
having to wait for net output taxes in the future to deduct the input taxes carried 
forward), lowers its value, raises the effective VAT rate, and has cash flow 
consequences for the affected business. 
 
Table 7.2 summarizes the VAT refund structures offered in the VAT legislation of the 
SADC Member States.  Ideally, all legitimate VAT refunds should be paid back 
immediately, just as VAT inputs that are deductible and offset accrue immediately.  
At best “immediate” has to allow for the inherent claim filing and payment delays of a 
few weeks.   Only some of the countries offer “immediate” refunds as a matter of 
principle.  These are Namibia, South Africa, Zimbabwe, and Mozambique.  Mauritius 
has fairly broad categories of business (exporters and other zero rated producers, and 
major investors) that would likely lead to most taxpayers in a credit position being 
able to claim “immediate” refunds.  Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia and South 
Africa also offer interest on late refund payments.  Other countries, mainly the lower 
income countries, tend to favor businesses that are “regularly” in a refund position 
and give assurances of clearing the other claims within time periods varying between 
3 and 6 months.    
 
To deal with concerns of investors facing delays in refunds, Zambia allows deferment 
of VAT payments on specified capital imports until VAT input deductions are 
claimed, and Botswana allows deferment up to 25 days on import VAT.   Malawi zero 
rates a large range of capital equipment items.  The deferment approach requires 
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Table 7.2.  Structure of VAT refunds in SADC Member States 
Country Tax type Refunds offered Limitations Special 
features 
Year  
Angola Selective 
sales/excise tax  
n.a n.a n.a n.a 
Botswana VAT 1.First offset against other 
outstanding taxes, then 
refund if regular exporter 
or certified manufacturer 
for export or international 
financial service center  
(S42) 
2. Refunds to diplomats, 
aid agencies of VAT on 
domestic supplies 
(imports exempt) (S43) 
1. Other refunds are 
payable at end of 
second month 
following due date 
for submission of 
return  (or 3 months 
after credit was 
generated) (S42) 
2. Withhold refund if 
returns not filed 
(S42) 
 Deferred import 
VAT up to 25 
days in month 
following 
importation 
S15(6) 
2002 
DRC Turnover n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Lesotho VAT 1. First offset against any 
outstanding tax arrears, 
otherwise carry forward 
 2.  Regular refund 
claimants as determined 
by Commissioner can 
claim refund immediately 
Refunds can be 
claimed after 3 
months  
 2003 
Malawi VAT  1. First offset against any 
VAT overpayments, 
otherwise carry forward 
 2.  Regular refund 
claimants as determined 
by Commissioner can 
claim refund immediately  
Refunds can be 
claimed within 90 
days  
1. Import VAT by 
installments with 
interest 
2. Zero rating of 
many capital 
equipment items 
2003 
Mauritius VAT VAT credits carried 
forward with except for  
1. Inputs in proportion to 
zero rated supplies (or 
all inputs if “mainly” 
zero rated supplies) 
 2.  VAT on capital 
investment where VAT is 
in excess of Rps 150,000  
(S21-24) 
1. No credit for 
VAT paid on 
passenger vehicle, 
accommodation, 
restaurant and 
entertainment 
expenses 
2. Claim input tax 
within 24 months 
Interest payable on 
refund claims not 
paid within 45 
days 
2003 
Mozambique VAT Refund claims at request 
of taxpayer; priority to 
investors and exporters 
 Offers interest on 
overdue refunds 
Refund claims 
must be first 
audited and 
certified by an 
independent 
accountant  
2004 
Namibia VAT 1. First offset against any 
outstanding tax arrears 
2. Refund if regular 
exporter or credit less 
than N$10,000, 
otherwise within two 
months (S38) 
 Late refund 
payments earn 
interest at rate of 
11% per annum 
unless audit 
required (S39) 
2003 
South Africa VAT First offset against any 
outstanding tax arrears, 
otherwise any complete 
claim is immediately 
payable (S44) 
 Late refunds earn 
interest from 
earlier of 21 days 
or 21 days from 
return being 
complete (S45)  
2001 
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Swaziland Sales Tax n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Tanzania VAT 1. Refund monthly for 
persons in regular 
credit position, 
otherwise 
2. Outstanding credits 
refundable once every 
half year starting from 
month of first credit 
claim (S17) 
Claim input tax 
within one year 
Refunds payable 
within 30 days of 
due date or receipt 
of return 
2001 
Zambia VAT Credit amounts are 
refundable within 21 days 
of end of quarter including 
last day of tax period 
(S19); amended to 
payment within 30 days of 
lodgment of claim 
Claim input tax 
within one year 
VAT on specified 
list of capital 
equipment imports 
can be deferred 
until input VAT 
deduction is taken 
2003 
Zimbabwe VAT 1.  Refund claimable and 
payable if in excess of 
Z$500, otherwise 
credit carried forward 
(S44) 
2.  Diplomats can claimed 
refunds on domestic 
supplies 
Claim input tax 
within six years  
2004 
 
 
effective customs controls and co-ordination with domestic VAT administration, and 
no domestic capital equipment producers that would be put at a disadvantage relative 
to imports.  Zero rating can be effective assistance to registered users of capital 
equipment, but it represents a net VAT loss to the extent capital equipment is used by 
unregistered businesses.  
 
Despite these not always favorable assurances of refund payments, it is actual refund 
payment behavior that determines the actual financial costs that businesses pay 
because of delayed refunds.  Delays in refund payments basically mean that 
businesses face a higher effective (and somewhat unpredictable) VAT rate.  This 
undermines a core reason for introducing a VAT system to support exporters and 
investors.   Accordingly, there would be a benefit to regional investment to 
encourage a harmonized approach to refund policy and practice, namely, to 
move towards more “immediate” refunding with in the limits of the 
administrative capacities of countries.   
 
 
Treatment of sales or excise taxes on inputs into business activities for countries 
without VAT 
 
Angola 
Angola has a single stage selective sales or excise tax at the manufacturers’ level and 
on imports.  It appears that exemptions are provided for inputs into production.  It is 
not clear whether input exemptions are limited to registered manufacturers and only to 
the production of taxable goods and exports, or the production of all goods by a 
registered manufacturer or producer.  It appears that excise taxes are paid on inputs 
purchased or imported by unregistered producers, service providers, primary sector 
producers, and traders.  This would result in tax stacking and an increase in the 
effective tax rates. 
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DRC 
DRC has a turnover tax for manufacturers, construction and certain services.  No 
deductions or exemptions are provided for taxes paid on inputs into production. 
 
 
Swaziland 
Swaziland has a sales tax using the “ring system” where registered traders can import 
or purchase inputs and capital equipment used in the production.  
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VIII.  Cross-Country Issues of VAT Policy Co-ordination 
 
A broad-based VAT implemented using credit-method on a destination basis by a 
national government taxes imports, but zero rates exports.   Its successful 
implementation clearly depends on the effective administration of taxes on 
international trade.   Customs administration controls trade, collects taxes on imports, 
and verifies exports.  When groups of neighboring countries establish free trade 
among these countries, border controls may get weakened or removed.  This can 
fundamentally change the implementation of VAT from the perspective of any 
member country of the group.  In the case of SADC, under the Trade Protocol, the 
movement towards a Free Trade Area (FTA) has been agreed.  In addition, already 
within SACU, free trade has long existed.   Within SACU, customs and excise duties 
are collected in a pooled fashion and border controls between member countries have 
been weakened, but not fully removed.  In the case of the wider grouping of SADC, 
the FTA will be established by 2008 with complete removal of duties phased in by 
2012.  Under the FTA, customs border controls will remain, as country of origin rules 
will be used to determine trade from SADC Member States.  SADC has the goal of a 
customs union by 2010 and a common market by 2015 that (as outlined in the SADC 
Regional indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP)). The nature of the border 
controls under the customs union and common market has not yet been determined.  
The nature of the border controls will dramatically impact the nature of the VAT 
structure that can be successfully implemented within SADC.   
 
This Chapter explores the impact of removing border controls on the operations of a 
VAT and explores options for the VAT structure within a customs union or common 
market.  These options will affect both the tax treatment of trade, the degree of 
harmonization of rates, the distribution of revenues among member countries and the 
role of any SADC authority required to co-ordinate the VAT system.   This 
investigation will illustrate the impacts of removing border controls on the operation 
of a VAT using the credit-method on a destination basis, exploring the relative 
importance and nature of imports into SADC Member States, and then analyzing the 
alternative VAT structures that could be considered to deal with the problems of 
operating a VAT within a customs union or common market.  Appendix D is also 
provided to give a more comprehensive background analysis to the operation of 
different VAT mechanisms with free trade within customs unions or common 
markets. 
 
 
8.1.  The impacts of removing border controls on the VAT 
 
To examine the impact on VAT operations of creating an area with free trade with no 
border controls, the focus is put on international trade between member countries.  It 
is assumed that a mature common market has been established as a single customs 
territory.   (Equally, the effects of removal border controls could be examined in the 
case of a mature customs union such as SACU.) 94 
                                                 
94  A customs union is a group of countries forming one customs territory that allows the free flow of 
trade among these countries without quantitative restrictions or trade taxes.  A common market is the 
same as a customs union, but also allows the free flow of capital and labor within the region.   Both a 
common market and a customs union are free trade areas.  Ideally, particularly in a common market, 
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Trades within such a common market for customs purposes are not treated as 
“imports” or  “exports.”   Hence, such “internal trade” is similar to trade between the 
states of a federal state.  In the case of the destination principle VAT system, 
“external trade” with countries outside of the common market is treated in the 
normal fashion: VAT is imposed on imports and zero rated on exports.  This means 
that, viewed as a whole, the tax falls on consumption within the customs union or 
common market.   
 
How the internal trade between member countries or states is treated, however, will 
effect which internal trades are taxed and at what rates, especially where countries 
have different tax rates, and which countries actually receive the revenues.  Trade 
across internal borders will be analyzed by focusing on the tax structures affecting the 
firms or individuals acting as the “exporter” (firm 1) and “importer” (firm 2) and the 
tax flows accruing to the two countries.   
 
In the first situation, the implementation of the destination-based VAT is analyzed 
with full border controls, while in the second without any border controls.   The base 
case that will be considered first reflects the current situation in SADC, where all 
exports, including internal exports, from a country are zero rated and border controls 
are maintained.  The second case removes the border controls.   A number of ways for 
solving the problems that arise are then considered. 
 
In these cases, see Figure 8.1, the output tax of firm 1 is to, the VAT charged on 
imports is ti, the input VAT deduction or credit received by firm 2 is tic and the final 
tax collected on the output of firm 2 is tf..   Given these taxes charged and credited, the 
revenues collected by the two countries A and B are given by RA and RB, respectively. 
 
Case 1 - Border controls and zero-rated internal exports 
Zero-rated exports is the normal arrangement for a destination-based national VAT.  
In this case, internal exports are zero rated such that to = 0.  See Fig 8.1.  If the 
importer is registered for VAT, VAT is collected on the internal imports at ti which is 
then credited to the registered importer, firm 2, such that tic = ti.  Firm 2, then collects 
the VAT on final sales of tf.  From these transactions, the total tax collected is tf.  The 
revenues collected by countries A and B, RA and RB are given by: 
 
RA = to = 0 
RB = ti - tic + tf.  =  tf.   
 
If the importer is unregistered, then the import VAT, ti is the final VAT (and country 
B forgoes (tf. - ti ), and the revenue collections are: 
 
RA = to = 0 
RB = ti.   
                                                                                                                                            
the economic borders would not be controlled to allow the free flow of goods and people within he 
area.  The consequences of open economic borders are the prime issue for the operation of the VAT 
within a common market, or more generally, within an area allowing free trade. 
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In this case, country B collects the VAT on the final consumption of goods in that 
country at the place where the importer is registered (domestic VAT).   In the case of 
imported goods by unregistered businesses or individuals, country B collects the VAT 
at the point of importation (import VAT).  This means that country B may miss the 
taxation of any subsequent value added if it is conducted by unregistered traders, but 
collects the full tax if the importer is purchasing for final consumption, and may even 
collect additional VAT if the import becomes an intermediate input of a subsequent 
registered business before final consumption.   
 
The import VAT characteristic of the credit-method destination VAT is important for 
many low-income countries where imports as a share of GDP are high and a 
significant share are purchased by unregistered traders.  This will be discussed further 
below as will the treatment of imported services, which are not directed affected by 
the existence of customs border controls, but are affected by some of the alternative 
VAT structures when border controls are removed. 
 
Border controls also assist country A controlling the internal exports by verifying the 
exports that are zero-rated rather than charged the standard VAT rate. 
 
Case 2 - No border controls and zero-rated internal exports 
Without internal border controls, a number of problems arise.  Country A has no way 
of confirming exports to country B without the co-operation of country B such that 
fraudulent export claims by firms in A are likely.  Country B, however, can only 
effectively assist country A confirm exports if the importer is a registered business.  
In the case of registered firms, import VAT cannot be collected at the border by 
country B, but can be self-declared by the firm at the time of filing a domestic VAT 
return (or VAT is collected by reverse charging by the importer) in which case a 
credit is simultaneously claimed, and hence, only the output tax paid.95   See Figure 
8.2. 
 
                                                 
95 Note that self-declaration of the import VAT is effectively the same as the “deferred VAT” structure 
above such that (ti  - tic) = 0.   See Appendix A, case I.a.ii. 
 
 
     FIRM 2 
Fig 8.1.  Normal zero rating 
COUNTRY A COUNTRY B
 
   FIRM 1 
BORDER
to= 0    ti    tic = ti               tf  
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In the case of unregistered businesses or individuals in country B importing from 
country A, country B has difficulty in enforcing any collection of import VAT such 
that no VAT is collected, ti  = 0.  This is effectively the same as setting the import 
VAT at zero on internal imports (ti  = 0 and tic = ti  = 0). 
 
Without border controls and zero-rated internal exports, the revenue collections on 
internal trade by countries A and B if the importer is registered are:  
 
RA = to = 0  (or  - to, if fraudulent exports)  
RB = (ti  - tic) + tf.  =  tf.   
 
If the importer is unregistered, then the import VAT, ti is the final VAT, and the 
revenue collections are: 
 
RA = to = 0 
RB = ti  = 0   
 
 
 
E-Commerce and distance shopping 
It should be noted that  “distance shopping” (sometimes also referred to as “distance 
selling”), which includes internal imports initiated by internet (or e-commerce) or 
other telecommunications or mail, is effectively the same as internal trade without 
border controls (unless all postal and shipping agents are under customs controls.)  
Similarly, the taxation of imported services is also effectively the same as internal 
trade without border controls.  The VAT revenue collections effectively depend upon 
whether the importer is a VAT registered business or not. 
 
Clearly, as shown in case 2, the dropping of border controls in the case of a credit-
method destination-based VAT with zero-rating of internal exports poses a serious 
revenue risk.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                              
 
 
 
     FIRM 2 
Fig 8.2.  Zero rating of internal exports 
   without border controls 
COUNTRY A COUNTRY B
 
   FIRM 1 
 to =0      ti = tic =?               tf  
 
93 
• First, the exporting country is exposed to increased risks of export fraud to 
exploit the zero-rating of  “exports”.  Typically goods are zero rated and 
supposedly exported – but actually remain for domestic consumption. This 
phenomenon has already been observed with SACU where border controls 
have been weakened, but not eliminated, and cross-border shopping is 
prevalent, for example, between Lesotho and South Africa.   
 
• Second, the importing country loses all the import VAT on goods imported by 
unregistered importers.  This can be a serious revenue loss if such import trade 
is a significant share of imports.  Removing the VAT from this trading channel 
would also be expected to expand this type of trade at the expense of trade by 
registered businesses.  The higher the share of trade by formal sector 
registered businesses and the lower the share of direct imports of final 
consumption goods by unregistered businesses, the smaller this problem.  
Hence, this problem may be more manageable within groupings of industrial 
countries such as the European Union, but much less so within groupings of 
low and lower middle-income countries such as within SADC. 
 
8.2.  Importance of VAT charged on imports 
 
How large is this problem of final imports by unregistered business and individual 
importers amongst SADC Member States?    As a start, imports are typically a high 
share of the economic activity in SADC.  Table 8.1 shows that between 1992-96 and 
1997-2001 on average imports as a share of GDP among the non-SACU SADC 
countries have been mainly in the range of 20% to 40% of GDP with the exception of 
Mauritius at close to 50% of GDP.  Imports as share of GDP for the SACU countries 
have been even higher, in the range of 40% to 70% of GDP with the exception of 
South Africa at around 20%.   It is likely that further regional trade liberalization will 
raise these import shares further, particularly for the smaller non-SACU countries.  It 
is clear that VAT on imports is typically an important component of the overall VAT 
in SADC countries.  
 
In addition, Table 8.2 shows the trade imbalances in goods and services on average 
between 1992-96 and 1997-2001 for SADC Member States.  For 7 out of the 13 
countries, there have been large trade deficits (over 10% of GDP).  For a further 3 
countries (DRC, Mauritius and Zimbabwe), trade deficits have been more modest.  
Only 3 countries (Angola, Botswana and South Africa) experienced trade surpluses.  
This implies that the destination VAT base (taxing imports and consumption) is the 
larger potential tax base than the origin VAT base (taxing exports and production).   
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Table 8.1:  Imports as share of GDP, 
SADC Member States, averages 1992-96 
and 1997-2001 
   
  1992-1996 1997-2001
 Percentages 
Non-SACU countries  
Angola 30.8 37.8 
DRC 14.3 24.1 
Malawi 33.6 33.5 
Mauritius 54.1 49.0 
Mozambique 39.6 26.3 
Tanzania 30.9 17.5 
Zambia 22.6 23.0 
Zimbabwe 32.6 32.5 
SACU countries   
Botswana 40.2 45.8 
Lesotho (%GDP) 105.6 89.8 
Lesotho (%GNDI) 56.6 62.4 
Namibia 41.7 45.0 
Swaziland 83.7 77.8 
South Africa 17.8 22.5 
Table 8.2:  Trade balance (exports minus 
imports) in goods and services as share of GDP, 
SADC Member States, averages 1992-96 and 
1997-2001 
   
  1992-1996 1997-2001 
 Percentages 
Non-SACU countries  
Angola 5.1 3.6 
DRC 1.7 (1.3) 
Malawi (18.7) (11.6) 
Mauritius (4.5) (2.8) 
Mozambique (30.0) (24.1) 
Tanzania (22.1) (10.8) 
Zambia (6.1) (11.4) 
Zimbabwe (3.1) (1.2) 
SACU countries   
Botswana 10.9 14.2 
Lesotho (%GDP) (95.8) (66.2) 
Lesotho (%GNDI) (70.0) (54.2) 
Namibia (10.9) (12.4) 
Swaziland (22.6) (15.7) 
South Africa 2.4 2.1 
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With a high share of imports in GDP, not surprisingly SADC Member States with 
VATs show that high shares of their VAT collections are collected on imports.  Table 
8.3 gives the import VAT as a share of total VAT collections between 1998 and 2002 
for 6 of the 8 SADC countries with VAT in place by 2002.  Data was not available 
from Namibia and Mauritius.  In recent years these ratios have typically been in the 
range of 50% to 70%.  South Africa has been at the bottom end of the range with 
import VAT as a share of total VAT at or close to 50% and initial data from Botswana 
shows that it is at the top end of the range at about 70%, with most other countries 
mainly in the 50% to 60% range.  Much of the import VAT will be collected on the 
inputs of registered traders, and hence, become input VAT deductions against the 
gross domestic VAT declarations, but the remainder represents final VAT collections 
as imports by unregistered businesses or individuals.   Appendix C provides a detailed 
analysis of the estimation of the share of final VAT collections that are derived from 
import VAT.   
 
To estimate the share of final VAT collections coming from imports, information is 
required on the share of import VAT that becomes an input VAT deduction by 
registered domestic importers.   Unfortunately, this information is not known directly 
for most countries.   Some countries break down the input VAT deductions claimed 
by registered VAT payers into deductions arising from VAT paid on imported inputs 
versus VAT paid on domestic input purchases.   For example, a recent study in Ghana 
for 1999-2001 was able to determine that approximately 60% of the import VAT was 
deductible as input tax while the import VAT averaged around 70% of total VAT 
collections.96  Hence, 40% of the import VAT were final VAT collections and formed 
about 28% of final (net) VAT receipts in Ghana.   
 
Even though similar data is not available on the breakdown of input VAT deductions 
for SADC countries, it is unlikely that less than 30% or more than 70% of the import 
VAT will become an input VAT deduction.  Hence, it is reasonable to expect that 
import VAT represents somewhere in the range of 15% to 50% of the final VAT 
taxes.97   
 
This means that even at the lower end of this range, if border controls are 
removed and taxes are not collected at the borders, a country would be at risk of 
losing some 15% or more of its VAT collections that would otherwise have been 
collected from imports by unregistered importers.    
 
In addition, countries would lose revenues through increased export frauds related to 
either falsely declared zero-rated internal exports or “round tripping” of such exports 
back into the home country.   To deal with this situation, a number of changes could 
be made to the VAT structure for dealing with internal trade within a regional free 
trade area such a common market.   Appendix D gives a systematic comparison of the 
range of tax structures applied to internal trade within a regional free trade area such 
as proposed for SADC.  Here, the focus is on potential solutions. 
                                                 
96 Graham Glenday, “VAT analysis and revenue estimation based on micro-simulation data,” a report 
prepared for the Ministry of Finance, Ghana, August 2003. 
97 Namibia maintains import VAT accounts for registered VAT payers to control payment, deferral and 
deduction of import VAT.  This will allow the estimation of the share of import VAT deducted.  
Malawi records the amount of input VAT arising from import VAT on its VAT returns and hence the 
share of import VAT that is deducted could be estimated. 
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Table 8.3.  Import VAT as a share of total VAT, selected SADC 
countries, 1998-2002 
      
     Fiscal year ending in:  
  1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
 Percentages 
Botswana     70.0p 
Malawi 60.0 64.6 68.7 60.1 56.4 
Mozambique  59.3 58.6 57.5 57.1 
South Africa 45.5 47.2 45.7 47.9 51.6 
Tanzania  50.8 49.7 60.3 59.2 
Zambia 34.0 42.1 60.0 62.8 57.9 
P = preliminary estimate     
 
 
8.3.  Potential VAT structures on internal trade within SADC 
 
If border controls are significantly weakened or eventually eliminated on internal 
trade within SADC, then there are three types of potential solution to sustain VAT 
revenues and maintain a system of destination-based VAT.   
 
All of them involve: 
  
(i) VAT being charged on internal exports, and  
(ii) require some level of involvement of a regional cross-country supervisory 
agency sanctioned by regional treaties,  
 
but differ on:  
 
(i) how the revenues from internal trade would be distributed among the countries 
in the region and  
(ii) whether or not countries are required to harmonize their VAT systems, or 
whether the VAT rate structures can vary across countries.   
 
Note - All of these solutions involve removing zero rating from internal exports 
(or exports between member countries of the regional free trade area), but 
choices exist concerning the VAT rate charged on the exports and whether or how the 
importing country gets compensated for the VAT included in its internal imports.  
More detailed analysis and background to the various proposals is given in Appendix 
D. 
 
a.  Compensating VAT with reconciliation 
 
It is perhaps easiest to start with the Compensating VAT or so called “CVAT” as it 
was derived out of the need to solve the problem of state level VATs in a federal 
system of government where the state governments have freedom to set differing 
VAT rates, but the interstate borders are free of fiscal controls.   
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Under the CVAT, rather than a zero rate exports, a special or compensating VAT 
rate, co, is charged on internal exports of both goods and services made by any 
member country to any other member country and the revenues are paid to a 
regional or super national supervisory agency established by the member 
countries such as the SADC Secretariat.  See Figure 8.3. The rate could be set any 
where within the range of standard VAT rates charged in the region.  Any VAT 
registered business in the exporting country - country A - would by default charge the 
standard VAT rate (to.), unless the purchaser is in another country within the region 
when co is payable, or outside of the free trade region, when the export would remain 
zero rated.  The importing country  - country B - gives the importer credit for the 
CVAT paid in country A on the import (if the importer is VAT registered.)  The tax 
authority in country B receives the compensating tax from the supervisory agency and 
could reconcile its compensating tax receipts with the input tax deductions based on 
paying compensating tax claimed by its importers.  Therefore, in the case of 
registered firms importing, the revenue collections by countries A and B are:  
 
RA = co - co = 0 
RB = - co + co + tf.  =  tf.   
 
This is exactly the same outcome for a destination VAT with border controls and 
zero-rated internal exports 
 
If the importer is unregistered, then the importing country may or may not capture the 
tax.  The exporting firm in country A would pay the compensating tax to the 
supervisory agency if the exporting firm had information that the buyer was a resident 
of country B (as would be the case of a mail order or other direct shipment).  The 
agency would then compensate country B.  If the exporting firm was unaware of the 
location of the buyer it would charge the domestic VAT rate by default and country A 
would collect the domestic VAT, to, as a final tax on the export.   In these cases, the 
revenue collections by countries A and B are: 
 
RA = to or co - co = 0 
RB = 0 or co 
 
Compared to the case of zero-rated internal exports where no tax would be collected 
by either country on goods and service exported to unregistered businesses in other 
member countries, with the compensating tax in place the importing country the 
importing country collects co where the location of the importer is known (this tax 
may be higher or lower than its standard rate) and the exporting country collects is 
own rate where the location within the region is not known.    
 
  
 
98 
 
 
An alternative approach to reconciliation is to have the tax authorities in all member 
countries collect the compensating tax on internal exports and report both internal 
export transactions and VAT input tax claims based on compensating tax payments by 
registered importers to the supervisory agency.  Given internal trade flows in both 
directions, the supervisory agency would then calculate the balancing payments that 
would need to be made between pairs of countries that would equal the difference 
between the gross flows of compensating tax that would have others occurred through 
the supervisory agency.  At a minimum each country would want to ensure it 
collected compensating tax to cover the input deduction claims of its registered 
importers based on payment of compensating tax. 
 
As already noted, the uniform compensating tax rate could be set anywhere within the 
range of standard rates of the member countries, which currently range from 10% to 
20% in SADC.  The greater the dispersion in the rates in the region, the larger the 
possible differences between to and co.  These differences can be expected to result in 
misdeclarations of internal trade with unregistered importers.  
 
• If to < co, then the importer will attempt to appear to be a domestic buyer to get 
the lower rate to the detriment of the revenues of the importing country, and  
• if co < to, then domestic buyers will have an incentive to appear to be from 
another member country.   
 
Suppliers would need to create false shipping documents to justify charging the 
wrong rate.  It is clear, however, that the smaller the spread in rates the smaller the 
problem. 
 
To remove the problem of the registered supplier having to make the decision on 
whether or not to charge the default rate on a domestic sale compared to the 
compensating tax rate on internal exports and zero rate on exports outside of the 
region, the system can be run by each member country charging its standard rate on 
internal exports, that is, co = to.    
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This transfers the problem of dealing with multiple rates to the registered importer, 
where now tic = to and to will vary by the country of origin of the import, and to the 
reconciliation process by the supervisory agency where importers will be paying VAT 
at the different rates of the exporting countries.  Unregistered importers will also have 
an incentive to import from the lower rate countries, all else being equal.   Having a 
uniform compensating tax simplifies the calculation of input VAT deductions and the 
reconciliation amounts.    If tax is to be charged at the rate of the country of origin of 
the internal export, then consideration can be given to the next option based on the 
origin principle of charging VAT for internal trade.   
 
b.  Origin principal on internal trade, but no reconciliation 
 
Under this approach, the destination principle is applied to external trade (exports are 
zero-rated and imports taxed), but the origin principle is applied to internal trade 
(internal exports are taxed.)   Taken as a whole, the region would be applying VAT 
using the destination principle on a consumption base, but the distribution of the 
revenues would not follow the distribution of final consumption across member 
countries.  Under this approach member countries could have different standard VAT 
rates. 
 
Under the origin principle, exports are taxed.  Under the credit-method, this export 
VAT should be credited against any subsequent VAT to prevent tax stacking prior to 
the final sale.  The importing country, however, will have difficulty in verifying the 
VAT paid on the imported inputs without special arrangements.  As a result, the 
import country has to resort to crediting the registered firm with a notional input 
VAT, possibly equal to the standard VAT that would have been paid on the import.  
The firm then credits this “input tax” against its output VAT.  With an international 
treaty and a supervisory agency, the exporter could supply copies of tax-paid invoices 
to the importing firm 2 and country B could have the right to request confirmation of 
the VAT paid from country A and then give a credit for this VAT, or tic = to exactly.  
See Figure 8.4. This crediting process by the importing country does not depend upon 
border controls.  The importing country then collects VAT from the stages of 
production within its borders.  If the importer is unregistered, no further VAT is 
collected in the importing country (country B) as if this is final consumption.  
 
If the importer is registered, the revenues collected by countries A and B are given by: 
 
RA = to  
RB = - tic + tf.    
RA + RB = to - tic + tf   
                    =  tf ,  if  tic = to  
 
If the importer is unregistered, then the revenue collections are: 
 
RA = to  
RB = 0.   
 
In the case of the registered importer, the total tax is the same final tax that would be 
collected under the destination principle, but now the distribution of revenues depends 
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upon the distribution of the valued added in production of the consumed good or 
service.  In the case of the unregistered importer, tax is collected in the exporting 
country.   To the extent that VAT rates differ across countries, unregistered importers 
will also have an incentive to import from the lower rate countries, all else being 
equal. This will bias production in the region towards countries with lower VAT rates.   
 
  
 
An origin tax can effectively be collected from all registered traders on all supplies 
(including services and distance sales to persons in other member countries) at the 
point of sale rather than at the point of export.  Internal exports by unregistered traders 
would be missed without border collection of the export VAT, but this is usually less 
of a problem in that exporters are typically the larger businesses in an economy.  Note 
that tax will be collected at least at the tax rate of the exporting country on all taxable 
supplies, no mater whether they are supplied to a registered or unregistered persons or 
are services or distance sales.    
 
This option results in the VAT falling on consumption within the common market, but 
the VAT revenues collected may not be distributed among the countries according to 
consumption within the countries as the VAT charged on internal exports is retained 
in the exporting country unless some compensatory payments are made between 
the countries or an alternative revenue sharing arrangement is made.   
 
Origin taxation of the internal trade makes the distribution of the revenues favor the 
countries with a higher share of the taxable production (net internal exports) rather 
than taxable consumption (net internal imports).98  In the case of SADC, countries 
with net internal export balances would gain VAT revenues such as South Africa at 
the expense of most other SADC Member States with net internal import balances.  
                                                 
98 With origin taxation internally and destination taxation externally, unusual distributions of VAT 
could arise depending upon the trade balances of countries internally and externally.  A country that is 
a net external importer, but a net internal exporter would gain a disproportionately high share of the 
total revenues of all member countries.  By contrast, a country that was a net external exporter, but net 
internal importer would receive a disproportionately low share of the total revenues. 
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The bias for unregistered importers to purchase from the lower VAT rate countries 
could exacerbate these trade imbalances within SADC.  Hence, while application of 
the origin principle with regional supervision and administrative co-operation solves 
the loss of VAT revenues on imports by unregistered importers from the relaxation of 
border controls and improves the taxation of trade in services and of distance sales, 
the distribution of revenues within the SADC region may not be acceptable.  Hence, 
an approach that retains the benefits of origin taxation in revenue collection needs to 
be combined with a different approach to revenue sharing across the region. 
  
c.  Origin principal on internal trade, with revenue pooling and consumption 
based sharing 
 
This approach retains the destination principle for external (outside the common 
market) trade, and origin principle for internal trade, but pools all the VAT 
collections from all the member countries.  The revenue pool is then shared in 
proportion to estimates of consumption (or some more accurate estimate of the value 
of the VAT base) of each member country.  This requires  
 
(i) a supervisory agency to manage the revenue pool and 
(ii) a common tax structure be applied across all countries.99  
 
 Without a common VAT structure, countries with broader bases and higher VAT 
rates will be transferring revenues to those with narrower bases and lower VAT rates.  
To allow for some variation in standard VAT rates, the consumption base of each 
country could be weighted by its standard VAT rate, or instead of estimated 
consumption bases being used to share revenues, estimated consumption taxes would 
be used as weights.  This approach has been suggested for the European Union VAT 
system100 and will be applied under the new SACU Agreement for the collection of 
excise duties using the GDP of the SACU member countries as the sharing basis.   In 
general, the approach of collective or pooled collection avoids the issues of any 
revenue gaps at the internal borders, and the sharing in proportion to the estimated 
consumption bases or collections allows the countries to retain their revenue bases.  
This approach is analogous to a nation-state collection of a destination-based VAT 
and then sharing the revenues across sub-national political units according to 
consumption shares.   
 
The revenue pooling and sharing approach has some concerns that need to be 
addressed.  
 
• First, concerns arise about whether the incentives of the tax administrations of 
individual countries to collect revenues are undermined by the pooling 
process.   
                                                 
99 Complete harmonization of tax structures is not essential, but the basic features of the tax structure 
that change the effective VAT rate on tradable goods and services or affect any incentives to invest 
across countries should be harmonized.  The tax rates, zero rates and exemptions affecting the cost of 
tradable goods and services need to harmonized.  The real level of turnover for compulsory registration 
and the VAT treatment of local public sector-type services could be subject to some degree of variation 
across countries. 
100  Commission of the European Communities, “A Common System of VAT: A Programme for the 
Single Market,” COM(96) 328, July 1996. 
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• Second, as can be noted from Chapter 6, there is a wide variation in tax 
efficiencies across countries that can make revenue sharing across countries of 
a relatively large revenue source such as VAT problematic on the basis of any 
macroeconomic aggregate such as GNDI, GDP or consumption.  Without 
adjusting for tax efficiency, the more inefficient countries will receive a larger 
share than they deserve.   
 
Two approaches to combined retention and pool sharing are explored in Appendix E.   
 
• The first approach uses partial retention and sharing of the residual pool in 
proportion to a member country’s share of consumption.  For example, 
member countries could retain share of their own collections (say, two-thirds) 
and deposit the remainder in a central pool for sharing amongst member 
countries based on estimates of consumption.  This approach leaves member 
countries with incentives to collect, partially adjusts for the VAT efficiency, 
and reduces concerns about the timing of receiving funds back from a central 
pool.   As the retention gets higher, concerns would arise about the allocation 
of taxes collected on imports from outside of the common market arriving and 
being collected in one country while they are destined for another member 
country.  This would require the allocation of retained taxes on such imports to 
the destination country to which the goods are assigned.   
 
• The second approach has countries that are net internal importers from the 
other member countries retain all their collections, while the net exporting 
countries retain a share of their collections that removes the estimated share of 
revenues derived from net exports to the other member countries.    The 
remainder of the collections by the net exports would be deposited in a central 
pool and shared amongst the countries with net imports from the other 
member countries in proportion to their share of total net internal imports by 
the net importing countries.  While the allocations across countries would be 
precise and avoid the issues of different collection incentives and VAT 
efficiencies across countries, it leaves the concern that measures of internal 
trade between member countries would need to be retained.  This may require 
the use of border controls.  The problem of customs collection of imports by 
one country destined to another member country is handled through the 
mechanism of adjustments based on net internal exports and imports between 
member countries.        
 
 
8.4    Future Directions for SADC 
 
The approach of origin-based collection internally, and pooling and sharing revenues 
may be taken as a medium term target, but is not attainable in the short term given the 
significant differences in the consumption taxes structures and bases across SADC 
Member States aside from the need to build the revenue pooling and sharing legal and 
institutional structures.  Currently, 10 of the 13 SADC members have VATs, some of 
a very recent origin.  Focusing more on the current situation, all member countries 
still maintain fiscal border controls, hence the development of any co-ordinated VAT 
collection can utilize these facilities.   As shown in Appendix D (section I.A (iii) and 
(iv)), however, the CVAT (or compensating VAT) and/or the charging of domestic 
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VAT on internal exports (along with registered importers getting input VAT credits 
for taxes paid in the exporting country and the import country getting compensated 
for providing these credits can be applied) can be implemented with border controls in 
place.   In fact, with border controls in place the importance of having more similar 
sales tax or VAT systems is diminished because differences in tax treatment can be 
resolved in the border transactions.    
 
This resolution of different tax structures can be illustrated using Figure 8.5 where 
VAT is charged on internal exports (either at the domestic VAT rate of to in country A 
or at the compensating rate of co if a CVAT is in place), the importing country B 
charges (or credits) the difference between its import VAT rate and the exporting 
country rate (ti - to) and then allows its import VAT rate to be taken as an input VAT 
deduction if the importer is VAT registered against output VAT (tf).    
 
Country B claims compensation of co =  to from country A through a supervisory 
agency for crediting the VAT rate of country A.   Clearly if both countries have the 
same standard VAT rate, the border resolution simplifies (ti - to =0), but in principle 
the tax differential could be collected or credited at the border if the rates differ.  If 
country B had a single stage sales tax instead of a credit-method VAT that exempted 
tax on capital and intermediate inputs into the production of taxable supplies, then ti = 
0, but the registered importing business would receive a full credit of to, the tax paid 
in country A. 
 
It is further noted that some of the features of an overall consumption tax system 
already exist within SACU.   SACU already has revenue pooling and sharing for 
import and excise duties within common tax structures with a supervisory agency in 
place (though it is currently undergoing reforms under the 2002 SACU Agreement.)  
Within SACU, the issues of weakened border controls have already emerged and 
bilateral agreements are being pursued and implemented, such as between South 
Africa and Lesotho, to resolve these problems. 
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This analysis suggests approaches to develop a regional consumption tax structure.    
 
• The early stages would involve the establishment of a CVAT with a 
reconciliation arrangement.  This could be initially tested either within SACU 
or across a subset of SADC countries.  This tax-and-compensate mechanism is 
already being used on trade between South Africa and Lesotho.  This structure 
could then be rolled out to all SADC Member States such that internal exports 
are subject to tax at either the domestic VAT rate or a CVAT rate by the time 
a customs union is in place in 2010, or later, by 2015, the target for a SADC 
common market.  Agreements could also be reached about the degree of 
harmonization of VAT structures and rates within the SADC region to allow 
revenue sharing based on estimated consumption tax bases or collections.   
This would allow a switch from revenue reconciliation to revenue pooling and 
sharing once the legal and institutional arrangements exist for managing a 
SADC revenue pool.        
 
• Another early initiative that should be undertaken is an effort to confirm the 
share of import VAT that is a final tax across countries or alternatively the 
share of final taxes that are derived from import VAT.   Data to available to 
date suggest that some 15% to 40% of final VAT could be collected at the 
border.  This represents a significant share of VAT revenues that could be at 
risk.  A high rate of final tax collection on imports forms a fundamental 
motivation for changing the VAT treatment of internal trade from destination 
to origin based within a customs union or common market where fiscal 
borders are weakened or eliminated.  Unfortunately, direct evidence is not 
available from SADC Member States.  Countries should therefore be 
encouraged to collect and report the following: 
 
i. Import VAT or VAT collected at the border by customs each fiscal year.  
While these records are available to the VAT authorities of all countries, 
all countries do not systematically report them. 
 
ii. Import VAT collected from registered and unregistered importers.   This 
requires either self-declaration by the importer of his VAT registration 
status on import documents and/or the matching of importer identification 
numbers (usually a taxpayer identification number) with records of 
businesses registered for VAT. 
 
iii. Total input VAT deductions and the amount of these based on import VAT 
paid in a fiscal year.  This requires domestic VAT returns to split input 
VAT deductions into those arising from import VAT paid and those arise 
from VAT invoices from domestic suppliers. 
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IX.  VAT administration: organization, operations and 
development   
 
The performance of a tax system depends critically on many structural features of an 
economy.  These issues were discussed at some length in Chapter VI in terms of the 
tax capacity, effort and efficiency of the member countries.  Two critical components 
of any tax system are the capacity of the taxpayer to comply with the tax law and the 
capacity of the tax administration to assist the taxpayer to comply as well as enforce 
compliance where it is not voluntarily forthcoming.   The credit-method VAT is a 
self-assessed tax which puts a large burden on the taxpayer in terms of appropriately 
issuing VAT-invoices, maintaining books and records, collecting VAT, filing returns 
and making payments to the authorities.   The success of a VAT, therefore, depends 
critically on the capacities of the taxpayers.   The focus in this Chapter, however, is on 
the capacities of the tax administrations to facilitate and enforce a VAT.    
 
The primary source of information on the tax administration capacities of SADC 
Member States is a survey on tax administration organization and operations, with a 
focus on VAT, general sales or turnover tax administration, in order to determine its 
status and the need and scope for development of the administrative capacity.    
 
All thirteen SADC Member States provided answers to the questionnaire.  The survey 
was largely self-administered, but David Hollinrake, SADC Tax Advisor, also visited 
nearly all of the countries and interviewed the tax authorities, and assisted where 
possible with obtaining answers to the survey.  The author, Graham Glenday, also 
visited or worked with the tax authorities in six of the member countries in the context 
of this or other projects.  A copy of the questionnaire that was administered is 
provided in Appendix F and a listing of the meetings with officials in Member States 
is provided in Appendix G. 
 
The results of the survey are tabulated at the end of this Chapter as Table 9.1. 
 
 
9.1 Organization and management of tax administration 
 
Organization of tax administration 
Three aspects of the broad organization of tax administration were focused on:  
  
(i) whether the tax administration was organized as a separate revenue 
authority and the degree of autonomy of the administration;  
(ii) whether the administration was organized on a tax-type or functional basis 
and  
(iii) whether a large taxpayer unit had been established. 
 
Seven of the thirteen member countries (Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, South Africa, 
Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe) have established over the past decade semi-
autonomous revenue authorities to administer taxes.  Mauritius and Mozambique have 
revenue authorities under preparation and Swaziland has one under consideration with 
expected implementation in August 2006.  Where revenue authorities are not in place, 
taxes are administered by departments of the Ministry of Finance and the tax officials 
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are appointed under the general public or civil service arrangements.  In most cases, 
where revenue authorities exist, boards of directors, which have varying degrees of 
private sector representation, makes appointments, other than the Commissioner 
General.  In one case, Botswana reports that appointments are still made under the 
public service laws, rather than independently by the authority (as an interim 
measure).  In the case of the DRC, the revenue department reports a high degree of 
autonomy in administrative and financial matters of tax administration.   
 
Functional organization of the administration of inland revenue (or the collection of 
any type of tax revenue from domestic taxpayers) has become a common trend 
internationally.  A functional organization is based on managers overseeing one tax 
administration function (for example, revenue collection) for all types of tax.  This 
contrasts with tax-type organization where one manager oversees all functions for one 
type of tax.  The move towards functional organization seeks administrative cost-
savings, higher revenue yields and less compliance burden of the taxpayer through the 
synergies of simultaneous audits and collections of all types of tax from a taxpayer.   
 
Most countries with an Anglo-tax tradition have tax type organizations.  This is true 
for all the nine SADC Member States with strong Anglo influences on the 
development of their tax systems, except for South Africa, and Zimbabwe, which 
have shifted to functional organizations as part of establishing their revenue 
authorities.  These countries also often followed the Anglo-tradition of placing VAT 
or sales taxes under their Customs and Excise administrations.  This is still true in 
Botswana and Swaziland. 
 
Countries with tax traditions derived from continental Europe tend to have inland 
revenue organized on functional lines.   This is the case in Angola, DRC and 
Mozambique.  Mauritius has a tax type organization.  Overall only six of the thirteen 
member countries are fully or largely functionally organized.  Zambia has its debt 
collections, and large business and investigations organized on a functional basis but 
broadly retains tax type administration.  Mauritius along with establishing a revenue 
authority is also reorganizing its tax administration along functional lines. 
 
Where revenue authorities have been established there is always some degree of 
centralization or co-ordination of many high-level functions (policy and planning, 
legal services, and internal investigation, as examples) and support functions (such as 
human resources, information technology and finance).   Key tax administration 
functions of audit and collection typically remain separate, however, if the authority 
has a tax-type organizational structure. 
 
Another trend that is emerging in tax administration is the development of client-
oriented tax administration.  The focus here is recognizing that taxpayers in different 
sectors or of different sizes may require different services, compliance strategies and 
have different revenue importance.  A client-oriented structure involves having 
functionally organized units focus on different market segments.   The most common 
example is the large taxpayer unit or LTU, where large taxpayers, typically identified 
by having a high turnover level, have a one-stop relationship with the revenue 
administration.  Typically assessment, audit, collection and service functions are 
provided by one-unit for all tax types.  Clearly, the formation of LTU would be easier 
in the context of a functional organization, but interestingly LTU's exist in tax-type 
107 
organizations as commonly as functional organizations.  Overall, seven Member 
States report establishing LTUs – four amongst the functionally organized 
administrations (Angola, DRC, Mozambique, and Namibia) and three amongst tax-
type administrations (Malawi, Mauritius and Tanzania).  South Africa reported an 
LTU was under consideration. It is now introduced.  Two countries (Lesotho and 
Zambia) also report having large trader units within VAT and/or income tax 
administrations. 
 
Budgeting for and costs of tax administration  
The questionnaire sought budget allocation to tax administration in total and by inputs 
(personnel, capital, other current) and by type of tax in order to check the 
transparency of tax administration budgeting and the potential use of the unit costs of 
collections as revenue performance measures.   
 
Eleven of the member countries have a budget allocated by the Ministry of Finance 
that is negotiated annually.  Two have their budget set as a share of collections: DRC 
(7%), and Lesotho (2%). 
 
Only five countries (Botswana, Mauritius, Namibia, South Africa and Swaziland) 
reported the costs of tax administration broken down by input types and Lesotho 
reported the total cost.   Namibia and South Africa could not break down the costs by 
tax-type.  This is understandable where functional tax administration is being used 
such as in South Africa. 
 
Client market 
The questionnaire requested information on the taxpayer population in terms of 
numbers registered, numbers active taxpayers and size distribution of registered 
taxpayers in order to determine how aware the administrations are of the 
characteristics of their client population and whether it is possible that this 
information was being used to direct administrative resources to improve the 
efficiency of collections.    
 
All but two could provide a count of the number of registered VAT, sales or turnover 
taxpayers.  Zimbabwe could not provide further details as its VAT was in start-up 
phase.  Angola could not separate out the turnover taxpayers from all registered 
taxpayers.   Out of the remaining eleven countries, nine could give estimates of the 
active taxpayer population, but only six could provide a distribution of the registered 
taxpayers by turnover.   
 
Staffing, qualifications, pay and training 
All countries except Zimbabwe (new organization) and Mozambique supplied 
information on the number of tax administration personnel involved in the VAT, sales 
or turnover tax administration.  While there is difficulty in the comparability of the 
data because of different organizational arrangements, particularly functional versus 
tax-type organizations, there is a wide range in the number of taxpayers per tax 
official.   
 
At the low end, with less than 40 taxpayers per official are Lesotho, Malawi, 
Swaziland and Tanzania and officers are administering only one type of major tax.   
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In the mid-range are Mauritius (40), Botswana (69), and South Africa (84).  Namibia 
has 341 taxpayers per officer, and Angola has 5,628 taxpayers (including individuals) 
per officer or 649 corporate taxpayers per officer.  In the cases of South Africa, 
Namibia and Angola officers are administering all inland revenues.  Having too few 
tax officers can be inefficient as the tax may neither be effectively enforced nor the 
taxpayer properly serviced, but equally having too many tax officers is wasteful of 
resources.  This is likely to be the case in the countries with below 40 taxpayers per 
officer managing a single tax.  Angola, by contrast would appear to have too few tax 
officers, but closer analysis of Namibia would be required to determine whether the 
staffing was appropriate. 
 
Tax administration requires a range of high skills including management, law, 
accounting, auditing, information technology etc.  Ideally, a high proportion of tax 
officers should have post-secondary education at the university or other professional 
certification level plus considerably job specific skill training.  While there are 
difficulties in making comparisons across different organizational structures, 
generally many countries appear to have shortages of high qualification staff.     
 
Mozambique did not report any estimates of qualifications of staff.  Four countries 
report having less than 20% of their staff with post-secondary university or other 
professional certification: Angola, DRC, Malawi and Namibia.  Four report between 
20% and 40% of their staff with such qualifications:  Botswana, Mauritius, South 
Africa and Swaziland.  Four report having over 40% of highly qualified staff:  
Lesotho, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe, but their estimates may be over stated by 
underreporting the share of centrally employed support staff that are actually 
servicing VAT administration.   All countries report acute shortages of qualified 
accountants – typically well below 5% of the officers.   
 
No systematic pattern emerges from reports of vacancies.  When reviewing the 
competitiveness of wages offered by the tax administrations with the private sector, a 
clearer pattern emerges that the revenue authorities operating outside of the 
restrictions of the civil service pay scales, are able to offer more competitive pay 
packages than the departmental administrations.  Even amongst the revenue 
authorities, however, problems emerge in retaining or attracting highly qualified 
personnel such as fully qualified accountants.    
 
Overall, while the implementation of revenue authorities has improved the ability of 
tax administrations to retain and attract qualified personnel, there remain issues of the 
adequacy of the skill levels of staff and the need to develop internally or attract top-
level professional and managerial staff.   Tanzania reports the use of performance-
based term contracts for top managers.  Further investigation into the use and 
effectiveness of such contracts may be fruitful.  The problems of inadequately 
qualified staff are more acute among the tax administrations that cannot offer 
competitive pay.  The traditional trade-off between over-employment of lower skilled 
personnel and raising the pay levels of top employees to attract or retain them persists. 
 
All member countries, except DRC, report having some forms of internal training 
capacity, ranging from a small unit to a more formal training institution.  DRC only 
uses external training capacity.  The internal training capacity is typically geared to 
training new recruits in VAT or sales tax law and administration.  Many offer various 
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more advanced courses or refresher courses.  About a third mentions audit related 
training.  Other skills training in areas, such as management or information 
technology, are only mentioned by a few countries, such as Zambia and Mauritius.  
Given the high fixed costs of developing and maintaining training capacities, it is not 
surprising that the poorer and smaller countries typically have more limited training 
capacities and limited funds to make use of regional and external training 
opportunities.    Most countries report use of regional training opportunities such as 
those offered by SADC and the Southern Africa Tax Institute (SATI) that is based in  
South Africa.  Angola, DRC and Mozambique all note the difficulties of accessing 
regional training opportunities because of language and financial limitations.   
 
Most of the countries report making use of training opportunities abroad in Australia, 
France and the US to the extent that funds are available.   
 
Clearly, the building of capacities in tax administrations represents a major long-term 
challenge for SADC.  Much of the capacity will need to be internally generated, but 
some can be achieved through changes in pay policies to attract and retain top quality 
staff.  Training strategies will need to be at the core of moves towards functional 
administration (officers will need to be trained in all the major domestic or inland 
taxes), greater use of information technology, especially e-government, enhanced 
audit performance and improved taxpayer service.  Tax officers will need broader 
access to training in “non-traditional” areas such general management, public 
relations, information technology as well as more traditional areas such law, 
accounting and auditing.    
 
There are clearly economies of scale in training that can be accessed on a regional 
basis.  The ability to conduct all training regionally is limited by issues such as 
language, and differences in the laws and specific procedures of the Member States.  
Regional and international training is usually better suited to higher level training and 
more general skills such as accounting, management, information technology, tax 
analysis and revenue forecasting.  Such training can be used for leadership training as 
well as the training of trainers.  Moves to harmonize laws and administration across 
SADC Member States, however, would expand the range of training opportunities 
that could be offered on a regional basis or at least amongst groups of countries with 
the same working language and similar tax and economic structures. 
 
Computerization  
The degrees of computerization of tax administration cover a wide range.  In the area 
of customs administration, Angola and Mozambique do not provide information.  
Botswana and Mauritius report having high degrees of computerization of customs 
clearances and administration.  At the other extreme, Lesotho and Swaziland only 
have computerized customs and trade statistics.  In between these, the other member 
countries report systems (such as Asycuda) that are either run in parallel to paper 
systems or may have partial computerization of some customs functions and varying 
degrees of integration with the administration of other taxes such as the use of 
common taxpayer registries.   
 
In the area of domestic administration of VAT, sales or turnover taxes, the degree of 
computerization is typically less than for customs.  A number of countries report a 
high degree of computerization and reliance on computer records (though paper 
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returns and correspondence records are maintained.)  These include Mauritius, South 
Africa, Zambia and Zimbabwe.  A number are maintaining parallel paper and 
computer systems (such as VIPS).  These are Botswana, DRC, Lesotho, Malawi, 
Mozambique and Namibia.  Swaziland report limited use for capturing returns 
information and collection statistics, while Angola only reports using computers in 
maintaining collection statistics. 
 
Clearly, in SADC considerable scope exists for strengthening the use of computer-
based administration in VAT, sales and turnover taxes both at the borders and inland.   
 
With the rapid growth of internet services based on the World Wide Web and related 
e-governance techniques, the importance of comprehensive and integrated tax 
administration systems is growing.  The internet not only provides a powerful and 
cost-effective means of communicating with the tax paying public by making tax 
compliance information rapidly and widely available (as will be discussed further 
below under taxpayer education), but also opens the door to the electronic receipt of 
both tax return information and tax collections.   
 
Effective internal computer systems need to be in place to receive and process this tax 
information and account for the tax receipts.  Moreover, the internet has greatly 
“democratized” information technology.  It is making powerful computer-based 
information and data processing tools widely available, in user-friendly ways and at 
relatively low costs.  Internet cafes are offering low cost access to the power of the 
internet and are becoming available in most urban centers where the bulk of taxpayers 
are located.  E-filing and e-payments of taxes are dramatically lowering the costs of 
tax administration and, more importantly, of tax compliance.  At the same time 
offering enormously expanded, more timely and more accurate information bases to 
tax administrators and tax policy analysts.  Many countries are either encouraging or 
even requiring the e-filing of tax return information on a selective or more general 
basis e.g. for the largest taxpayers.  In some countries, e-filing will include tax 
calculators to ensure accurate tax calculations as well as e-payment mechanism of tax 
liabilities.   This cost-effective potential of e-government in tax administration needs 
to be exploited by SADC Member States.  The capabilities of member countries are 
noted under taxpayer education and service below. 
 
 
 Tax administration functions 
 
Audit capacity 
With any self-assessed tax such as the VAT, audits, especially field audits, are a 
critical tool in controlling the accuracy of tax returns.   The effectiveness of any audit 
program depends critically on three factors.    
 
• First, the audit program or the basis of selection of businesses for a tax audit: 
which businesses have a high probability of having underreported their tax 
liability by a large amount.   
• Second, the quality of the auditors determines their ability to detect or identify 
underreporting of taxes.   
• Third, the mechanisms used to control quality and preventing corruption.   
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The second factor, the quality of the auditors, is dealt with under the section on 
staffing and training, which notes a shortage of fully qualified accountants in most of 
the tax administrations, but recognizes many countries provide training in the area of 
tax accounting and auditing.  The other two factors are the focus here.     
 
Most countries report routine field audits ranging from once a year to once every five 
years.  Some countries distinguish between visits and more in-depth investigation, and 
between the levels of effort devoted to small versus large businesses.   Namibia 
reports random risk-weighted selection.  South Africa reports grouping firms into 
three groups – high, medium and low – resulting in visits every 3, 4 or 5 years.  
Swaziland uses past records and subjective judgment to risk classify firms to 
determine the frequency of audits.  Tanzania uses size to determine the same three 
classes of frequency of visits – large firms being visited more frequently than small.  
It also report that the computer system does assign points to identify high risk 
companies, but generally manual selection is used.  Malawi requires audits of all 
firms claiming refunds.  Zambia reports a combined system of computer-based, 
intelligence based, subjective judgments and past audit result-based risk assessment 
and selection.   
 
There is clearly much scope for developing objective risk-based selection of audits 
and especially with regard to refund audits that appear to take a disproportionately 
high level of resource in many countries.  This requires the development over time of 
computer-based track records to identify key determinants of high-risk taxpayers.    
 
Audits can be risky in the sense that they open up opportunities for improper 
negotiations between the auditor and taxpayer.  To control audits, many countries 
report field audits being conducted in pairs and audit reports being scrutinized by a 
supervisory or some higher-level officer.  A few countries report the use of internal 
audits or follow-up audits either randomly or intelligence-advised as well as checks 
on audit reports.  A few countries report no mechanism for oversight of audits. 
 
Debt collection capacity 
All countries, except DRC, report having some type of special units dedicated to debt 
collections.  In the six countries with functional organizations, these units collect 
taxes from all types of domestic taxes.  In addition, Zambia reports that its debt unit 
services all types of tax even though it has a tax-type organization.  The remaining six 
countries organized by tax type have separate collection units for each tax type.  In 
DRC, it appears that debt collections are conducted by an external organization.  
Seven countries report the size of their dedicated debt collection units, varying from 4 
in Botswana dedicated to VAT up to 28 in Zambia with a combined tax collection 
unit.   
 
Most countries have similar debt collection powers.  Typically penalties and interest 
are charged on outstanding taxes and demand notices are issued to defaulting 
taxpayers.  Most countries report the ability to attach and auction property (land, 
buildings and other real assets), many can attach or freeze bank accounts, and some 
can garnish wages or sequester rental or other income flows.  In most cases, the tax 
authorities are empowered to undertake collection enforcement actions.  Angola and 
DRC appear to have external agencies to enforce debt collections.             
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Enforcement and appeals 
Generally tax enforcement is carried out through administrative procedures.  Only 
South Africa report actual prosecution of tax fraud cases, while Lesotho, Zambia and 
Tanzania report cases under preparation.   
 
All countries report layered mechanisms for the taxpayer to appeal agency-made 
assessments, penalties etc.   In general appeals can be made to the tax administration 
to a senior official or the highest-level officer in the administration.  A few countries 
(Lesotho, Malawi and Tanzania) report internal committees to review appeals rather 
than delegating the task to the top officer.  Only Angola and Swaziland report that 
appeals can be made to the Minister for Finance.  Many countries have established 
some special tax tribunal, board or court as the first level of external appeal.  These 
include Botswana, Lesotho, Mauritius, South Africa, Tanzania, Zambia and 
Zimbabwe.  Malawi and Namibia report their intention to introduce such bodies.  
These specialized “courts” tend to be the major bodies for most VAT appeals.  South 
Africa has also introduced an “Alternative Dispute Resolution” mechanism, though 
the range of issues that can be negotiated rather than determined on the facts of a case 
are unclear.  In most countries, appeals can be taken to the high courts, though this is 
generally uncommon for appeals on assessments under an indirect tax such as VAT, 
sales or turnover tax in unless there is some fundamental issue of legal interpretation.   
In Angola and Mozambique, the administrative courts are the highest level of appeal, 
but as is pointed out in many situations the senior tax administrators are also members 
of administrative courts.   
 
Taxpayer education and service 
VAT is a self-assessed tax that puts the bulk of the burden of administration of the tax 
on the registered taxpayer.   The cost-effective education and service of taxpayers can 
lower the costs of compliance and improve the quality of compliance.  All countries 
report using various media and strategies for educating and communicating tax 
compliance information.   
 
Most countries use some combination of the following:   
 
• visits to taxpayer (particularly upon first registration or audit),  
• workshops,  
• public rallies,  
• help desks at local offices,  
• central information call centers with toll-free telephone lines,  
 
And distribute information through a range of media including: 
  
• official publications (government gazette),  
• pamphlets and guides,  
• public newspapers,  
• radio and TV advertisements or discussion programs,  
• special tax newspapers or journals,  
• and various uses of internet services.   
113 
 
As noted above, under computerization capacities, internet services offer powerful 
cost-effective means for disseminating large amounts of information rapidly.  The use 
of the internet as a media varies across countries.  South Africa and Mauritius have 
websites that provide full services of publishing documents (budget speeches and 
documents, laws, regulations, rulings, guidelines, etc), e-filing and e-payment of 
taxes.  Many countries have websites that provide full publication of documents.  
These include Botswana, Lesotho, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe.  Other countries 
have websites with limited summary and descriptive information about the tax 
agencies and taxes. These include Angola, Namibia and Swaziland.  Namibia is 
preparing to launch a more capable website.  DRC tax authorities do not appear to 
have a website, but report using email to communicate with taxpayers, as does 
Lesotho.  
 
Some countries such as South Africa have implemented policies of rapid or 
immediate publication of all key public documents (laws, regulations, policy 
announcements, etc) to ensure rapid and comprehensive access to public information.  
In the case of a tax system such as the VAT, e-publication and even e-mail provide a 
powerful tool for rapid and accurate dissemination of technical information such as 
changes in rate or exemption schedules, effective dates of application of changes, etc 
as well as softer information such as encouraging good citizenship by taxpayers.  Any 
information that can be published in printed media can also be published through the 
internet. 
 
Clearly, the results of the survey indicate a wide range of channels being used to 
communicate with taxpayers.  The effectiveness of the messages and the ready access 
to accurate and timely information about tax compliance is difficult to judge from 
some of the survey responses.  For example, the quality of pamphlets and how widely 
are they distributed and in what languages.  In some cases it is clear that every 
registered taxpayer is sent a copy, but in others a pamphlet may have a limited 
numbers printed or only be available in limited locations.   
 
Ultimately, there is a need to survey taxpayers as to the effectiveness of taxpayer 
education and services – such as how much do they know, how quickly and cheaply 
do they find out about changes in tax compliance and how difficult or costly is it for 
them to comply. 
 
 
  Tax performance statistics 
 
The questions on tax collection statistics were designed to assess the availability (and 
hence potential use in tax policy and administration functions) of various collection 
measures.   
 
The first group of questions, about the amounts of VAT, sales tax or turnover tax 
collected at the border compared to domestic transactions, was motivated by the 
concerns raised earlier in the report about the importance of collections at the border 
and the issues this raises in the context of establishing a common market.  Customs 
plays critical roles in collecting taxes on imports by unregistered persons as well as 
controlling export frauds that have to be overcome in moving to a common market.   
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The second set of questions checks on the availability of data that are important 
management information in directing tax enforcement efforts as well as in forecasting 
tax collections.  This information focused on collections of arrears and payments of 
outstanding refunds. 
 
Table 9.1 shows that only 7 of the SADC Member States are able to report VAT, sales 
or turnover collections at the border: Botswana, Malawi, Mauritius, South Africa, 
Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe.  These countries plus Namibia also reported 
collections from domestic transactions.  The other countries cannot separate out the 
source of their revenue collections.   
 
Somewhat fewer countries were able to report statistics on arrears and unpaid refunds.  
Botswana, Mauritius, South Africa, Tanzania, and Zambia reported data on the 
amounts of arrears and the periods of delay in collections.  In the case of Zimbabwe 
given the newness of the VAT, arrears and refund data was not yet available.  Only 
three countries report the share of arrears arising from parastatal companies that are 
typically more difficult to collect.  Mauritius reported the important distinction 
between arrears arising from self-assessments and those from agency assessment, the 
latter being typically more difficult to collect.   In addition, Malawi reports the 
aggregate breakdown of arrears between parastatal and private companies based on 
manually maintained records.  Only Mauritius and Zambia report the amounts of 
unpaid refunds at year ends.   (For the three countries that do not have a VAT, credit 
refunds are not an issue.) 
 
Finally, out of the twelve countries excluding Zimbabwe, only four reported the 
amounts of taxes collected from enforcement actions (as opposed to payments arising 
from self-assessments): Botswana, Mauritius, South Africa and Zambia.  The amounts 
and sources of taxes, penalties and interest payments is important source of 
management information in directing enforcement activities (particularly tax audits) 
as well as in making revenue forecasts. 
 
Overall, while most countries report having parallel computer systems to maintain 
collection statistics, it is evident that most are not maintaining or using this data in a 
fashion that would assist tax enforcement and revenue forecasting.    
 
 
9.4 Interpretation issues 
 
Some caution should be used in interpreting the results of the survey.  It has to be 
recognized that in some cases where no information was provided, that the 
information may nevertheless exist in some office of a government to which the 
official assigned to respond may not have access.  Even in such cases, however, lack 
of a response indicates that the information is not readily available or being 
commonly used in the management of the tax.   The ineffective use of information is 
an issue in itself. 
 
Another area of caution arises out of the comparability of some measures such as 
costs of administration and numbers and quality of staff.   The problem clearly arises 
from two sources.  One is the administrations that are organized on a functional basis 
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have difficulty in allocation staff and costs to the VAT, sales or turnover tax.  The 
other is in administrations with revenue authorities providing centralized common 
support services, there is also a problem of recognizing and allocating these costs to a 
particular tax.  These concerns will be recognized as supporting a recommendation 
that future research aimed at assessing and improving tax administration should be 
conducted on a comprehensive tax-system basis rather than a tax type basis to assess 
staffing and financial resource adequacy and allocations.  
 
 
9.5 Summary and conclusions 
 
Not unexpectedly, given the diversity of the income levels and other economic 
structural and cultural differences among the SADC Member States, there is a wide 
range of administrative capacities in the region to support VAT implementation.  At 
the same time, considerable and significant reforms of tax systems have been 
undertaken, and in many cases, are still being undertaken or implemented.  The 
development of tax administrations is an ongoing endeavor.  While some member 
countries have achieved a high level of sophistication and efficiency in tax 
administration, no country can claim to have achieved and implemented “best 
practices” in all areas of tax administration.  In all countries, the efficiency of tax 
administration is not just limited by internal administrative capacities, but often more 
importantly by the limited capacities of the economically active population to comply 
with taxes.         
 
A number potential areas for action based on the survey findings are already outlined 
above.  This cross-country comparison, however, cannot reveal the detail of the flaws 
in tax system design or implementation in each individual country.  That would 
require a considerably more thorough and detailed analysis of the tax systems in each 
country than undertaken here.  This study can serve, however, to sensitize 
administrators across the SADC Member States to the different approaches being 
taken across the region that may stimulate follow-up reviews and actions in their own 
countries.  Beyond that, this attempt is made to highlight some issues and areas that 
will be important in moving towards a common market, improving tax co-ordination, 
and most importantly, in encouraging and providing co-operation in tax 
administration that will provide mutual gains in SADC.   
 
Improved collection information 
The results of the survey confirm what had been noted earlier from the publicly 
available tax collection data, namely, that there is weak data in a number of countries 
concerning indirect taxes collected by customs.  Also, there is weak data in many 
countries on the collection of arrears, the payments of refunds, the absorption of credit 
carry forwards, the types of arrears and collections arising out of different 
enforcement actions.   
 
This situation persists despite computer-based maintenance of tax collection statistics 
in nearly all countries.  The production of such data requires the upfront coding of 
data such that the key characteristics can be captured in management information and 
collection statistics using in monitoring and forecasting revenues.   Similarly, weak 
reporting of the details of the costs of tax administration and any unit costs of tax 
administration is evidenced.   
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A co-operative project could be undertaken that would develop best practice 
advice for SADC Member States on tax collection data coding and reporting as 
well as for reporting unit costs and other performance measures of tax 
administration from the administration budget systems. 
 
Strengthening computerization and introducing e-governance 
As noted, most countries can still make improvements in the capacities of their 
computer systems for internal systems administration.  More importantly, the 
emergence of internet-based services on the World Wide Web is now making 
powerful tools available to tax administration to communicate detailed and simple 
information to the taxpaying population as well as allowing the taxpayer to file tax 
returns, calculate taxes and make payments cost-effectively while also providing tax 
administrations with timely and accurate tax data.    
 
A co-operative project could be undertaken to review existing e-governance 
techniques being used in the region and to advise SADC Member States on the 
development and use of e-governance techniques, at a minimum in the area of e-
publishing and effectively communicating with the tax paying population.  An 
addendum to this project could be the provision of technical assistance on  
 
(a) the legal environment necessary to use the internet for e-filing and e-payments 
of taxes, and possibly  
(b) technical issues and options arising in the introduction of e-filing and e-
payments. 
  
Preparations for functional administration: technical assistance and capacity 
building 
International experience is showing that functional organization of tax administration 
offers opportunities to gain more effective use of scarce administrative resources, 
significantly more effective auditing and debt enforcement, and opens the door to 
providing more focused taxpayer services, such as the Large Taxpayer Unit.   
Preparatory to undertaking effective functional organization is the introduction of 
supportive tax legislation and training of personnel.   
 
It is recommended that SADC Member States either review and co-ordinate 
administrative provisions across existing tax type legislation, or introduce a 
comprehensive tax administration law for all domestic tax types.   
 
The review of the human resources in the tax administration of SADC Member States 
showed weakness in key areas where functional organization can be most effective, 
such as policy, assessment and audit.  Many countries showed low shares of personnel 
with university and other post secondary training specific to tax administration.  All 
countries had very small numbers of qualified accountants.     
 
With the growing shift of tax administrations towards functional administration, this 
study has revealed the importance of examining tax administration capacities on a 
comprehensive basis to assess weakness and where co-operative support program may 
prove to be effective.    
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It is recommended that a SADC project be undertaken that goes further than the 
current study by undertaking a combined assessment of strategies that countries 
could undertake to migrate to functional organizations, and assessment of the 
training needs and delivery capacities of member countries, especially where 
human resource constraints are limiting computerization, introduction of e-
governance, and functional organization.    
 
The training considerations should go beyond accounting, auditing, tax legislation and 
tax system implementation, and should also look at weakness in management, project 
implementation, tax policy analysis, revenue forecasting and communications 
capacities.    
 
SADC should undertake a study to develop a comprehensive regional training 
strategy that should advise on  
 
(i)  where regional training for routine tax administration activities (whether at 
an introductory or more advanced level) makes sense taking into account 
gains in economies of scale, but limited by country differences such as 
language, and  
 
(ii)  where regional and external or international training should be used to 
develop trainers, innovators and leaders in the tax systems at both middle 
and high levels.  These types of training are enhanced by deeper, broader and 
more comparative approaches to education such that both the range of approaches 
and practices are studied along with the critical analysis of why they do or do not 
work in different country contexts.    
 
The study should assess existing regional training capacities or centers, address the 
costs of training and professional education, and identify mechanisms for financing 
regional training centers. The study could also address the roles of the professional 
organizations, especially for the accounting profession, in training of personnel and 
the development approaches to improve the local tax systems within member 
countries. 
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Table 9.1  VALUE ADDED AND SALES TAX ADMINISTRATION IN THE SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY
Angola Botswana Dem. Rep. of Congo Lesotho Malawi Mauritius Mozambique
Tax Turnover tax on consumption. VAT Turnover tax
(Impôt sur le chiffre d’ affaires , 
or ICA)
VAT VAT (Surtax) VAT VAT (IVA)
I. TAX ADMINISTRATION
1.1.1 Organization Structure Tax and customs 
administrations are separate 
depart-ments under the 
Ministry of Finance. Tax 
administration covers income 
and excise taxes, and customs 
collect consumption taxes on 
imported goods.  Revenues 
from oils and diamonds are 
administered separately.
VAT is administered by the 
Department of Customs and 
Excise under the Ministry of 
Finance.  Income tax is 
administered by a separate 
Department.
The General Tax Directorate 
(GDI) is set up under the 
Ministry of Finance, but it 
enjoys administrative and 
financial autonomy.  GDI 
collects revenue on behalf of 
the Public Treasury under the 
Authority of the Ministry of 
Finance.
VAT is administered by a 
Division within Lesotho 
Revenue Authority (LRA), 
which is also responsible for 
collection of income taxes, 
customs, and excise duties.
Tax policies are the 
responsibility of the Tax Policy 
Unit under the Ministry of 
Finance.  LRA has established 
an economic unit to support the 
Ministry.
Established in 2000, Malawi 
Revenue Authority (MRA) is 
responsible for administering 
income taxes, import duty, 
excise duty, and VAT (surtax).
MRA has three Divisions: 
Income Tax, Customs and 
Excise, and Surtax each 
operating independently under 
a Commissioner who report to 
the Commissioner General.
Department of the Ministry of 
Finance.
Domestic VAT−as well as 
excise duties and income 
taxes−is administered by the 
National Directorate of Taxes 
and Audit (DNIA), which is a 
department under the Ministry 
of Finance.
Import VAT is collected by the 
National Directorate of 
Customs (DGA).
Revenue Authority Revenue authority is under 
consideration, but not top 
priority.
Revenue Authority was to be 
established in 2004.
Part of Ministry of Finance with 
high degree of administrative 
and financial autonomy 
The Lesotho Revenue 
Authority was formed on 
January 2003 under the 
auspices of the LRA Act.
MRA is an autonomous 
revenue authority.
The formation of a revenue 
authority is under serious 
consideration.
The Government is preparing 
for the establishment of a 
central revenue authority that 
will combine the function of 
DNIA and DGA.
Degree of Autonomy from 
Ministry of Finance and 
Public Service
Revenue administrations fall 
under the responsibility of the 
Ministry of Finance.
VAT is administered within the 
Department of Customs and 
Excise under the Ministry of 
Finance.
Part of Ministry of Finance with 
high degree of administrative 
and financial autonomy 
LRA Board of Directors−which 
includes representative from 
businesses, legal, and 
accountancy profession−is 
appointed by the Minister of 
Finance.
MRA has a high degree of 
autonomy.  It operates on a 
commercial basis with an 
independent Board of 
Directors.
VAT administration runs 
autonomously under a 
Commissioner.
DNIA and DGA are 
departments under the Ministry 
of Finance.
Degree of Functional 
Administration
The revenue administrations 
are organized across functional 
areas, including collection, 
legal, audit, advice, special 
investigation/research, and 
administration/human 
resources.
Separate tax type department 
with Customs and Excise 
department
One organization for inland 
revenue, and appears to be 
functionally organized.  
Customs under separate 
administration
LRA is organized around tax 
types.  Each division has its 
own debt management and 
investigative arms, although 
merging these functions for all 
types of taxes is under 
consideration.
There are cross functional 
support departments under the 
MRA headquarters that provide 
administrative services:
- Board Secretary
- Legal Council
- Finance and Administration
- Tax Audit and Investigation
- Information Technology
- Policy Planning/Research
- Internal Audit
- Public Relation
The tax administration is 
organized by tax type, except 
for the Large Taxpayer 
Department where each tax 
function covers all type of 
taxes.
IVA, excise, and income taxes 
are organized as a separate 
division with significant degree 
of functional integration: large 
taxpayer unit, audit, and debt 
management.
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Namibia South Africa Swaziland Tanzania Zambia Zimbabwe
Tax VAT VAT Sales Tax VAT
(introduced in July 1998)
VAT VAT
(introduced in January 2004)
I. TAX ADMINISTRATION
1.1.1 Organization Structure Tax administration is the 
responsibility of the Ministry of 
Finance.  The Commissio-ner 
of Inland Revenue oversees 2 
directorates:
(1) The Directorate of Inland 
Revenue is responsible for 
income tax, VAT,  transfer and 
stamp duties, and petroleum 
taxation.
(2) The Directorate of Customs 
and Excise
The South African Revenue 
Service (SARS) is an 
autonomous organization.  It is 
not part of the Ministry of 
Finance.
Sales tax is administered by 
the Department of Customs 
and Excise, and employees are 
part of the Civil Service.
Income tax is administered by 
a separate government 
department.
VAT administration on the 
mainland is the responsibility of 
Tanzania Revenue Authority 
(TRA).
The TRA has a board of ten 
Directors and the senior official 
is the Commissioner General.  
Five members are ex-officio, 
other Members of the Board 
are from the private sector and 
represent appropriate 
professions.
The Board has a mandate to 
advise the Minister of Finance 
on tax policy.
VAT is administered by a 
distinct division under the 
Commissioner of VAT within 
the Zambia Revenue Authority 
(ZRA).
A Governing Board oversees 
the operations of ZRA.
The ZRA is responsible for 
VAT, customs and excise 
duties, income taxes, property 
transfer tax, and mineral 
royalty.
Zimbabwe Revenue Authority 
(ZIMRA).
Revenue Authority Namibia does not have a 
revenue authority.
SARS is a revenue authority. Currently there is no revenue 
authority.  However, the 
government is considering to 
introduce of an independent 
revenue authority in 2006.  The 
authority would be responsible 
to administer customs, excise, 
and VAT.
Tanzania Revenue Authority 
was formed in July 1996.
Zambia Revenue Authority was 
formed in April 1994.
Zimbabwe Revenue Authority 
was established in January 
2001.
Degree of Autonomy from 
Ministry of Finance and 
Public Service
The Directorate of Inland 
Revenue is under the Ministry 
of Finance.
SARS has considerable degree 
of autonomy.  SARS Act is 
independent from the Civil 
Service.
ZIMRA is an autonomous 
organization.
Degree of Functional 
Administration
Within the Directorate of Inland 
Revenue, each type of taxes is 
administered separately.  
However, functionalities such 
as audit, debt collection, large 
trader, and special 
investigations are covering all 
taxes.
The tax administration is 
organized across functional 
areas.  There are 8 General 
Managers that form the 
Executive Committee of SARS. 
Each General Manager has a 
specific responsibility: 
Taxpayer Service, Customs, 
Assessment, Enforcement, 
Strategy & Planning, Law 
Administration, and Finance & 
Human Resources.  General 
Managers report to the 
Commissioner.
The operations, enforcement, 
and administration of VAT is 
incorporated within the above 
structure.
The collection of sales tax is 
integrated under the 
Commissioner of Customs.
There are 4 departments within 
TRA: VAT, Income Tax, 
Customs and Excise, and 
Large Taxpayers.  The taxes 
are administered separately, 
but a new corporate plan is 
already in place to combine tax 
functions, such as audit, 
taxpayer service, and returns 
processing.
Presently, there are 8 
crosscutting support 
departments: finance, tax 
investigations, information 
systems, human resources, 
research and policy, internal 
audit, legal affairs, and 
taxpayer education.
There are three operational 
divisions: Customs and Excise, 
Income Tax, and VAT.
Supporting directorates covers 
all types of taxes: 
Administration, Human 
Resources, Legal and 
Information Technology, 
Internal Audit, Internal Affairs, 
and Executive Support Unit.
ZIMRA is organized around 
functional divisions which cover 
all types of taxes: Investigation, 
Planning, Internal Audit, 
Operations, Human 
Resources, Finance and 
Administration, Legal Advice 
and Corporate Secretarial.
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Appointment of Managers Appointed on normal promo-
tion from within the Ministry of 
Finance.
Appointment is made pursuant 
to the Public Service Act.  Top 
managers report to the 
Permanent Secretary, Ministry 
of Finance through the 
Secretary for Financial Affairs.
General Director and his/her 
Deputy are appointed by the 
President.
Directors are appointed and 
dismissed by the Minister of 
Finance.
Minister of Finance appoints 
Commissioner general
Board of Directors appoints 
directors and senior managers.
The Commissioner General is 
contracted for 5 years and is 
appointed by the Minister of 
Finance with Presidential 
approval.  The MRA Board 
appoints other Commissi-oners 
and Deputy Commissioners.
The VAT Commissioner is 
appointed by the Public Service 
Commission, and reports to 
Financial Secretary.
Managers appointment follows 
regular civil service recruitment 
rules.
1.1.4 Large Taxpayer Unit (LTU) There is a unit set up to service 
the biggest taxpayers across 
all taxes.
No large taxpayer unit. Directorate for Large 
Companies (Direction des 
Grandes Enterprises, or DGE)
There a large taxpayer unit in 
each division for each tax type.
Large Taxpayer Unit was 
established in November 2004. 
Covers auditing, but not 
collections.
Large Taxpayer Department is 
a separate unit that administers 
all tax functions of income 
taxes and VAT.
There is a large taxpayer unit 
in three DNIA offices: Maputo, 
Beira, and Nampula.  These 
large taxpayer units cover all 
types of taxes under the 
jurisdiction of DNIA.
Criteria to be Serviced by 
LTU
Minimum turnover level and 
type of industry (oil, diamond, 
and public sector).
N/A Turnover above $300,000
Taxpayers with turnover less 
than $300,000, but above 
$72.000 are served by the Tax 
Centers (CDI).  Taxpayers with 
turnover less than $72.000 are 
served by the Synthetic Tax 
Centers (CIS).
Turnover above M 500,000. Turnover used as criterion Turnover above Rs 200 million. Companies with turnover 
above 1 billion meticash per 
month, or with large number of 
labor force paying PAYE.
Number of Taxpayers Served 
by LTU
350 Companies. N/A 400 companies 20% of registered taxpayers 
are serviced by the LTU.
50 taxpayers 249 VAT taxpayers. 322 in Maputo; 149 in Beira; no 
data in Nampula.
Share of Revenues of the 
LTU
Revenue collections of the 
biggest taxpayer unit constitute 
60% of the total national 
revenues.
N/A 75% of revenues. 80% of total VAT revenues. N/A 20% of VAT revenues. No data available.
1.2.1 Tax Administration 
Expenditures
No data available. For FY 2002/2003, the total 
expenditures were P 44.6 
million.  Personnel constitute 
72% of the total expenditures.
The Treasury hands back 7% 
of DGI revenue collections as 
operational expenses. 
FY 2003/4: M 60.4 million. No data available. No data available.
Administrative Expenditures 
on Customs
No data available. For FY 2002/2003, the total 
expenditures for customs 
administration were P 33.5 
million.
No data available. FY 2003/4: M 24.2 million. No data available. FY 2003:
Personnel Rs. 111.3 million
Oth. Current Rs. 62.9 million
Capex Rs. 2.3 million
No data available.
Administrative Expenditures 
on VAT/Sales Tax
No data available. VAT consumes 25% of the 
Customs budget.  For FY 
2002/2003, the total 
expenditures for VAT 
administration were P 8.1 
million.
No data available. FY 2003/4: M 12.9 million. No data available. FY 2003:
Personnel Rs. 28.2 million
Oth. Current Rs. 11.2 million
Capex Rs. 2.8 million
No data available.
Budget Allocation Part of the normal budgeting 
process within the Ministry of 
Finance.
Negotiated each year with the 
Ministry of Finance
DGI receives 7% of the 
revenue collections for its 
operational costs.
Under the current LRA Act, the 
LRA is funded by 2% of 
estimated revenues.  This 
formula is to be reviewed.
The MRA is funded by 
Government Grant as a normal 
budget vote.
Budget is negotiated each year 
with the Ministry of Finance.
Budget is allocated by the 
Ministry of Finance.
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Appointment of Managers Vacancies are advertised in 
internal circulars.
Appointments are through the 
normal recruitment process.  
There is not a specific VAT 
Commissioner.  The 
Commissioner of SARS acts 
as the commissioner for all 
taxes.
Appointments of Deputy 
Commissioners and above are 
made by a Civil Service Board.  
The Minister of Finance 
approves all senior managers' 
appointments.
The Chair of the Board is 
appointed by the President.
The Minister of Finance 
appoints the Commissioner 
General, and approved by the 
President.  Positions at Deputy 
Commissioner and above are 
filled by open competition 
including interviews by the TRA 
Board.
Post of Assistant 
Commissioner and above are 
subject to a competitive 
internal and external process.  
The Board of ZRA holds 
selection interviews.  These 
posts are filled on a 5-year 
contract basis.
Posts are advertised and the 
Board interviews short listed 
candidates.
Top managers report to the 
Commissioner General who is 
an ex officio member of the 
Board.  Senior managers are 
employed on a 3-5 year 
contract basis.
1.1.4 Large Taxpayer Unit (LTU) Monitoring of large taxpayers is 
primarily a function of the 
Income Tax Directorate.
There is currently no large 
taxpayer unit, but it is under 
consideration.
There is no large taxpayer unit. Large Taxpayer Unit is a 
separate department under a 
Commissioner.  The LTU is 
multifunctional and includes 
income taxes, customs, and 
VAT.
There is no large taxpayer unit 
in place, but there is a large 
trader control team for VAT 
that carries out audits on large 
traders.
No large taxpayer unit, 
although payments of large 
taxpayers are closely 
monitored.
Criteria to be Serviced by 
LTU
Turnover and complexity (i.e., 
mining companies, financial 
institutions, and commercial 
fishing).
N/A N/A N/A N/A
Number of Taxpayers Served 
by LTU
15 large taxpayers are VAT 
registered.
N/A N/A About 5% (or 114) of registered 
VAT payers are served by the 
LTU.
N/A N/A
Share of Revenues of the 
LTU
No data available. N/A N/A About 24% of VAT revenues 
are collected by the LTU.
N/A N/A
1.2.1 Tax Administration 
Expenditures
FY 2003:
Salaries: N$ 25.1 million
Others:   N$   9.9 million.
FY 2002:
Salaries: N$ 18.1 million
Others:   N$ 13.0 million.
FY 2003:
Personnel: R 1.7 billion
Others: R 1.2 billion.
FY 2002:
Personnel: R 1.5 billion
Others: R 0.8 billion.
FY 2003:
Personnel: E 12.7 million
Capital: E 779,000.
FY 2002:
Personnel: E 11.2 billion
Capital: E 200,000.
No data available.
Administrative Expenditures 
on Customs
No data available. The accounting system does 
not allow to disaggregate 
expenditure by tax type.
No data available. Operations are integrated.  The 
accounting system does not 
allow breakdown by tax type.
Administrative Expenditures 
on VAT/Sales Tax
The accounting system does 
not allow to disaggregate 
expenditure by tax type.
The accounting system does 
not allow to disaggregate 
expenditure by tax type.
No data available. Operations are integrated.  The 
accounting system does not 
allow breakdown by tax type.
Budget Allocation Government department 
funding is negotiated as part of 
the normal budgeting process.
Negotiated each year with the 
Ministry of Finance.
The department is funded by 
the budget vote following 
negotiation with the Ministry of 
Finance.
The TRA Act stipulates that  
TRA to be funded from a 
proportion of revenue receipts, 
plus grants or loans and own 
resources. However, the 
practice has been that the TRA 
funding is negotiated with the 
Ministry of Finance annually.
The Authority is a corporate 
autonomous body funded 
through the National Budget.  
The budget is negotiated each 
year with the Ministry of 
Finance.
Negotiated each year with the 
Ministry of Finance as a normal 
budget item.
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1.3.1 Number of Registered Value-
Added Taxpayers
Total number of registered 
taxpayers is 1.15 million 
(individual) and 150,000 
(business).  No specific data 
on the number of turnover 
taxpayers.
10,471 (May 2004). No data available except for 
the 400 taxpayers served by 
the Directorate of Large 
Taxpayers.
1,350 taxpayers. 2,826 taxpayers (March 2004). 7,077 taxpayers (June 2003). 332,149 taxpayers (Dec 2003).
Number of Active Value-
Added Taxpayers
No data available. 10,365 (May 2004). No data available. 1,200 taxpayers. 1,801 taxpayers. Approx. 6,965 taxpayers. No data available.
Taxpayer Size Frequency 
Distribution
No data available. Top 16 (0.2%) largest 
companies by annual turnover 
responsible for 18% of the total 
VAT revenues.
Top 53 (0.7%) largest 
companies by annual turnover 
responsible for 32% of the total 
VAT revenues.
No data available. 14.0% with turnover greater 
than M 5 million.
61.2% with turnover greater 
than M 500,000 but less than 
M 5 million.
24.8% with turnover less than 
M 500,000 (registered 
voluntarily).
24.8% with turnover greater 
than MK 10 million.
23.1% with turnover greater 
than MK 2 million but less than 
M 10 million.
52.1% with turnover less than 
MK 2 million (registered 
voluntarily).
Top 2.3% taxpayers with 
turnover of more than Rs. 100 
million contribute 20.4% of the 
total tax as per return.
The bottom 62% taxpayers 
with turnover of less than Rs. 5 
million contribute 10% of the 
total tax as per return.
No data available.
Minimum Business Turnover 
for Compulsory Registration
No lower limit − anyone 
supplying goods or services 
liable to consumption tax 
should register and remit the 
tax.
P 250,000 No data available. M 500,000 MK 2,000,000. Rs. 3,000,000.
No minimum for 28 specified 
businesses.
Three Tier Registration:
Normal - Turnover > 250 mil.
Simplified - Turnover > 100 mil
Exempt (require to register)
1.4.1 Number of Consumption Tax 
Officer Positions
(Filled and Vacant)
No data available.  Income and 
consumption taxes are carried 
out on a combined basis.  The 
National Directorate of Tax 
Administration has 60 staff in 
the head office and about 171 
in the regions. (5,600 
taxpayers per official; 649 
corporate taxpayers per 
official)
151 positions filled.  No vacant 
position.  (69 taxpayers per 
official)
No data available. Total staff: 88  (15 taxpayers 
per official)
Vacancies: 8                      
Total staff: 127 (22 taxpayers peTotal Positions: 176   (40 
taxpayers per official)
Vacancies: 28
No data available.
Number of Officers with 
University Degree
Seven (3%); an effort to raise 
the number, preferences is 
being given to degree holders 
at recruitment.
49 out of 151 officers (32%) 
have a university degree.
Approximately 2.5% of the total 
personnel have a university 
degree.
90% of the personnel have a 
university degree.  LRA 
requires a university degree 
and more than 2 years 
experience for senior positions.
20 (2 with Master's degree)(16%6 personnel (3%) No data available.
Number of Qualified 
Professional Accountants
Ten.(4%) None. No data available. 8 qualified professional 
accountants (9%).
4 in the Audit and Investigation 
Team, which is also 
responsible for VAT (surtax) 
(3%)
11 persons (6%) No data available.
Number of Officers with Post 
Secondary School 
Certifications
No data available. No data available. Approximately 17.5% of the 
total personnel have post 
secondary school certifications.
To join LRA, the minimum 
requirement is a diploma.
11 (9%) 102 persons.(58%) No data available.
Number of Support Staff in 
Establishment
No data available. 15 positions filled.  No 
vacancy.(30%)
Approximately 2.5% of the total 
personnel are in the support 
staff category.
1 secretary and 3 drivers.  The 
drivers are not included in the 
above 88 total staff.(5%)
14 (11%) 58 positions (33%)
8 vacant
No data available.
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1.3.1 Number of Registered Value-
Added Taxpayers
14,000 (January 2004). 1,035,495 businesses are on 
the register as at December 
2003.
1,138 sales taxpayers
(Jan 2004).
13,464 (June 2003). 23,333 (January 2004).
2004 budget changes that 
raised the turnover limit and 
disallowed voluntary 
registration would remove 70% 
of the register.
6,000 so far.  More applications 
are being processed daily.
Number of Active Value-
Added Taxpayers
Approx. 2,300 are non filers. 506,098 taxpayers (Mar 2003). 834 sales taxpayers
(Jan 2004).
11,114 (June 2003). Approx. 8,000 (January 2004).
Taxpayer Size Frequency 
Distribution
No data available. No data available. No data available.
The main groups in the register 
are importers, exporters, and 
service providers (architects, 
lawyers, etc.).
About 8.3% of taxpayers have 
a turnover of more than T.shs. 
500 million
The bottom 50% of taxpayers 
have a turnover of less than 
T.shs. 20 million.
> ZMK 100 million 31%
ZMK 50−100 million 20%
< ZMK 50 million 49%
Minimum Business Turnover 
for Compulsory Registration
$ 200,000, but voluntary 
registration is allowed.
R 300,000. E 20,000. T.shs. 20 million.  About 50% 
(6,254) of registered traders 
have turnover below this level.
ZMK 200 million (effective Feb 
2004), and no voluntary 
registration allowed.
Zim $ 250 million.
(approx. US $ 20,000)
1.4.1 Number of Consumption Tax 
Officer Positions
(Filled and Vacant)
Total in Establishment: 41
Number Filled: 36
Number Vacant: 5
Officers are responsible for 
both VAT and income taxes.  
VAT requires approximately 
one-third of the time. (341 
taxpayers per official)
It is difficult to identify 
dedicated VAT personnel.  The 
total number of SARS 
personnel is 12,265 (March 
2003).   (84 taxpayers per 
official)
Total positions available in the 
Customs, Excise, and Sales 
Tax Department is 201. (6 
taxpayers per official)
Filled: 182  
Vacant: 19
507 personnel. (27 taxpayers 
per official)
Approved Establishment: 218 
(107 taxpayers per official)
Current: 183
Vacancies: 35
Number of Officers with 
University Degree
5 personnel (12%) 3,770 (26.7%) of the personnel 
have tertiary qualifications 
(university degree and 
diplomas).
26 personnel (13%) 269 personnel (53%). 102 personnel (47%). Approximately 80% staff.
Number of Qualified 
Professional Accountants
None. 128 chartered accountants are 
employed at SARS. This 
number is included in the 
above total (1% of total staff or 
3% of staff with tertiary 
qualifications)
6 personnel (not included in the 
figure above).(3%)
Number of Officers with Post 
Secondary School 
Certifications
6 personnel.(14%) 777 officers are identified with 
other post secondary school 
certificates, which include 
taxation, forensic audit, 
information technology, VAT, 
etc.(6%)
54 persons have post 
secondary school qualifications 
(25%)
238 personnel (47%). About 20% of staff.
Number of Support Staff in 
Establishment
Total in Establishment: 25
Number Filled: 23
Number Vacant: 2
Shared between VAT and 
direct taxes.
Approximately 5,000 support 
and administrative staff.  It is 
not possible to distinguish 
between administrative and 
other functions.(40%)
135 positions filled (67%)
15 vacant.
498 personnel across all 
departments.
Approved Establishment: 27 
(12%)
Current: 25
Variance: 2
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1.5.1 Pay Scale Relative to Civil 
Service
Same as civil service. Same as civil service. Same as civil service, plus 
bonuses derived from the 
specific duties, revenue 
realized, and tax disputes.
LRA salaries are approximately 
double that of civil service.
For pension able, MRA salaries 
are approximately double that 
of civil service.  For contract 
employees, the salaries are 
more than double that of civil 
service.
Benefits for senior manage-
ment include performance 
bonuses and car & housing 
allowances, which are not 
provided for civil service.
Same as civil service. Same as civil service.
Condition of Employment 
Relative to Civil Services
Same as civil service. Same as civil service. Generally similar to the civil 
service.
Benefit packages tend to be 
more salary focused, with less 
allowance (car/housing) than 
that of civil service.
Same as civil service. Same as civil service.
Comment on the Adequacy 
of Salary and Benefit 
Packages to Retain Tax 
Officers
Recruitment is not generally 
difficult given the high rate of 
unemployment.  However, it is 
difficult to recruit quality 
established professionals from 
the private sector.
Government pay scales are not 
adequate to retain qualified tax 
officers and to discourage 
moves to the private sector.
Current salaries are perceived 
inadequate to retain qualified 
personnel and to prevent 
corruption.
Benefit packages are far better 
than that of the civil service, 
but not fully aligned to private 
sector.
Staff retention is not a serious 
problem, but recruitment for 
certain positions (e.g., lawyers) 
is more difficult to attract 
quality professionals from the 
private sector.
Not adequate.
Recruitment of quality staff and 
professionals from the private 
sector is difficult.
Not adequate.
Recruitment and retaining of 
quality and professional staff.
1.6.1 Degree of Computerization 
of Customs Administration
Not known. Customs administration 
processes, including customs 
clearing and enforcement, and 
databases are computerized.
Data from tax forms and 
accounts are computerized, but 
parallel paper process is 
maintained as final basis for 
customs clearing and 
enforcement.
Only revenue collection and 
trade statistics are 
computerized.
Computerization of customs is 
still limited, even though 
Asycuda system is in place and 
being enhanced.
The Customs and Excise 
Department is connected to the 
sophisticated TradeNet 
system.
No information available.
Degree of Computerization 
of VAT/Sales Tax 
Administration
Only revenue collection 
statistics are computerized.
Data from tax forms and 
accounts are computerized, but 
parallel paper process is 
maintained as final basis for 
administration and 
enforcement.
Data from tax forms and 
accounts are computerized, but 
parallel paper process is 
maintained as final basis for 
administration and 
enforcement.
All data from VAT forms and 
accounts are computerized, but 
parallel paper process is 
maintained as final basis for 
administration.  The VAT 
system (VIPS) includes general 
ledger, risk assessment, 
automated penalty, and on-
demand reporting modules.
The surtax system uses the 
same register (taxpayer id 
generator) as the income tax 
and Asycuda systems.
Tax returns are entered into 
the computer, but it has 
limitations in the number of 
data recorded.  Most reports 
are for collection statistics.
The VAT administration has a 
sophisticated computer system 
based on Unix (Solaris) 
operating systems.  The server 
is connected to 97 PCs with 
linkages to Customs, Large 
Taxpayer Income Tax, 
Accountant General, and 
Mauritius Network Services.
All data from VAT forms and 
accounts are computerized, but 
parallel paper process is 
maintained as final basis for 
administration.  The VAT 
system (VIPS) includes general 
ledger, risk assessment, and 
on-demand reporting modules.  
However, the full potential of 
the system is not being utilized.
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1.5.1 Pay Scale Relative to Civil 
Service
Same as civil service.
Officers are civil servants.
SARS has a higher 
remuneration packages than 
that of the civil service with 
comparable rank.
Same as civil service. Pay scale are generally higher 
than that of the civil service.
Remuneration is approximately 
double than that of civil service.
The pay scale is different from 
that of the civil service.
Condition of Employment 
Relative to Civil Services
Same as civil service.
Officers are civil servants.
Conditions of employment are 
different to the civil service.  
Salary levels, leave benefits, 
staff grades are different from 
that of the civil service.  
Affirmative action is a strong 
factor in the employment 
policies and processes.
Same as civil service. For Deputy Commissioner level 
and above, the employ-ment is 
on a 3-year contract basis.  
They receive bonuses based 
on performance.
Some senior grades also 
receive car, housing, and 
medical benefits.  These do not 
apply to civil service.
The salary and other allowance 
scales are higher than in the 
civil service.  The ZRA recruits 
its own members of staff 
without government 
intervention.
Some officers receive car, 
housing, and educational 
allowances.
Comment on the Adequacy 
of Salary and Benefit 
Packages to Retain Tax 
Officers
The civil service salary is not 
regarded as sufficient to retain 
tax officers, particularly those 
with tertiary qualifications.
The SARS remuneration policy 
is higher than that of the 
market at the lower grades, 
match the market at the middle 
grades, and lower than the 
market at the senior grades.  
SARS is in a position to make 
a limited counter offer in cases 
where SARS wishes to retain 
the service of a particular 
employee.
Salaries are deemed adequate 
to both recruit and retain staff 
across the board.
Recruitment is rather difficult to 
hire the best people because 
salary and benefits packages 
are less than that of the private 
sector.
ZRA employs a lot of qualified 
personnel and tries to be as 
competitive as possible.  
Experience shows that 
qualified accountants in the 
lower managerial grades are 
often tempted to more lucrative 
private sector packages.
The package is seen as 
"average" in the market.  Some 
officers were leaving for better 
packages in the private sector.
1.6.1 Degree of Computerization 
of Customs Administration
Customs data are compu-
terized, but parallel paper 
process is maintained.
An Asycuda ++ is being rolled 
out throughout the country.
Data from tax forms and 
accounts are computerized, but 
parallel paper process is 
maintained as final basis for 
customs clearing and 
enforcement.  A greater degree 
of computerization is being 
pursued on an on-going basis.
Only trade statistics are 
computerized.  Separate paper 
records are maintained as the 
basis for customs clearance.
An Asycuda system is installed 
to support the customs 
administration.
Data from tax forms and 
accounts are computerized.  
Computer generated Single 
Administrative Document 
(SAD) in printed form is issued 
to the declarant signature as 
proof of being the source of the 
declaration.
Data from tax forms and 
accounts are computerized, but 
parallel paper process is 
maintained as final basis for 
customs clearing and 
enforcement.
Degree of Computerization 
of VAT/Sales Tax 
Administration
Customs data are compu-
terized, but parallel paper 
process is maintained.
The currently installed system 
was developed in house.  A 
plan to introduce a "Bull" 
computer system is well 
advanced.
VAT is fully computerized.  
However, paper files are still 
maintained to keep track of 
correspondence and returns 
submitted.
Only registration and returns 
data entry are computerized.  
Other functions, including 
balance calculation, are done 
manually.
A VAT Information Processing 
Systems is being used.  The  
revenue statistics generated by 
this system is delayed by about 
two weeks due to the 
requirement for manual 
intervention.
All VAT administration 
processes are computerized 
and databases are 
computerized which is also the 
primary basis for administration 
and enforcement.
The VAT information 
processing system is being 
upgraded to a more advanced 
system, which will link direct 
and indirect taxes.
VAT is computerized (SAB 
System), but  manual records 
are still maintained to keep 
track of correspondence and 
returns submitted.
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1.7.1 Internal Audit and 
Organization of Audit 
Capacity
No info on internal audit 
capacity.
Taxpayer audits cover all type 
of taxes, including direct taxes, 
consumption taxes, and 
customs.  Audits are normally 
carried out at the business 
premises.
Internal Audit is based at the 
Customs and Excise 
Headquarters.
VAT auditors are based at 
regional offices.  The auditors 
report to the regional 
managers.
No info on internal audit 
capacity.
There are 260 auditors 
distributed across tax offices.  
Forty of the auditors are based 
at the Directorate of Large 
Taxpayer.
VAT audits are primarily 
carried out at the business 
premises.
There is a special internal audit 
team of two people that reports 
directly to the Commissioner.
This team checks only internal 
system, not dealing with 
businesses.
No internal audit procedures 
are being employed.
Desk Audit Procedures No specific desk audit 
procedure other than pre visit 
preparation.
Desk audits are normally 
applied to low risk companies.  
When requested, traders have 
to bring supporting documents 
to the officers for verification of 
tax declarations.
Desk audit are conducted for 
all refund claims.  The desk 
audit will either allow or 
disallow refunds, or select the 
claim for field visit.
Desk audit includes 
preparation for field visit and 
verification for refunds.
Routine Desk Audit:
- Each month, files are 
allocated by the supervisor 
according to the predeter-
mined selection criteria.
- Audit officers extract 
information also from other 
sources, and prepare report 
with recommendations.
- Supervisor submits his/her 
own comments and report to 
the Assistant Commissioner for 
further action.
- Supervisor updates the 
computer record accordingly.
Note:
6 officers in routine desk audit
9 officers in repayment desk 
audit.
Desk audit are conducted for 
all refund claims.  The desk 
audit will either allow or 
disallow refunds, or select the 
claim for field visit.
Organization of Field Audit 
Capacity
There is an audit unit at the 
head office, at the biggest 
taxpayer unit, and in each 
regional office.
Potential risks, amount of tax 
involved, and resources 
available.
Most audits are conducted at 
the taxpayer premises.  A field 
audit can be executed by a 
duly mandated tax officer.  No 
further audit shall be conducted 
in respect to a tax or period 
that has already been audited.
VAT auditors are divided into 
three teams:  (1) large taxpayer 
unit; (2) routine and refund 
verifications; and (3) other 
taxpayers unit.  Each team is 
headed by a principal officer 
who supervises 5 senior 
inspectors and 5 inspectors.
Field audits are carried out in 
teams of two officers.
Nationally, there are 30 officers 
responsible for audits: 2 
Principal Officers who 
supervise senior revenue 
officers, revenue officers, 
assistant revenue officers, and 
revenue assistants.
Two Assistant Commissioners 
and an Assistant Regional 
Manager oversee the audit 
practice.
Field audits are conducted in 
pair.
There are 7 field audit units, 
each headed by a supervisor.  
The audit supervisors report to 
Assistant Commissioners.
In addition, 5 investigating 
officers, who work directly 
under an Assistant 
Commissioner, conduct in-dept 
audits which may lead to 
additional assessments.
Audit falls under the Deputy 
Director of Audit.  The audit 
function has two parts:
- A team for routine audits, 
which cover VAT, excise, and 
income taxes;
- A second, smaller team that 
looks at suspect of VAT 
businesses.
Number and Qualifications 
of Field Auditors
40 auditors at the head office 
and 10 auditors at the biggest 
taxpayer unit.  No data for 
regional offices.
University Degree:  35
Diploma:  23
Certificate:  6
Total:  64
No data provided. 34 VAT auditors. Number of officers in the Audit 
Section is 68.
Qualifications include London 
Chamber of Commerce 
Accounting, Pitman Advanced 
Bookkeeping, Diploma in 
Business Administration, B.Sc. 
Economics.
No data available.
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1.7.1 Internal Audit and 
Organization of Audit 
Capacity
The Ministry of Finance has an 
internal audit unit with staff 
reporting directly to the 
Permanent Secretary.
Auditing for both Customs and 
Sales Tax is carried out under 
the Inspectorate Sub-Division.  
The unit reports to the officer in 
charge of the Inspectorate 
Division.
TRA has a dedicated internal 
audit department.
Atypical field office includes an 
operations and a compliance 
sections.  The operations 
section will carry out the initial 
sift of desk audit for refund 
claims.
The compliance section 
conduct field visit and 
enforcement.
The ZRA has a specific internal 
audit team to look at ZRA 
systems across the board.  
This team reports directly to 
the Commissioner General.
An internal audit division report 
directly to the Commissioner 
General through the Internal 
Audit Manager.
Desk Audit Procedures The risk analyzers allocate the 
audits to the auditors who then 
required to analyze and audit 
the case.  Audit report is 
submitted to the audit manager 
once the auditor is satisfied 
with the findings.
If differences are found, 
assessment are raised 
electronically for approval by 
the audit manager.
There is no desk audit as such 
for sales tax.  Officers, 
however, do plan and carry out 
desk-based intelligence and 
information gathering.
Repayment Claims:
The operations section 
examines tax returns and VAT 
clearance certificate for 
exporters.  The certificate is a 
requirement that must be 
certified by an independent 
auditor.
All repayment claims are then 
passed to headquarters for 
final examination.
Pre-Visit Preparation:
This includes previous visit 
report, the trader's ledger, and 
return analysis sheet produced 
by the VIPS.
Parameters are set onto the 
VAT system.  Some returns 
that fail the set parameters are 
sent for short audits, while the 
rest are subjected to internal 
desk audit.  A check list is used 
to help the desk inspection 
function.
Desk scrutiny of repayment 
claims is in place.
Organization of Field Audit 
Capacity
Field auditors for VAT are 
usually Senior Taxation Officer-
level.  They always visit in 
pairs.  Most visits take one day. 
Auditors set the time alloted for 
visit, and it is presented in 
weekly plan.
The audit unit is divided into 
smaller units of three officers 
and a team leader.  After each 
assignment, the various team 
leaders report to the officer in 
charge of the audit team about 
their findings in their audit 
work.
Regional Audit Manager 
supervises both operations and 
compliance sections.
Deputy Manager oversees the 
compliance section.
Senior Officer directly manages 
and oversee a team of 
auditors.
Two officers form an audit 
team and visit jointly.
There are 24 auditors based in 
Dar es Salaam offices covering 
7,000 traders.
8 investigations (criminal) 
officers, 18 large trader 
inspectors, and 102 short and 
long audit inspectors 
(excluding desk audit).
Number and Qualifications 
of Field Auditors
Qualifications: Senior Tax 
Officer.
There are 1,469 auditors 
responsible for all taxes.
Generally, there is no minimum 
qualification requirements to be 
employed as an auditor.  
However, 12 of the officers do 
have a degree in accounting, 
management, and law.
No information about the total 
number of auditors.
254 field auditors.  Most of 
them have a degree in 
taxation, accounting, 
economics, and finance.
128 officers with minimum 
qualification of a diploma for 
Assistant VAT Inspector, and a 
degree for VAT Inspector.
No data available.
 128 
Table 9.1  VALUE ADDED AND SALES TAX ADMINISTRATION IN THE SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY (contd)
Angola Botswana Dem. Rep. of Congo Lesotho Malawi Mauritius Mozambique
Audit Selection Process The targets  to visit all 
businesses annually.  Audit 
Selection is done manually by 
looking such indicators as late 
returns, cross references from 
other audits, and information 
received.
Manual Risk Assessment: 
assign points based on returns 
submitted, previous audits, tip 
offs, company records.
All 400 large taxpayers are 
audited annually.
About 15% (1.500) of medium 
sized taxpayers are audited 
annually by the Tax Centers.  
About 5% of small-sized 
taxpayers are audited by the 
CIS.
At present, audit selections are 
still done manually.  This 
process will be automated and 
included into VIPS in the 
future.
Principal Officers select audits 
manually based on their 
experience.  
The Surtax computer has the 
option to record complexity and 
compliance points, as a 
measure of  risk.  This facility, 
however, is not used.
- Exception lists extracted from 
the computer system
- Un-audited cases over a 
specified period
- High revenue risk cases
- Random sampling
- Cases referred by other 
parties
Audits are selected manually 
by managers.
Type and Frequency of 
Audits
The law makes provision for all 
businesses to be visited within 
a five-year period.
The audit unit aims to carry out 
15 audits a month, normally 
carried out in pairs.  Small 
business audits usually last 2-3 
days, and larger business 5-8 
days.
Field audits constitute 80% of 
the total time allocated.
No information about the 
frequency and coverage.
First-level audits based on 
records are conducted once a 
year.  Second-level audits are 
conducted once.
No further explanation on the 
first- and second-level audits.
Desk audits and verification 
visits are conducted as 
required.
Intensive field audits are 
conducted once a year.  Each 
visit by two officers may last for 
2 days for small taxpayers to 
one week for large taxpayers.
Businesses are audited within 
3 months of registration.  No 
information about the audit 
frequency after that.
All excess returns are audited.
Every business will be visited 
once every 5 years.
Investigations are carried out 
when it is considered justified.
Audit Reports and Follow Up 
Procedures
An audit report includes audit 
objective, background 
information, risk analysis, and 
trader's accounting systems.
Additional assessment as a 
result of an audit process will 
be followed by the debt 
management.
Auditors' supervisor will 
validate the tax adjustment 
based on the multidisciplinary 
auditor reports following an 
audit process.  The supervisor 
is responsible for the 
monitoring and follow-up.
Audit reports are compiled and 
approved by principal officers.  
Measure of compliance and 
new assessment are fed into 
the VIPS.
Auditors make visit reports, 
which are scrutinized by a 
Principal Officer.  All reports 
are also scrutinized by 
Assistant Commissioner.
If and additional tax assess-
ment is raised, the report is 
forwarded to the Commissioner 
General for his comments, and 
possibly additional penalties.
Audit report covers description 
of the business, books and 
records kept, bank accounts, 
input-output check, and 
discrepancies observed.
Follow up procedures:
- Reports are reviewed by the 
supervisor followed by recom-
mendations
- The Assistant Commissio-
ner−after consultation with 
senior management, if 
necessary−takes the final 
decision.
Audit reports are scrutinized by 
the Head of Office and the 
National Director, who can 
request a follow up audit by a 
different team.
Oversight Procedures for 
Field Audit
Head of Section and Head of 
Office review audit reports.  
Director has to be notified for 
large assessment.  There is no 
procedure for additional 
management checks.
The supervisor is responsible 
for the monitoring and follow-
up.
No further detail on the 
oversight procedures for field 
audit.
Principals initiate, review, and 
approve audits, as well as 
follow up on progress.
No formal management 
program, although senior 
management may request for 
an already audited file to be 
reviewed by some other 
officers or the internal audit 
team.
Audit reports are scrutinized by 
the Head of Office and the 
National Director, who can 
request a follow up audit by a 
different team.
1.8.1 Organization of Debt 
Collection
The debt collection is part of 
the tax administration function 
and it covers all type of taxes.
Separate unit within the VAT 
Division.
Taxpayers self-assessed their 
tax and remit payments 
together with the tax returns.  
Additional official assessment 
must be paid within two weeks 
after the notice issuance.  Tax 
Registrar will issue a notice to 
third parties (Avis à tiers 
détenteurs ) to make a seizure 
of assets and put the seized 
assets up for auction.
Each type of tax has a 
separate debt management 
unit.  Debts are established 
using VIPS data.
Each Tax Division has a 
separate debt management 
unit, but frequently surtax debts 
are pursued jointly with that of 
income tax.
Given the limitation of the 
computer systems, debt 
collection is administered 
manually.
There is a section in the 
department under the 
responsibility of an Assistant 
Commissioner.
There is a debt collection unit 
(DCU) is the tax offices.  This 
unit is responsible to recover 
debts from all type of taxes 
under the jurisdiction of DNIA.
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Audit Selection Process Audit selection is done 
manually; risk assessment is 
not used.
The risk analyzers identify 
cases for audit and allocate 
according to the type of audit 
required (desk or field) and 
further classified as routine, 
refund, or in-depth.  
Audit report and any 
assessment raised are 
submitted to the audit 
manager.
Risk is assessed manually by 
the audit officer based on the 
records from past audits and 
other information, and classify 
the taxpayer into high risk, low 
risk, risk neutral, and other (for 
importers who imports only 
duty free goods).
The VIPS select some cases 
for audit based on the risk 
measurement.  Complexity and 
compliance points are 
allocated to taxpayers after 
audits.
In practice, the manual selec-
tion criteria is more often used 
because of the resource 
constraint.
All audits are selected 
manually at Assistant 
Commissioner level using a 
combination of manual, VAT 
system, and an internal 
information database to 
provide a judgment of the 
degree of taxpayer risks.
After visits, officers provide a 
compliance and complexity 
rating for the trader to be 
entered into the system.
Not yet developed.
Type and Frequency of 
Audits
All taxpayers should be visited 
at least once in 5 years.
Refund audits are selected 
randomly based on risk from 
cheques cycles printed every 
Monday.
Audits are classified as desk, 
routine, refund, and in-depth.  
Taxpayers are also referred to 
audit when applying for de-
registration.
The target is to visit every 
registered taxpayer at least 
once in a 3-4 year cycle, but 
the coverage in 2002/3 was 
only 10.2%.  Risk profiling has 
become a greater factor.
High Risk: every 2 years
Low Risk: every 5 years
Risk Neutral: every 4 years
Other: as necessary.
Income tax and sales tax 
auditors sometimes combined 
audits and share information.
Large taxpayer − once every 
year for routine audit.
Medium-sized taxpayers are 
suppose to be visited once 
every two years.
Small taxpayers are visited 
once every three years.
VIPS sets an "assignment 
value" that estimates the length 
of visit time.
-Visits at an interval 1-3 years 
that cover the period since the 
last audit visit.
'-Visits to traders whose 
returns have failed set 
parameters−this often be pre-
repayment visits.
Other audits include 
registration and de-registration 
and irregular investigations.
Audit Reports and Follow Up 
Procedures
Audit reports completed by 
officers are scrutinized by their 
line manager.  Senior 
Managers examine visit reports 
on a spot check basis.  
Irregularities are followed up by 
a return visit to ensure 
compliance.
There is a standard audit 
report.  Assessments are 
computer generated and 
automatically sent to the 
taxpayer.  The mailing function 
is the responsibility of an 
outside contractor.
The administrative personnel 
follow up the collections, and 
are responsible for the debt 
management procedures.
Audit report form includes 
information about the 
complexity and compliance 
points, and time take.  This 
data is entered into VIPS.
Officers complete simplified 
summary report and a more 
detailed report for each visit.  
Additional forms are completed 
to update the computer 
system.
Audit reports are referred to 
supervisors.
Oversight Procedures for 
Field Audit
Managers have a program of 
unannounced overtaking visits.
The audit manager reviews a 
case and specifics.  When 
essential steps had been 
omitted, the audit manager will 
refer the case back to the 
auditor to re-visit those 
aspects.
There is no program of 
physical management 
oversight.  If wrongdoing is 
suspected, there is an option to 
use internal auditors to 
investigate.
Management checks are 
largely limited to desk 
checking.
Some return visits might be 
made for specific reasons, but 
this is not a routine procedure.
Managers at senior inspector 
and Assistant Commissioner 
levels undertake indoor review 
of all visit report.
Not yet developed.
1.8.1 Organization of Debt 
Collection
The Debt Collection Unit 
services both VAT and Direct 
Taxes.
Debt collection and 
management is run by a 
separate unit within the branch 
offices and forms part of the 
administrative function.  This 
function covers all type of taxes 
(VAT, PAYE, and income 
taxes).
There is a separate unit of 3 
people dedicated to debt 
recovery for both customs and 
sales tax supervised by 
principal officer.
Headquarters has a small 
dedicated debt collection unit.  
Regional offices monitor their 
own VAT debt cases.  Officers 
rely on manual oversight rather 
than ledger balance recorded 
on the VIPS.
The Debt Collection Unit (DCU) 
is now responsible for all types 
of taxes.
The overall management of the 
DCU is the responsibility of an 
Assistant Commissioner who 
reports directly to the 
Commissioner of Finance.
Each region has its own 
integrated debt 
management/collection regime.
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Number of Tax Officers 
Dedicated to Debt Collection
No data available. Four. No data available.  Tax 
Registrars are located in each 
directorate and external 
departments (CDI and CIS).
4 senior collectors and 6 
collectors.
Sixteen personnel nationally. 9 officers. No data available.
Debt Enforcement 
Mechanisms
Local civil courts can order 
recovery, forced sale, or 
sequestration of assets.  In the 
regions, the head of the tax 
office is usually also the local 
judge who would decide on tax 
assessment and debt cases.
Penalties and interests, 
demand notices, attachment of 
accounts, attachment of 
property.
25% penalty for failing to 
submit the tax returns in time.
10% fine for each month 
payment overdue.
Notice to third parties (Avis à 
tiers détenteurs) for follow-up 
procedures.
LRA officers are authorized to 
seize and arrange auctions to 
sell goods, and have ability to 
secure monies by freezing 
bank accounts.
Process for debt recovery: 
demand, final demand, seizure, 
and forced sale.
Arrears can be written off only 
with the approval of the VAT 
Commissioner.
An officer or the police can 
carry out distraint on assets to 
recover the debt.
a. Computer generated notices 
on returns with short or no 
payment
b. Letter requesting payment
c. Attachment orders
d. Distress warrants
e. Contrainte
f. Privilege of inscription
- A debt is notified manually
  to the DCU.
- A demand notice is sent to
  the taxpayer.
- When payment is not
  received, a distraint is
  instituted.  An attachment
  to bank accounts can also
  be used.
Debt legally expire after 15 
years.
1.9.1 Number of VAT/Sales Tax 
Fraud Cases Prosecuted per 
Year
Tax fraud is administratively 
viewed as civil/financial matter.  
Failure to pay tax may result in 
civil proceeding for recovery.  
No criminal prosecution has 
been carried out.
Some cases (number of cases 
not available) have been sent 
to the Attorney General, but 
none has been prosecuted.
No data available. Currently 10 cases are under 
investigation.  No one has 
been prosecuted since VAT 
was introduced in July 2003.
No case on surtax fraud has 
been prosecuted thus far.
Some criminal-type 
investigations are carried out 
by experienced auditors with 
the aim of imposing penalties 
rather than prosecution.
A criminal investigation is 
never carried out in practice.  
An in-dept audit is conducted in 
lieu of criminal investiga-tion.
Fraud cases have never been 
reported to the police for 
investigation.
Cases of suspected fraud are 
dealt with as financial matters, 
which subject to penalties.
Number of Cases of 
Administrative Penalties
No data available. FY 2003: 12,282 instances for 
4,834 taxpayers with the total 
amount of penalties P 46.4 
million.
No data available. Penalties are calculated 
automatically by the computer 
at 3% per month.
No data available.
A surcharge of Rs 200 per day 
is charged for non rendering 
returns.  Penalty is charged at 
10% of arrears for the first 
month, and 2% for each 
additional month up to 100%.
No data available.
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Number of Tax Officers 
Dedicated to Debt Collection
13 officers for both VAT and 
Direct Taxes.
No data available. Collection (enforcement): 3
Adjustment/queries: 3
Data capture: 10
No data available. The DCU has an establishment 
of 28 dedicated officers for all 
taxes.
No data available.
Debt Enforcement 
Mechanisms
- Final account is sent to the
  trader outlining the debt.
- Manually issued reminder is
  issued 10 days later.
- Second reminder is manual-
  ly issued 10 days later, pos-
  sibly with an investigation
  officer visit.
- If financially viable, the State
  Attorney may be used to re-
  cover.  This can include at-
  tachment of property and 
  eventual forced sale.
- Charges in connection with
  attachment and disposal are
  added to the debt.
- Debts deemed to be irreco-
  verable are written off.
A 10% penalty is automatically 
raised for a late VAT payment.  
There is no penalty for a late 
return.  Interest is chargeable 
on per month or part of a 
month basis.
Demand notices and reminders 
are send out, reminders are 
sent out.  Bank accounts and 
other debtors of the taxpayers 
can be attached.  Debt 
judgment against the taxpayer 
also gives the taxpayer a bad 
credit record.
Monthly statements are printed 
on the government mainframe 
(customs office has terminals).  
Those with debts of more than 
3 months are selected for 
recovery action.
Interest at 2% per month can 
be added manually for late 
payments.
Demand notices have been 
used, but ineffective.  
Attachment can also be used, 
but it is cumbersome and very 
slow.
The main power used is to 
advise the borders to remove 
the deferment facility for 
defaulters, or refuse to clear 
new imports
The law provides for distraint 
and forced sale of assets and 
the freezing and sequestration 
of monies from accounts.  
However, the debt manage-
ment units try to recover debt 
without recourse of these 
means.
- Immediate Demand Letter
- Warrant of Distress
- Auction (Forced) Sales
- Garnishee Orders
- Civil Suits
- Charge on Land
No data available.
1.9.1 Number of VAT/Sales Tax 
Fraud Cases Prosecuted per 
Year
There is provision for 
prosecution for fraud but no 
case has been investigated to 
this standard.  The Special 
Investigation Unit carries out in-
depth audit rather than 
investigating criminal cases.
For FY 2002/3, 64 cases were 
prosecuted for fraud and 
evasion.  A number of tax-
payers and consultants have 
been jailed.
No data available. A tax investigation unit is in 
place to cover all tax types.  
TRA has its own lawyers who 
run the prosecutions to their 
conclusion.
No data available.
Number of Cases of 
Administrative Penalties
None compliance, such as 
failure to file returns and to 
keep proper accounts, are 
criminal offences.  Approxi-
mately 400 criminal sum-
monses have been issued.  
However, the Court has mostly 
referred these cases back to 
the Department.
This appears to be a need for 
an option of non-criminal 
administrative financial 
penalties, with recourse to the 
courts for more serious cases 
of fraud.
The computer system 
automatically raises penalties 
for late payments.  This 
statistics are not readily 
available.
There is no administrative 
penalty for administrative 
offences (e.g., late filing, 
inadequate books, incorrect 
pricing).
No data available. For FY 2003/2004, 36 cases 
were in the process of 
investigation.  Of these, 24 
have been settled by 
compounding, and 12 are in 
the court process.
No data available.
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1.10.1 Levels of Appeal Open to 
Taxpayers under VAT/ Sales 
Tax
− The Head of Local Office
− National Tax Directorate
− Ministry of Finance
− Administrative Court
Note: In the regions, the head 
of tax office is usually also the 
local judge who heads the 
court/tribunal.
- Level 1:
Director of Customs & Excise
- Level 2:
Board of Adjudicators
- Level 3:
High Court
Appeals can be lodged to the 
General Director of Taxes 
without the tax being paid.
Taxpayer may appeal to the 
VAT commissioner who may 
refer the matter to an appeals 
committee made up of 6 
officers, including the Assistant 
Commissioner for Debt 
Management.
A Revenue Appeal Tribunal will 
be established later in 2004 
following the parliamentary 
approval.
Appeals go to an internal body 
made up of heads of sections, 
after which the Commissioner 
General is the highest level of 
appeal.
The law has made provision for 
a tax tribunal, but this is not yet 
in place.
The first level of appeal would 
be  the Objection and Appeal 
Section, which is set up under 
an Assistant Commissioner.  
After that, the process would 
be:
- Objection to Commissioner
- Appeal to Assessment
  Review Committee
- Appeal to Supreme Court
Taxpayers may appeal to the 
senior officer at the tax office.  
If the decision is not accepted, 
taxpayers can be referred to an 
administrative court, which 
include the Head of the 
relevant tax office in the panel.  
There is no further appeal 
beyond this court.
1.11.1 Mechanisms for Educating 
New Taxpayers
Visits, workshops, and 
pamphlets.
Media (TV, radio, newspapers), 
booklets/pamphlets, 
seminars/workshops, visits to 
the VAT offices.
Media (TV, radio, newspapers) 
and pamphlets.
Media (TV, radio, newspapers) 
and leaflets.  First audit 
includes heavy advisory 
component.  LRA has 
established a well-resourced 
and accessible advice center 
with simple multilingual leaflets.
The headquarters has a Public 
Relation and Taxpayer 
Education Directorate.
A good range of leaflets has 
been introduced, although 
some are in need of reprint.
- Educational visits (not very
   effective)
- Workshops at office.
New taxpayers are provided 
with advice when they apply for 
registration.
Mechanisms for Educating 
Taxpayers on Changes in 
Laws, Regulations, and 
Procedures
Printed leaflets, newspaper 
advertisements, and seminars 
for affected sectors.
Media (TV, radio, newspapers), 
booklets/pamphlets, 
seminars/workshops, VAT 
Journal
The General Directorate 
provides an e-mail address for 
communication with the 
taxpayer.
Public Service Division is 
responsible for disseminating 
information to the public.
For more than five years, a TV 
program called Taxation and 
Development  has been giving 
information about tax issues.
Media (TV, weekly radio show, 
newspapers) and 
leaflets/posters.
Media (TV, radio, newspapers), 
public rallies, and leaflets.
New taxpayers are provided 
with basic education at 
registration.
Taxpayers are informed 
through:
- Circulars
- TV
- Workshops
- Canvassing campaigns
- Leaflets
- Websites
Media (TV, radio, newspapers) 
and leaflets.
Capacities and Strategies to 
Service Taxpayers
Four to five people are 
assigned in each local tax 
office to deal with taxpayer 
queries.
Dedicated office, dedicated 
telephone, immediate 
responses through e-mail and 
post, websites, workshops and 
seminars for accounting 
professions.
Telephone enquiries are taken 
by the dedicated advice center 
at the head office.  The VAT 
Division has its own websites 
and e-mail service for 
enquiries.
Dedicated offices at the 
regions, a toll-free telephone 
line, and websites.
No dedicated office is setup to 
service taxpayers.  Taxpayers 
are directed to a specific 
section which will answer their 
questions.
Toll free telephone for 
providing advice and 
information.
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Table 9.1  VALUE ADDED AND SALES TAX ADMINISTRATION IN THE SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY (contd)
Namibia South Africa Swaziland Tanzania Zambia Zimbabwe
1.10.1 Levels of Appeal Open to 
Taxpayers under VAT/ Sales 
Tax
Appeals are made to the senior 
manager in the department, 
and to the Commissioner as 
the last resort.
Taxpayers also have access to 
the Ombudsman to complain, 
but the Ombudsman cannot 
rule on assessments.
There are plans to set up a 
process of appeal to a Special 
Tax Court.
Objections and appeals can be 
referred to a specially 
constituted tax board.  This 
process is less formal than the 
tax court, and less costly for 
both the taxpayer and SARS.
An Alternative Dispute 
Resolution (ADR) process has 
been introduced as a 
mechanism before the formal 
court proceedings are followed.
Businesses may appeal to the 
senior officer and the 
Commissioner, after which they 
may appeal to the Ministry of 
Finance or to the courts.
Complaints are dealt 
internally.  Complaints can be 
made with regard to service 
quality and unfair treatment.
Appeals are limited to 
decisions related to 
assessments and refusal to 
refund or register.  There are 
two tiers of appeal: an Internal 
Appeal Board that hears 
initially; and Tax Revenue 
Appeal Tribunal.
Appeals require payment of 
50% of the tax in dispute.
Internal Appeal: The Commi-
ssioner General has the power 
to waive penalties and interest 
in part or in full.  Appeals are 
decided accord-ing to the 
amount being appealed:
- Sr. Inspector < K5 million
- Asst. Commissioner
  < K 15 million
- Deputy Commissioner
  < K 25 million
- Commissioner > K 25 million
Revenue Appeal Tribunal: An 
independent body appoin-ted 
by the Minister of Finance.
Taxpayers may raise an 
objection with the 
Commissioner General.  
Taxpayers can also appeal to 
Special Tax Court, then to the 
High Court and finally to the 
Supreme Court.
Taxpayers also have an option 
to raise complaints with the 
Ombudsman.
1.11.1 Mechanisms for Educating 
New Taxpayers
Press releases in the news-
paper, and the circulation of 
pamphlets.
VATNEWS is published at 
least twice a year.  VAT guides 
are updated continuously.  E-
mail facilities are increasingly 
being used.
Field visit or inquiry by the 
taxpayers.
TRA has a Director of 
Taxpayer Education.  For VAT, 
in the headquarters there is a 
taxpayer service officer who 
reports to the Director and VAT 
Commissioner.  There is also 
taxpayer education staff in all 
regional offices.
TRA has a toll free hotline for 
information and complaints, 
leaflets in English and Swahili, 
and websites.
- Educational Visits
- On the Spot Advice
- Booklets, Leaflets
- VAT Knowledge Confirma-
tion Form - to assess the 
taxpayer's knowledge prior to 
registration
ZIMRA has a well developed 
public information division.  
Information conduits include 
TV, radio, newspaper adverts, 
promotional gifts, billboards, 
and pamphlets.
Mechanisms for Educating 
Taxpayers on Changes in 
Laws, Regulations, and 
Procedures
Press releases in the news-
paper, and the circulation of 
pamphlets.
VATNEWS and VAT Guide are 
distributed to all taxpayers.  
VATNEWS gives details of law 
amendments.  The SARS 
website is regularly updated.
Radio, newspaper, and the 
Government Gazette.
Law changes may be 
published in weekly Gazette.
Special booklet is produced to 
describe significant changes.
- Gazette Notices
- Post Budget workshops to
  educate taxpayers on new
  changes
- Weekly radio program
  known as The Taxman
- TV and newspapers
- Website www.zra.org.zm
- Workshops
As above, plus the 
Government Gazette.
Capacities and Strategies to 
Service Taxpayers
A customer service center is in 
place in Windhoek.  The 
Department is developing 
websites to cover its various 
activities.
Taxpayer service is mainly 
through the branch offices 
around the country.  
Comprehensive websites are 
available.  A telephone line for 
reporting tax fraud is operating 
as well as for reporting 
corruption.
None. Similar to educating new 
taxpayers.
ZRA has two Advice Centers 
dedicated to taxpayer services: 
one in Lusaka and one in 
Copperbelt.
Theres is a developed central 
office in Harare that 
coordinates for the whole 
country.  There is no dedicated 
enquiry point in each office.
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Table 9.1  VALUE ADDED AND SALES TAX ADMINISTRATION IN THE SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY (contd)
Angola Botswana Dem. Rep. of Congo Lesotho Malawi Mauritius Mozambique
Website Content Ministry of Finance:
www.minfin.gv.ao
Website in Portuguese.
Department of Customs and 
Excise:
www.finance.gov.bw/vat/
− VAT Act and Amendments
− VAT Regulations
− VAT Guide/Practice Notes/
   Brochures/FAQ
− VAT Forms: Registration
   and Returns
− Feedback/Contact Us
None. Lesotho Revenue Authority:
www.lra.org.ls
− VAT Division Profile
− VAT Acts and Regulations
− VAT Brochure/FAQ/
   Registration Info
− Feedback
Malawi Revenue Authority:
www.mra.mw
− Basic descriptions about
   taxes
Ministry of Finance and 
Economic Development:
ncb.intnet.mu/mof/department/
vat/
− Acts and Regulations
− Registration Forms and
   Tax Returns
− VAT Leaflets
− E-Filing and E-Payment
− Contact Us
None
\
1.12.1 Training Capacities/ Schools No formal training school.  
Training is carried out in-
house.
In-house training for new 
officers and refresher courses 
for existing officers.
The National School of Finance 
(ENF) provides training in 
taxation and customs.
CEPETEDE, a private 
institution, provides training in 
taxation and accounting for 
employees and high ranking 
officers.
In-house training for new 
officers with follow up 
mentoring.
Trainers are appointed in 
house, but consultants are also 
brought in.
MRA has its own training 
school.  Three full-time surtax 
trainers were being trained.
The tax administration has an 
in-house training school.
DNIA has its own training 
school that provides a limited 
number of courses.
Courses Offered Auditors receive up to one 
month of refresher training per 
year.
The last refresher training on 
the petrochemical industry was 
given in 2002.
- VAT Law and VAT Audit
- Introductory courses for new 
recruits
- Basic and advanced courses 
to refresh officers
The ENF runs a 3-year training 
course, which curriculum 
includes a two-month 
internship at the DGI or 
Customs Office.
Basic VAT (4 weeks)
VAT Act (2 weeks)
Basic Audit (2 weeks)
Advanced Audit (2 weeks)
Computerized Audit (2 weeks)
Entry level introduction, 
including surtax.
An advanced surtax curriculum 
is being developed to provide 
more focused skills at an 
advanced level.
Training offered includes basic- 
and advanced-level VAT 
courses, management and 
leadership courses, and 
general courses (e.g., 
computer).
A basic introductory courses 
for 2-3 weeks.
Use of External Training 
Facilities In-Country and/or 
Outside of Country
Tax administration personnel 
have attended SATI and SADC 
events.  Financing and 
language limitations, however, 
are major hurdles.
There is a push to raise the 
level of competence in English.
- Masters in Taxation - 
Australia
- Advanced Taxation - Republic 
of South Africa
In-country: CEPETEDE
Outside the country: One-year 
academic training at the Ecole 
des Finances  in Paris with 
support from the French 
Government.
Tax Policy and Administration 
at SATI, University of Pretoria.
The use of external training is 
minimal due to cost 
constraints, although 
opportunities are taken such as 
SATI and other overseas 
training.
When opportunities arise, they 
are taken−but resources and 
language limitations minimize 
such opportunities.
II. STOCKS AND FLOWS OF VAT/SALES TAX
2.1.1 Annual VAT/Sales Tax 
Collections − On Imports
No data available. VAT
FY 2002/3: 658.0 million
FY 2003/4: 1,175.3 million
Turnover tax accounted for 
about 60-75% of the total 
revenues.
No data available. Surtax
FY 2001: K 3.6 billion
FY 2002: K 3.9 billion
FY 2003: K 5.3 billion
FY 2001: Rs 3.4 billion.
FY 2002: Rs 4.1 billion.
FY 2003: Rs 5.7 billion.
No data available.
Annual VAT/Sales Tax 
Collections − On Domestic 
Transactions
Consumption Tax
FY 2001: 3.6 billion
FY 2002: 12.3 billion
FY 2003: 29.2 billion
The first 4 month of 2004:
11.0 billion.
VAT*
FY 2002/3: 434.5 million
FY 2003/4: 853.0 million
*Gross amount, include refund.
No data available. No data available. Surtax
FY 2001: K 2.7 billion
FY 2002: K 3.0 billion
FY 2003: K 4.5 billion
FY 2001: Rs 2.5 billion.
FY 2002: Rs 3.0 billion.
FY 2003: Rs 4.2 billion.
No data available.
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Table 9.1  VALUE ADDED AND SALES TAX ADMINISTRATION IN THE SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY (contd)
Namibia South Africa Swaziland Tanzania Zambia Zimbabwe
Website Content Ministry of Finance:
www.op.gov.na
− Brief descriptions about the
   Ministry of Finance
South African Revenue 
Authority:
www.sars.gov.za
− National Budget
− VAT Rulings & Regulations
− VAT Forms
− VAT E-Filing/Refund
− Report a Suspicious
− Contact SARS
None Tanzania Revenue Authority:
www.tra.gov.tz
− Corporate Plan; Org.
   Structure
− Tax Laws
− Tax Revenue Statistics
− VAT FAQ
− Contact TRA
Zambia Revenue Authority:
www.zra.org.zm
− Practice Notes, Leaflets,
   Legislation, General Tax
   Info
− Total Revenue Statistics
− Contact Us
Zimbabwe Revenue Authority:
www.zimra.co.zw
− Budget Speech, Finance
   Bills, Public Notices,
   Archives
− VAT Information/FAQ
− VAT Forms
− Contact Info
Search Registered Operator
1.12.1 Training Capacities/ Schools Training Division is responsi-
ble  for the staff training.  There 
is no training school in place.  
Training is provided on site.
Human Resource Division runs 
a training section that caters all 
tax types.  A new SARS 
Academy is going to take over 
the training function.
Yes.  Training is offered in 
three levels.
Tanzania has an Institute of 
Tax Administration.
ZRA used to have a fully-
fledged training center.  
However, the center had 
suffered neglect in terms of 
investment.  Training is now 
held on the second floor of the 
Revenue House in Lusaka, and 
in Nchanga House in 
Copperbelt.
ZIMRA has a highly developed 
internal training capacity.
Courses Offered VAT Introduction Course for 
new entrants (2 weeks).
VAT Audit Course for those 
new to audit work (2 weeks).
VAT related courses include 
VAT 1, 2, 3 each running 2-5 
weeks.  VAT recoveries and 
accounting are also offered.
Training is an on-going process 
carried out throughout the year.
Entry Level: 5-week 
introduction (including sales 
tax)
Mid Level: 5-week customs 
checking
Advanced Level: 4-week tariff 
classification
In-house lawyers receive 
specialist training.
Introductory courses for new 
staff.
Short courses (1-4 weeks) for 
VAT officers.
Courses are classified into 
three categories:
Technical − core training 
programs for improving tax 
inspection/collection perfor-
mance.
Corporate − this course is 
general in nature (e.g., com-
munication skills, customer 
care, etc.). External training 
provider deliver the courses.
Computer − computer training 
is provided by internal staff 
from the IT Department.
Training include 2-week 
technical course on VAT.
Use of External Training 
Facilities In-Country and/or 
Outside of Country
SATI and SADC seminars. SARS has a bursary scheme 
that allows officers to further 
their studies in disciplines that 
complement the SARS 
business.  From time-to-time. 
Study groups are arranged in 
other countries, and regional 
conferences are supported.
Opportunities are also taken to 
attend SATI and SADC training 
events, but funding is a 
challenge.
Short courses up to one month 
are conducted outside the 
country, normally for senior 
officers.
TRA frequently receives 
invitation to nominate staff to 
attend courses offered by 
CATA, SADC, COMESA, 
World Customs Organization.
ZIMRA makes use of executive 
development programs at the 
University of Zimbabwe, 
Harvard, and SAMI (South 
Africa).
CATA, SADC, and SATI are 
also utilized.
II. STOCKS AND FLOWS OF VAT/SALES TAX
2.1.1 Annual VAT/Sales Tax 
Collections − On Imports
FY 2001: R 26.1 billion.
FY 2002: R 31.6 billion.
FY 2003: R 37.7 billion.
No data available. FY 2001: T.shs. 182.1 million.
FY 2002: T.shs. 208.7 million.
FY 2003: T.shs. 250.2 million.
FY 2001: K 492.1 billion.
FY 2002: K 479.1 billion.
FY 2003: K 649.1 billion.
Import Tax:
FY 2001: $ 3.6 million.
FY 2002: $ 3.8 million.
FY 2003: $ 3.2 million.
Annual VAT/Sales Tax 
Collections − On Domestic 
Transactions
FY 2001/2: $ 1.9 billion.
FY 2002/3: $ 2.2 billion.
FY 2003/4: $ 2.4 billion.
FY 2001: R 28.4 billion.
FY 2002: R 29.5 billion.
FY 2003: R 32.4 billion.
No data available. FY 2001: T.shs. 140.0 million.
FY 2002: T.shs. 166.2 million.
FY 2003: T.shs. 201.6 million.
FY 2001: K   685.9 billion.
FY 2002: K   869.5 billion.
FY 2003: K 1,036.1 billion.
FY 2001: $ 28.1 million.
FY 2002: $ 71.9 million.
FY 2003: $ 88.7 million.
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Table 9.1  VALUE ADDED AND SALES TAX ADMINISTRATION IN THE SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY (contd)
Angola Botswana Dem. Rep. of Congo Lesotho Malawi Mauritius Mozambique
2.2.1 Composition of Arrears
(self assessed, estimated, 
penalties and interest, etc.)
No data available. FY 2002/3: 46.1 million
FY 2003/4: 124.1 million
No data available. No data available. Composition data is not 
available; arrears are manually 
recorded.
The debt stock excluding 
parastatals is circa K 150 
million.  Parastatals owe about 
K 265 million.
Self-Assessed:
FY 2001: Rs 28.4 million
FY 2002: Rs 30.3 million
FY 2003: Rs 44.4 million
Official Assessment:
FY 2001: Rs  94.2 million
FY 2002: Rs 110.3 million
FY 2003: Rs 237.1 million
No data available.
Months of Tax Arrears
(Stock of Arrears / Average 
Tax Collections per Month)
No data available. FY 2002/3: 0.7 months
FY 2003/4: 1.6 months
No data available. No data available. FY 2001: 0.42 months.
FY 2002: 0.51 months.
FY 2003: 1.12 months.
No data available.
Concentration by Sector
(Parastatal vs. Private)
No data available. Parastatal
FY 2002/3: 15.6%
FY 2003/4: 2.1%
No data available. No data available. All debts relate to private 
sector.
No data available.
2.3.1 Months of Credit Carry 
Forwards
(Stock of Credits / Average 
New Credits per Month)
No data available. No data available. N/A No data available. No data available. FY 2001: 1.29 months.
FY 2002: 0.96 months.
FY 2003: 1.59 months.
No data available.
2.4.1 Months of Refund Lags
(Stock of Refunds in 
Arrears/Average New 
Refunds per Month)
No data available. FY 2002/3: 0.2 months
FY 2003/4: 0.5 months
N/A Refunds are paid monthly for 
taxpayers in a regular credit 
position (e.g., exporters) and 
quarterly for other taxpayers.
By law, refunds should be 
made within 1 month.  In 
reality, the time may exceed 3 
months.
FY 2001: 0.51 months.
FY 2002: 0.67 months.
FY 2003: 0.62 months.
No data available.
2.5.1 Self Assessed and Declared 
Taxes
No data available. No data available. No data available. No data available. FY 2003: Rs 3.0 billion. No data available.
Additional Assessments 
Based on Audit of Books and 
Records
No data available. FY 2002/3: 21.7 million
FY 2003/4: 78.0 million
No data available. No data available. No statistics available.
Special exercise estimated that 
in 2003 56 assessments 
producing additional tax of K 
26.2 million.
FY 2003:
121 assessments for an 
amount of Rs. 92.8 million, 
exclusive of penalty.
No data available.
Additional Assessments 
Estimated without Audit of 
Books and Records
No data available. No data available. No data available. No data available. No data available. No data available.
Penalties No data available. FY 2002/3: 0.7 million
FY 2003/4: 46.4 million
No data available. No data available. No data available. FY 2003: Rs 58.9 million. No data available.
Interest No data available. FY 2002/3: 0.1 million
FY 2003/4: 3.1 million
No data available. No data available. No data available. Not applicable.  There is no 
provision for interests to be 
charged.
No data available.
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Namibia South Africa Swaziland Tanzania Zambia Zimbabwe
2.2.1 Composition of Arrears
(self assessed, estimated, 
penalties and interest, etc.)
No data available. Total VAT debt:
FY 2001: R 11.8 million.
FY 2002: R 14.6 million.
FY 2003: R 21.1 million.
No data available. No data available. FY 2003:
Total Arrears: K 128.9 billion
Assessed Tax: K 35.8 million
Penalties: K 66.4 million
Interest: K 26.7 million
No data available.
(VAT commenced on Jan 
2004)
Months of Tax Arrears
(Stock of Arrears / Average 
Tax Collections per Month)
No data available. 1-3 months: R     561,431
4-6 months: R     960,372
7-8 months: R     746,806
> 9 months: R 18,821,111
No data available. No data available. FY 2001: 1.8 months.
FY 2002: 1.6 months.
FY 2003: 1.5 months.
No data available.
Concentration by Sector
(Parastatal vs. Private)
No data available. No data available. No data available. No data available. Parastatal
FY 2002: 39.6%
FY 2003: 37.2%
No data available.
2.3.1 Months of Credit Carry 
Forwards
(Stock of Credits / Average 
New Credits per Month)
No data available. No data available. No data available. No data available. FY 2001: 0.04 months.
FY 2002: 0.04 months.
FY 2003: 0.04 months.
No data available.
2.4.1 Months of Refund Lags
(Stock of Refunds in 
Arrears/Average New 
Refunds per Month)
Refunds are repaid in timely 
manner (normally within 21 
days).
No data available. No data available. No data available. FY 2001: 0.6 months.
FY 2002: 0.4 months.
FY 2003: 0.4 months.
No data available.
2.5.1 Self Assessed and Declared 
Taxes
No data available. FY 2001: R 25.5 billion.
FY 2002: R 25.6 billion.
FY 2003: R 26.5 billion.
No data available. No data available. FY 2001: K 608.8 billion.
FY 2002: K 651.4 billion.
FY 2003: K 702.0 billion.
No data available.
Additional Assessments 
Based on Audit of Books and 
Records
No data available. FY 2001: R 5.9 million.
FY 2002: R 3.9 million.
FY 2003: R 2.9 million.
No data available. No data available. FY 2001: K 199.0 billion.
FY 2002: K   65.6 billion.
FY 2003: K   13.1 billion.
No data available.
Additional Assessments 
Estimated without Audit of 
Books and Records
No data available. No data available. No data available. No data available. No data available.
Penalties No data available. No data available. No data available. No data available. FY 2001: K 130.3 billion.
FY 2002: K   84.9 billion.
FY 2003: K   24.2 billion.
No data available.
Interest No data available. No data available. No data available. No data available. FY 2001: K  51.6 billion.
FY 2002: K  26.2 billion.
FY 2003: K   9.4 billion.
No data available.
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X.  Conclusions and Recommendations 
 
10.1   Conclusions 
 
1. SADC Member States represent a very diverse set of countries in terms of 
general economic indicators as well as specific characteristics relevant to 
implementation of a VAT, in particular, or tax systems, in general.   The 
countries vary significantly in size, per capita income, impacts of civil 
disturbances in recent decades, sizes of government, major sources of revenue, 
aid dependency, educational attainment, and sector and trade structures.  A 
common feature, however, is a high degree of trade integration for the most 
southern mainland country members.  
 
2. Given the focus in this study on taxes on consumption, it is noted that a 
number of countries have Gross National Disposable Income (GNDI) 
significantly above GDP due to a combination of net transfers and net factor 
income from abroad.  GDNI is the basis for determining savings and 
consumption, and makes GDP a problematic proxy for estimating 
consumption levels in a country.   
 
3. The relative size of governments in the SADC region is generally large by 
international standards and total revenues as a share of GDP are relatively 
high. VAT is important, particularly among most of the low-income members, 
but is not a dominant source of revenues. While VAT has emerged in recent 
decades internationally as a major player in world tax system, its introduction 
is even more recent within SADC.  The first VAT started only in 1989 and 
three countries (Botswana, Lesotho and Zimbabwe) have introduced VAT 
since 2002.   Three countries do not have VAT systems:  Angola, DRC and 
Swaziland.  DRC is planning to introduce a VAT in 2005.  Swaziland also has 
a VAT under preparation. 
 
4. The introduction of VAT has served different purposes in different countries.  
For most it has replaced existing broad-based sales tax systems in the search 
for more efficient tax collections, but without major increases in revenues. 
There are a couple of exceptions to this pattern.   Botswana has switched from 
a narrow-based selective sales tax to a broad-based VAT with significant 
revenue implications.  Mauritius has been systematically raising it s VAT rate 
and revenues as it has reduced its import duty rates and thereby its dependency 
on customs revenues.    
 
5. Generally, with a few exceptions, countries will have difficulty using the VAT 
to deal with the major revenue challenges arising from government deficits, 
aid dependency and the formation of common markets.  VAT rates in the 
region are generally already relatively high considering the low levels of 
efficiency of the VAT systems. 
 
6. Standard VAT rates convergence has being happening:  the range of standard 
rates has diminished over time.  All are in the range of 10% to 20%, but most 
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cluster around 15%.  Only Zimbabwe still has significant luxury VAT rates, 
while Swaziland has a luxury goods sales tax rate of 25%. 
 
7. Significant diversity exists in the application of exemptions, zero rating and 
refunds across member countries.  This creates a range of effective VAT rates 
as well as positive and negative protection.  A VAT with wide ranging 
exemptions and poor refund payments starts to look like a turnover tax. This 
risks undermining the benefits of a VAT structure.  
 
8. A number of countries have already exhausted the revenue potential of VAT 
through raising the standard rate.   
 
Countries with the lowest per capita incomes tend to have the weakest tax 
capacities and low VAT efficiencies, but highest VAT rates and most 
exemptions.   
 
This results in high price responsiveness of the effective VAT base to VAT 
rate changes, limiting scope for increases in revenue yield.  Hence, there are 
significant potential revenue and efficiency gains from base expansions and 
lowering tax rates, especially through introduction of unified presumptive 
taxes below minimum turnover levels.      
 
9. Most countries do have scope to increase yields through: 
  
a. Economic development and related structural changes that will expand 
effective tax base as formal and monetary sectors grow and per capita 
incomes and educational attainment rises.  
b. Minimization of official zero rating and exemptions 
c. Introduction of “unified” presumptive taxes below minimum threshold for 
compulsory VAT registration to expand effective base of domestic indirect 
taxation (see below) and raising the registration limits to reduce 
administrative burdens. 
d. Improved administrative and compliance efficiencies, particularly through 
computerization, including risk analysis. 
 
10.  In most SADC Member States imports form a high share of GDP.  Most have 
trade deficits (generally large), but a few have trade surpluses.  The 
importance of imports coupled with difficult domestic bases result in the 
collection of VAT being dependent on effective customs control and 
collection at border.  In the context of forming a common market, where 
border controls are weak, to protect revenues VAT may need to be charged on 
internal exports with reconciliation of border VAT collections to ensure the 
revenues of the net importing countries (origin as opposed to destination 
system).  SADC's planned economic integration will raise major challenges 
for its indirect consumption taxes.  SADC countries will need to either 
maintain customs controls at the internal borders, or charge a compensating 
VAT on internal exports 
  
11. Over the past two decades, SADC Member States have undertaken a range of 
tax reforms including strengthening their tax administrations.  These have 
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included a range of organizational and systems reforms and building the 
capacity of the personnel.  A significant range of tax administration capacities 
now exists among SADC Member States.  Many have implemented “best 
practice” arrangements in many functions; but none in all areas.   
 
12. Seven member countries have established semi-autonomous revenue 
authorities.  Six countries have functionally organized tax administration 
covering the inland or domestic tax administration.  At least one other country 
has partial functional organization of debt collections.  To achieve improved 
service of large clients and more efficient tax control, Large Taxpayer Units 
(LTUs) have been established on a multi-tax functional basis in seven 
countries and a further two countries have LTUs within their major tax types.  
Interestingly, none of the thirteen SADC countries has all three of these 
organizational arrangements and only one country has none of them.  
Importantly, there is still room for implementing and deepening 
functional organizations as well as expanding on client-oriented 
arrangements (including client needs evaluation) to enhance the cost-
effectiveness of taxpayer service and enforcement. 
 
13. Generally, there is limited ability of tax administrations to report on 
performance measures relating to the cost effectiveness of tax administration.  
Only about half the countries reported any detail of the expenditures on tax 
administration.  While most countries could report aggregate figures of total 
and active registered taxpayers, only half could give the distribution of VAT, 
sales or turnover taxes by the turnover of the businesses.   
 
Similarly, reporting of tax collections in manners that would assist 
management or revenue forecasting was not encouraging.  Only seven 
countries could report the VAT, sales or turnover taxes collected at the border 
by customs rather than on inland transactions.  Less than half could report tax 
arrears and only about a third could report details of the composition of arrears 
by age, source or type of assessment.  Similarly, low frequencies of reporting 
were evidenced on amounts of VAT credits unpaid or VAT credits carried 
forward in countries that do not refund all VAT credits when earned.  In part, 
this weak tax collection reporting arises as a result of most countries running 
parallel paper and computer systems which clearly removes the focus from the 
detailed management information that they should be able to extract from 
computerized tax administration systems. 
  
14. While most countries have computer systems supporting customs 
administration, only a few have fully computerized customs clearance 
systems.  Similarly, most countries have computer systems supporting their 
domestic VAT, sales or turnover tax administration, all countries still have 
paper returns and files, and most use the computer system for tax collection 
information rather than tax collection management.  There is still significant 
scope for fully computerizing tax administration system. 
 
15. The internet offers enormous scope for e-government including timely, 
accurate and cost-effective e-publishing of tax documents, e-filing of tax 
returns and e-payment of tax liabilities.  Only two countries have websites that 
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support all three major functions.  A further five have websites that make 
detailed tax documents available to the public, while the remainder have 
websites with limited summary information on tax authorities and tax 
compliance.  Development of the use of internet-based communications with 
the tax-paying populations represents a major opportunity for implementing 
more cost effective tax administration and raising tax efficiency levels. 
 
16. The review of the human resources in the tax administration of SADC 
Member States showed weaknesses in key areas where functional organization 
can be most effective such as tax policy, assessment and audit.  Many 
countries showed low shares of personnel with university qualifications and 
other post secondary training specific to tax administration.  Countries with 
revenue authorities reported improved ability to attract qualified staff, but still 
had difficulty in attracting or retaining top-level professionals.  All countries 
had very small numbers of qualified accountants.   The study did not produce 
any findings concerning more general skills, such as general management, 
information system management, public relations and communications, or 
policy analysis, which could be limiting the performance of tax 
administrations. 
 
17. Nearly all countries report having some form of internal capacity to provide 
VAT or sales tax training, typically training for new recruits and some 
refresher courses.  Only a few countries report having capacity to provide 
training in accounting and auditing.  Small countries with small numbers of 
officers have greater difficulty in supporting training institutions.  Most 
countries report making use of regional and international training 
opportunities, but also report limitations of language and funding. 
 
18. Very few countries make use of the court system to prosecute tax frauds.  
Countries generally use administrative means to enforce tax compliance.  The 
courts are used more frequently for tax appeals.  Seven countries report having 
established some form of special tax court, tribunal or board to be the primary 
form of appeals against tax assessment and other administrative decisions.  A 
further two member countries intend to establish such bodies.   
 
19.  Cost-effective field audits are a critical tool in achieving compliance under a 
self-assessed VAT, sales or turnover tax.  Only one country reports using 
random risk-weighted audit selection techniques.  Most countries report some 
structured audit selection system where all registered taxpayers are audited 
with different frequencies from once a year to once every five years based on 
some criteria such as turnover.  Some countries include random selection in 
picking audit cases, but many still report subjective judgment as a basis for 
selection. Many countries view refund audits outside the general audit 
function and devote a disproportionate resource to these audits.  Clearly, the 
lack of full development of computerized administration and a policy 
commitment to move away from manual selection limits the ability to use 
experience-based risk-weighted random audit selection procedures.   
 
20. Most, but not all countries, report some management oversight mechanisms to 
control for quality and reduce corruption in the audit process.  Most send out 
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auditors in pairs and use some form of management review of audit reports.  
Only a few countries report using follow up or overtake audits to check audit 
quality. 
 
21.  While there is significant room for strengthening tax administration in the 
SADC region, economic development status limits tax compliance through 
problems caused by large informal and agricultural sectors, low educational 
levels, limited capacity of the accounting professions, and similar factors.  
 
22. With the growing and desirable trend towards establishing functional tax 
organizations, future reviews and studies of the status and potential reform 
strategies of tax administration should be conducted on a comprehensive basis 
to cover the administration of all domestic or inland taxes. 
     
 
10.2.  Recommendations 
 
This report recommends a staged approach to develop a regional consumption 
tax structure over the medium-term.   The early stages would involve the gradual 
establishment of a compensating CVAT structure with origin-based taxation of 
internal exports, maintenance of border controls, and a reconciliation arrangement 
sanctioned by international agreement.  This could be initially tested either within 
SACU or across a subset of SADC countries.  This structure could then be rolled out 
to all SADC Member States with VAT systems meeting required degrees of 
harmonization such that internal exports are subject to tax at either the domestic rate 
or a CVAT rate by the time the SADC common market is in place in 2012.  
Agreements need be reached about the degree of harmonization of VAT structures 
and rates within the SADC region.  This would require Members States to introduce 
VATs over the medium term if they are to become part of a more open trading area 
that would be established among the countries involved in the roll out of a co-
ordinated VAT system.  The higher the degree of harmonization achieved among 
Member States, the more options are open (i) as to the final co-ordinated VAT system 
within SADC and (ii) the degree of openness of the internal trade borders that can be 
achieved.  A high degree of harmonization would also allow a potential switch from a 
origin-based CVAT arrangement with revenue reconciliation to revenue pooling and 
sharing once the legal and institutional arrangements exist for managing a SADC 
revenue pool.  Different partial pooling mechanisms are suggested for dealing with 
the issues of differential incentives and efficiencies in VAT domestic collections.   
 
More specific recommendations that would both enhance the operations of VAT and 
tax systems generally within the SADC Member States in a co-operative fashion and 
also assist improve co-ordination of the VATs within SADC along a path, as just 
described above, are as follows: 
    
1. It is recommended that an early initiative be undertaken by SADC to 
confirm the share of import VAT that is a final tax by member countries, 
or alternatively, the share of final taxes that are derived from import 
VAT.   
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Data available to date suggest that some 15% to 40% of final VAT could be 
collected at the border.  This represents a significant share of VAT revenues 
that could be at risk and the fundamental motivation for changing the VAT 
treatment of internal trade within a common market where fiscal borders are 
weakened or eliminated.  Unfortunately, direct evidence is not available from 
SADC Member States.  Countries should be encouraged to collect and report: 
 
a. Import VAT or VAT collected at the border by customs each fiscal year.  
While these records are available to the VAT authorities of all countries, 
all countries do not report them systematically. 
 
b. Import VAT collected from registered and unregistered importers.   This 
requires either self-declaration by the importer of his VAT registration 
status on import documents and/or the matching of importer identification 
numbers (usually a taxpayer identification number) with records of 
businesses registered for VAT. 
 
c. Total input VAT deductions and the amount of these based on import VAT 
paid in a fiscal year.  This requires domestic VAT returns to split input 
VAT deductions into those arising from import VAT paid and those arise 
from VAT invoices from domestic suppliers. 
   
2. It is recommended that an early initiative be undertaken to enhance 
SADC collection and administration cost information.   
 
Despite most SADC Member States maintaining computer-based systems for 
tax collection statistics, improvements are required in the maintenance and 
publication of statistics on: 
 
a. the tax collections by source (including the identification of tax collections 
from enforcement actions), and  
  
b. stocks of tax arrears, refund obligations and tax credit carry forwards (in 
countries which do not refund all outstanding credits) by type.   
 
This would increase the transparency of the tax systems, allow for improved 
management of VAT enforcement and credit refunds, and allow for more 
accurate forecasting of revenue collections.  To achieve enhanced reporting 
would require changes in the coding of data collection the computer systems.  
Another area of weakness in reporting is on the cost of tax administration, 
especially in terms of breaking down costs by tax type and by tax function to 
estimate the unit costs of collection.  
 
Additionally, it is recommended that consideration be given to a co-
operative SADC-wide project to develop best practice advice for SADC 
Member States on tax collection data coding and reporting as well as for 
reporting unit costs and other performance measures of tax 
administration from computerized tax collection and budget systems.   
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3. It is recommended that to improving tax efficiency and revenue growth 
prospects SADC introduce or expand the use of unified presumption taxes 
below minimum turnover levels for VAT registration for unincorporated 
businesses in place of VAT and income tax   
 
Base restructuring is required to expand domestic tax bases, harmonize rates 
and reduce major distortions from exemptions and speed up refunds.  Given 
the low tax efficiencies of the VAT and sales taxes, this would be an important 
innovation aimed at expanding the tax base.  Ad valorem turnover taxes should 
be charged on small businesses and unit taxes on micro businesses.  The 
administration of these taxes should be by local authorities in coordination: 
  
a. with general businesses licensing arrangements, and  
 
b. with central revenue authorities for taxpayer identification numbering 
and reporting.    
 
4. It is recommended that a co-operative project should be undertaken to 
review existing e-governance techniques in the region and to advise SADC 
Member States on the development and use of e-governance techniques, 
at a minimum in the area of e-publishing and effective communication 
with the tax paying population 
 
VAT is a self-assessed tax.  Information should be readily available to the 
taxpayer.  Indeed the VAT legislation, regulations, guidelines, and other 
information notices should be readily available not only to the taxpayer but 
also to prospective international traders and investors in a country and officials 
of other member countries.   SADC has made an effort to establish a Tax 
Database that includes tax legislation for all SADC Member States.  This 
information is, however, partial and static.  Completion of this study had to 
expend considerable resources to collect basic VAT system information.  
Currently, revenue authorities in seven member countries maintain up to date 
websites giving all relevant current VAT information.    
 
This would benefit national taxpayers, international investors and traders as 
well as SADC efforts at tax cooperation and coordination.  The information 
content of web sites should also be available in other formats (such as printed 
documents) nationally for those who do not have access to internet services.   
Internet-based reporting of economic and tax collection performance data 
should also be encouraged.   An extension to this project could be the 
provision of technical assistance on:  
 
a. the legal environment necessary to use the internet for e-filing and e-   
            payments of taxes, and 
 
b.  technical issues involved in introducing e-filing and e-payments.  
 
5. It is recommended that a SADC project be undertaken to accelerate the 
development of functional tax and VAT administration capacity.  This 
study should go further than the current study by undertaking a combined 
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assessment of strategies that countries could undertake to migrate to functional 
organizations, and assessment of the training needs and delivery capacities of 
member countries, especially where human resource constraints are limiting 
computerization, introduction of e-governance, and functional organization 
 
International experience is showing that the functional organization of tax 
administration offers opportunities to gain more effective use of scarce 
administrative resources, significantly more effective auditing and debt 
enforcement, and opens the door to providing more differentiated and targeted 
taxpayer services, such as through a Large Taxpayer Unit (LTU).   Preparatory 
to undertaking effective functional organization are the introduction of 
supportive tax legislation, understanding of the status of the overall tax 
system, and the training of personnel.  This requires:  
 
a. Review of tax administrations on a comprehensive basis rather than 
individual tax-type basis. 
  
b. Member countries either review and co-ordinate their administrative 
provisions across existing tax type legislation or introduce a 
comprehensive tax administration law for all domestic tax types.   
 
c. Training of tax officers in all relevant types of tax legislation, policy and 
procedures. 
 
d. Training in modern tax administration strategies and methods as well as 
key skills such accountancy and audit, and information system 
management.   
 
e. Development of cost-effective training capacity within the region. 
  
The training considerations should go beyond accounting, auditing, tax 
legislation and tax system implementation, and should also look at weaknesses 
in management, project implementation, tax policy analysis, revenue 
forecasting and communications capacities.    
 
The training strategy should advise on:  
(i) where regional training (for all or part of SADC region) for routine tax 
administration activities (whether at an introductory or more advanced 
level) makes sense taking into account gains in economies of scale, but 
limited by country differences such as language, and  
(ii)  where regional or international training should be used to develop trainers, 
innovators and leaders in the tax systems at middle and high levels.  These 
types of training are enhanced by deeper, broader and more comparative 
approaches to education such that both the range of approaches and 
practices in different countries are studied along with the critical analysis 
of why they do or do not work in different country contexts.    
 
The study should assess existing regional training capacities or centers, address the 
costs of training and professional education, and identify mechanisms for financing 
regional training centers.  The study could also address the roles of the professional 
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organizations, especially for the accounting profession, in training and development 
of the tax systems within member countries. 
 
In the interim, prior to establishing any regional training institutions, it may be cost-
effective for SADC to recruit a training coordinator to assess common country 
training needs, identify training resource persons, and co-ordinate the financing and 
organization of training facilities for an annual program of short-term training 
programs for Member States. 
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Data Sources 
 
Data was collected in descending order of priority from the following data sources: 
 
Revenue statistics: 
   
 International Monetary Fund, Government Finance Statistics 
 
 International Monetary Fund, Country Reports as published on IMF website, 
especially Statistical Appendices and selected Issue Reports  
 
 Ministry of Finance data collected by author for Lesotho, Malawi, South 
Africa, and Tanzania. 
 
 Institute of Public Policy research (IPPR), Namibia 
 
National economic and social statistics 
 
 World Bank, World Development Indicators, 2003 and 2004 
 
 International Monetary Fund, Country Reports as published on IMF website, 
especially Statistical Appendices and selected Issue Reports  
 
 Central or Reserve Bank for member countries, statistical web sites 
 
Tax administration survey of SADC Member States
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Appendix A:  New SACU Revenue Sharing Formula 
The 2002 SACU Revenue-sharing formula of SACU 
The revenue sharing formula of the 2002 SACU Agreement, for a given financial year, is: 
Ri = C (Ai/A) + (0.85) E (GDPi/GDP) + 20*(0.15) E (1-((Yi/Y)-1)/10) 
where: 
Ri = revenue share of SACU country i; 
i = Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa or Swaziland; 
C = all customs duties actually collected on goods imported into SACU, less the cost of financing the    
  Secretariat, the Tariff Board, and the Tribunal, less the customs duties rebated or refunded; 
Ai = c.i.f. value (at the border) of imports of SACU country i from all other SACU members, less re-
  exports; 
A = total c.i.f. value (at the border) of intra-SACU imports, less re-exports; 
E = all excise duties actually collected on goods produced in the SACU area, less the cost of financing 
  the Secretariat, the Tariff Board, and the Tribunal, less the excise duties rebated or refunded; 
GDPi = Gross domestic product of SACU country i; 
GDP =  total gross Domestic product of SACU members; 
Yi =  Gross domestic product per capita of SACU country i; 
Y = average gross domestic product per capita of all SACU members. 
After some algebraic manipulations, Ri becomes: 
Ri = C (Ai/A) + (0.85) E (GDPi/GDP) + (0.3) E (11- Yi/Y) 
The customs component: C (Ai/A) 
The pooled customs revenue will be distributed according to intra-SACU imports. On the basis of 1998/99 trade, 
South Africa would have contributed about 80% to the customs component, and its share of this component would 
have been 20.5% (in 1998/99 South Africa's intra-SACU imports were R7,520 million, while total intra-SACU 
imports amounted to R36,706 million). On the same basis, the BLNS would have contributed around 20% to the 
customs component, and their shares of the customs pool would have been: Botswana (26.6%), Lesotho (13.4%), 
Namibia (24.9%), and Swaziland (14.6%). These shares are expected to remain stable over time, though the size of 
the customs pool (C) will depend upon the value of imports and changes to the SACU tariff regime. 
The excise component: (0.85) E (GDPi/GDP) 
The size of the excise component has been set initially at 85% of the excise pool, and will be distributed on the basis 
of the GDP of each of the SACU countries. In 1998, South Africa's GDP represented 92.8% of SACU's total GDP, 
and its share of this component would have been 78.9% (92.8 times 0.85). The remainder of the 85% of the excise 
component would have been distributed as follows: Botswana (3.0%), Lesotho (0.5%), Namibia (1.8%), and 
Swaziland (0.8%). 
The development component: (0.3) E (11- Yi/Y) = (0.15){1/5 – 1/50(Yi/Y-1)}100 
The size of the development component has been set initially at 15% of the excise pool, and will be distributed 
inversely to each country's GDP per capita: the smaller the GDP per capita, the greater the share of the development 
pool. In 1998, GDP per capita in the SACU area was: Botswana (R17,968), Lesotho (R2,395), Namibia (R9,615), 
South Africa (R17,578), and Swaziland (R7,024); this leads to an average GDP per capita of R10,916. On this basis, 
the 15% share of the development component would have been distributed as follows: Botswana (2.80%), Lesotho 
(3.23%), Namibia (3.04%), South Africa (2.82%), and Swaziland (3.11%). 
The composition of SACU payment by component: 
On the basis of the previous figures, the BLNS countries would largely derive their total SACU revenues from the 
customs component: Namibia (83.7%), Botswana (82.1%), Swaziland (78.9%), and Lesotho (78.2%); while South 
Africa would receive 20.1% from this component. South Africa would get the majority of its SACU revenue from 
the excise component (77.2%), followed by Botswana (9.3%), Namibia (6.1%), Swaziland (4.3%), and Lesotho 
(2.9%). The development component is relatively more important for Lesotho and Swaziland (18.9% and 16.8%, 
respectively, of their total SACU revenues), followed by Namibia (10.2%), Botswana (8.6%), and South Africa 
(2.7%). 
Source: SACU Agreement 2002, and DTI (2001). 
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Table A.1 SACU revenues, composition and distribution, 1989/90 - 2000/01 
 (Rand millions)   
  1989/90 1990/91 1991/92 1992/93 1993/94 1994/95 1995/96 1996/97 1997/98 1998/99 1999/00 2000/01 2001/02 2002/03
Average 
96/97-
00/01 
Customs duties      2,194    2,502     2,736     2,961    3,413     4,247    5,326     6,518     6,067     5,986      6,518      7,854    8,632     9,500  
Import surcharges      2,625    2,075     1,456     1,521    1,756     1,171       457           (6)           (1)            2             0           -             1            1  
Specific excises       2,578    2,889     3,360     4,100    4,628     5,431    6,075     5,912     7,426     8,053      8,886     9,127    9,797   10,282  
Ad valorem excises         264       456        465        336       339        373       400        719        582        519         584        694       776     1,020  
SACU pool      7,661    7,922     8,017     8,918  10,136   11,222  12,258   13,143   14,073   14,559    15,989   17,674  19,206   20,803  
                
Total excises      2,842    3,344     3,825     4,436    4,967     5,804    6,475     6,631     8,007     8,572      9,470     9,820  10,573   11,302  
Excise share 37.1% 42.2% 47.7% 49.7% 49.0% 51.7% 52.8% 50.5% 56.9% 58.9% 59.2% 55.6% 55.1% 54.3% 56.2%
                
BLNS payments      1,366    1,801     2,760     2,984    3,089     3,249    3,890     4,363     5,237     5,577      7,197     8,396    8,205     8,259  
BLNS share of SACU 
pool 17.8% 22.7% 34.4% 33.5% 30.5% 29.0% 31.7% 33.2% 37.2% 38.3% 45.0% 47.5% 42.7% 39.7% 40.2%
                
Botswana         458       676     1,049     1,342    1,105        939    1,084     1,156     1,497     1,662      2,551     2,986    
 6.0% 8.5% 13.1% 15.0% 10.9% 8.4% 8.8% 8.8% 10.6% 11.4% 16.0% 16.9%   12.7%
Lesotho         264       355        424        548       747        841       907     1,006     1,173     1,033      1,183     1,126    
 3.4% 4.5% 5.3% 6.1% 7.4% 7.5% 7.4% 7.7% 8.3% 7.1% 7.4% 6.4%   7.4%
Namibia         448       559        946        735       782        902    1,156     1,349     1,560     1,805      2,241     2,877    
 7.1% 11.8% 8.2% 7.7% 8.0% 9.4% 10.3% 11.1% 12.4% 14.0% 16.3% 13.8%   13.5%
Swaziland         196       211        342        359       455        567       744        852     1,007     1,076      1,222     1,407    
 2.6% 2.7% 4.3% 4.0% 4.5% 5.1% 6.1% 6.5% 7.2% 7.4% 7.6% 8.0%   7.3%
South Africa      6,295    6,121     5,257     5,934    7,047     7,973    8,368     8,781     8,825     8,982      8,791     9,278    
 82.2% 77.3% 65.6% 66.5% 69.5% 71.0% 68.3% 66.8% 62.7% 61.7% 55.0% 52.5%   59.7%
South Africa share of 
GDP 93.6% 93.4% 93.6% 93.6% 93.6% 93.4% 93.4% 93.1% 92.9% 92.6% 92.3% 91.9%     92.6%
 
Appendix B:  Exempt and zero-rated items and persons 
                                                                                     
 
B - 1 
Appendix B.  
Exempt and zero-rated items and persons 
 
For countries with VAT systems 
 
Under a credit-method VAT, the distinction between exemptions and zero-rating is 
critical.  Production of exempt goods and services means that a business does not 
have to register, does not collect output VAT, and most importantly, does not qualify 
for input VAT deductions or credits.  Zero rating by contrast is treated as a positive 
tax arte and businesses are required to register, not collect output VAT, but qualify for 
input VAT deductions and credits.  In the case of import VAT, there is no effective 
distinction between exemption and zero rating.  In both cases no import VAT is 
charged.  Some countries focus their classification of exemptions and zero-rating on 
domestic supplies and purchases of specified or privileged persons and then have 
imports follow these classifications. Others will limit zero rating to domestic supplies 
and only exempt imports.   This means that special arrangements have to be made for 
refund of VAT on domestic purchases by privileged persons such as diplomats and 
aid agencies.  
 
The following tables list the exempt and zero rated goods and services, imports and 
supplies, and persons with special privileges with respect to VAT purchases, as the 
case may be for each SADC Member State. 
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Botswana (2002) 
 
Type of exemption 
or zero rating 
Reason Items 
Exemption Financial services. 
Education services.  
Leasehold land by way of lease.  
Residential rental. 
Prescription drugs and services in a public medical facility. 
Exempt supplies 
Scope 
clarification 
Any goods or services by the State, a local authority or an 
association not for gain. 
Services to members of an association by the association. 
Accommodation supplied by the employer to the employee as 
a benefit of employment. 
Structure of tax Exports of goods and services.  
International transport services.  
Sale of a going business between registered persons. 
Petrol, diesel and eliminating paraffin (subject to excise duty) 
Zero-rated supplies 
Policy Sorghum or maize meal. 
Goods or services supplied for the personal or official use of 
the President or any dependent member of the President's 
family. 
Structure of 
import duty 
Normal items exempt from import duty such as used/personal 
goods of changing residents or passenger baggage, temporary 
imports/exports, transit, reusable containers, inputs into 
production of exports, etc 
Exempt imports 
Policy Minimum allowances on personal gifts and purchases 
Diplomatic and aid agency official imports (can apply for 
refunds on domestic purchases) 
Charitable and welfare organization imports. 
Disaster and emergency relief imports. 
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Lesotho (2003) 
 
Type of exemption 
or zero rating 
Reason Items 
Exemption Public postal services 
Passenger transportation 
Medical and dental services 
Financial and insurance services 
Educational services 
Unimproved land 
Leasing or letting of immovable property by 
manufacturer, or for low-income housing schemes 
Residential housing property sales or rentals 
Hostels and boarding establishments 
Water (piped) 
Exempt supplies 
Uncertain Non professional sports organizations and activities 
Not for profit cultural activities 
Charitable organizations and activities 
Structure of tax Exports Zero rated goods 
and services Policy  Maize meal, maize grain, sorghum meal, unmalted 
sorghum grain, wheat flour, wheat grain, bread, milk, 
beans, peas, lentils, agricultural inputs (fertilizers, seeds 
and pesticides), livestock and poultry feed, paraffin for 
cooking, illuminating or heating. 
Structure of 
import duty 
Items normally exempt from import duty such as 
used/personal goods of changing residents or passenger 
baggage, temporary imports/exports, transit, reusable 
containers, inputs into production of exports, etc 
Exempt imports 
Policy Minimum allowances on personal gifts and purchases 
Diplomats, heads of state  
Relief supplies 
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Malawi (2003) 
 
Type of exemption 
or zero rating 
Reason Items 
Exemption Live animals 
Animal products (meat, fish, dairy, etc) 
Unprocessed vegetable products excluding cut flowers, 
including malts and starches 
Fuel wood 
Untreated water  
Petroleum products 
Insecticides, herbicides, fungicides 
Books and newspapers 
Mosquito nets 
Coin 
Spraying equipment 
Tractors, ambulances 
Medical equipment 
Exempt goods 
Structure of import 
duty 
Items normally exempt from import duty such as 
used/personal goods of changing residents or passenger 
baggage, temporary imports/exports, transit, reusable 
containers, inputs into production of exports, etc 
Exempt services Exemption Educational services 
Banking and insurance services 
Postal services 
Funeral services 
Transport of exports  
Structure of tax Exports, including ships and aircraft stores Zero rated goods and 
services Policy  Pharmaceuticals 
Medical Services 
Fertilizers 
Condoms 
Agricultural, horticultural and forestry machinery 
Food processing machinery 
Manufacturing equipment for pulp and paper, printing, 
textiles, clothing, leather and footwear, metal and metal 
working, wood working, rubber and plastics, tobacco 
product and vegetable oil sectors 
Motor vehicles for goods transport 
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Mauritius (2003) 
 
Type of exemption 
or zero rating 
Reason Items 
Exempt goods Exemption Unprocessed agricultural and horticultural produce, other 
than horticultural exports 
Primary agricultural and horticultural produce, other than 
vegetables and fruits produced in and exported from 
Mauritius and bird’s eggs in the shell 
Animal or vegetable fats and oils other than ghee produced 
in Mauritius and edible oils 
Live animals for food production excluding poultry 
Fish (excluding fresh, chilled or frozen fish, the produce of 
Mauritius, and canned tuna, smoked fish and processed fish 
produced in and exported from Mauritius) 
Meat (excluding meat of poultry) other than canned meat 
produced in and exported from Mauritius, meat offal 
(excluding offal of poultry) 
Bird’s eggs in the shell 
Buttermilk and cream (other than sterilized liquid milk), 
buttermilk, whey, kephir and other fermented or acidified 
milk and cream; cheese and curd. 
Rice, wheat, cereal flours (excluding wheat flour), bread. 
Molasses 
Soya bean protein 
Coffins 
Herbicides 
Green houses and related equipment 
Pharmaceuticals and antibiotics 
Kerosene including kerosene jet type fuel 
Invalid carriages 
Journals and periodicals 
Aircraft, ships, fishing vessels 
Works of art, collectors’ pieces and antiques 
Structure of 
import duty 
Items normally exempt from import duty such as 
used/personal goods of changing residents or passenger 
baggage, temporary imports/exports, transit, etc 
Exempt imports 
Exemption Common salt 
Scope 
clarification 
Specified fee paying sporting events 
Cargo handling services in respect of goods transported by 
sea or air in international trade 
Exempt services 
Exemption Financial services 
Educational and training services 
Transport of passengers by public service vehicles 
excluding contract buses for the transport of tourists and 
contract cars. 
Medical, hospital and dental services including clinical 
laboratory services, services provided in a health institution 
and veterinary services 
Postal services 
Renting of fixed telephone lines 
Internet provider services 
Burial and cremation services 
Sales and rental of land and residential property 
Construction of residential property 
Aircraft leasing 
Zero rated goods 
and services 
Structure of tax Exports of goods excluding exempt goods but including 
vegetables and fruits, horticultural produce, 
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pharmaceuticals, antibiotics 
Export of services 
International transport of passengers and goods by sea or air 
Duty free shop supplies 
Supplies (other than exempt items) to free port activities 
and imports into export processing zones (except capital 
equipment subject to 5% where supplies to local market 
within last 3 years) 
 Policy  Wheat flour, wheat bran, edible oils, margarine, sterilized 
liquid milk, curdled milk and cream, yoghurt 
Common salt 
Fertilizers, animal feeding stuffs other than prepared pet 
foods 
Printed books, booklets, brochures, pamphlets, leaflets and 
similar printed matter (except directories and reports), 
children’s picture, drawing or coloring books music, printed 
or in manuscript 
Electricity and related services supplied by the Central 
Electricity Board 
Water and related services supplied by the Central Water 
Authority and for irrigation  
Supplies by Wastewater Management Authority 
Services supplied by holders of global business and certain 
banking licenses 
 Import 
protection 
Ghee produced in Mauritius 
Fish, fresh, chilled or frozen, the produce of Mauritius 
Common salt 
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Namibia (2003) 
 
Type of exemption 
or zero rating 
Reason Items 
Scope of tax Fringe benefits to employees 
Trade union member services 
Exempt supplies 
Exemption Interest and margin-based financial services  
Financial intermediation services by a buy-aid society 
or a medical-aid fund 
Condominium management services 
Medical or paramedical services 
Hospital and similar health services 
Education services 
Land or building rentals for residential purposes 
accommodation or rental as employed housing 
allowance 
Public transport services  
Used goods (including vehicles)  
Goods and services to the Heads of State of foreign 
states 
Structure of tax Exports and supplies to EPZ 
International transport services  
Supply of services for land and land development 
outside Namibia, 
Services provided for temporary imports, 
Repair and maintenance of foreign bound aircraft or 
ship; Supply of services to non resident for ancillary 
transport within Namibia;  
Services related to international property rights for use 
outside of Namibia;  
Supply of telecommunication services for use by  non 
resident 
Supply of parts or service w.r.t guarantee agreement 
Charitable organizations and children’s homes, 
orphanages or old-age homes; 
Zero rated goods 
and services 
Policy  Postage stamps (except collectors items);  
Mahango, mahango meal, maize meal   
Electricity, water, and sanitation residential services, 
Petroleum products (unleaded and leaded petrol, 
distillate fuels, kerosene and lubricity agent mixtures) 
Purchases by diplomats, international agencies and 
technical assistance subject to privileges and exemption 
certificates (S40) 
Exempt imports Structure of 
import duty 
Items normally exempt from import duty such as 
used/personal goods of changing residents or passenger 
baggage, temporary imports/exports, transit, goods for 
use in EPZs, urns, wreathes, coffins and human 
remains,  
Unsolicited gifts, as subject to SACU agreements, 
unprocessed fish catches etc 
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Policy For use in mining or prospecting for natural oil or gas; 
Goods and services for humanitarian relief, under a 
technical agreement or as part of a multilateral 
agreement;  
Goods for Heads of State, Diplomatic and Foreign 
Representatives,  
Welfare or charitable purposes 
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South Africa (2003) 
 
Type of exemption 
or zero rating 
Reason Items 
Exempt supplies Exemption Financial services 
Passenger transport by road and rail 
Rental of residential accommodation and land  
Public or publicly recognized education services  
State provided medical services and medicines 
Supplies by employee organizations to members funded by 
membership contributions 
Condominium management services funded by levies 
 Scope of tax Supply by not-for-profit association of services or goods 
containing or produced from 80% by value of donated 
goods 
Zero rated goods and 
services 
Structure of tax Exports of goods and services 
International transport 
 Scope of tax State subsidies and donations to welfare organizations  
Transfer payments made by public authorities to vendors 
 Policy  Goods for agricultural, pastoral or other farming purposes 
Certain basic foodstuffs: brown bread, brown wheaten 
meal, maize meal, samp, mealie rice, dried mealies, dried 
beans, rice, lentils, fruit and vegetables, canned pilchards 
and sardines, milk (liquid, cultured, powdered), cooking oil, 
eggs, legumes and pulses, blended dairy powders 
Petrol, diesel (subject to excises and levies) and 
illuminating paraffin 
Gold coins  
Exempt imports Structure of 
import duty 
Items normally exempt from import duty such as 
used/personal goods of changing residents or passenger 
baggage, temporary imports/exports, transit, packing 
containers, urns, wreathes, coffins and human remains, , as 
subject to SACU agreements,  etc 
Travellers Cheques and Bills of Exchange 
 Policy Goods zero rated above:  food items, petroleum products, 
etc 
Imports for technical assistance or disaster relief  
Printed promotional materials on tourisms and exhibitions 
in foreign countries 
Goods for Heads of States, Diplomats and other Foreign 
Representatives 
Unsolicited gifts to public or local authorities, and not-for-
profit associations (for use in educational, religious or 
welfare purposes) 
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Tanzania (2003) 
 
Type of exemption 
or zero rating 
Reason Items 
Exempt supplies 
and imports 
Exemption Food, crop and livestock supplies (not for catering) 
Pesticides and fertilizersa and agricultural implements 
Approved pharmaceuticals 
Approved veterinary drugs and equipmenta 
Aviation spirits 
Aircraft, including parts and maintenance 
Water (other than canned/bottled) 
Postage stampsa 
Fishing gear 
Computers, printers, parts and accessories and cash 
registersa 
Locally processed yarna 
Packing material for milk processing and manufacturea 
Educational supplies (including capital goods to 
government-registered establishments), 
Medical, health and veterinary services 
Books and newspapers  
Sale and lease of housing and land  
Financial and insurance services 
Funeral services 
Tourism services  
Public transport services (excluding taxis, rental cabs and 
boat charters) 
Betting and gaming services (subject to selective tax) 
Equipment for mining sector activities 
For diplomatic missions 
For aid funded technical assistance 
For armed forces and armed forces duty free shopsa 
For charitable, religious, community based non-profit 
organization for specified public purposes 
For public institution or non-government organization 
receiving government subventions and agreement for relief 
from taxation 
Structure of tax Exports of goods and services 
Supply to outgoing ships/aircrafts for consumption or duty-
free sale 
Agricultural supplies to co-operatives intended for export 
International transport and ancillary services  
Zero rated goods and 
services 
Policy  Locally produced medicines, drugs and equipment. 
Exempt imports Structure of 
import duty 
Deceased or travelers personal effects, 
Duty free shops;  
a.  Under Second and Third Schedules only supplies are specified for qualifying for exemption or relief. 
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Zambia (2003) 
 
Type of exemption 
or zero rating 
Reason Items 
Exempt goods and 
services (domestic 
supply or import) 
Exemption Public water and sewerage supply services; other than 
canned/bottled water 
Food, crop and livestock supplies and products, dairy 
products, fish and infant foods 
Pesticides and fertilizers 
Domestic kerosene 
Gold bullion 
Treated and untreated mosquito nets  
Pharmaceuticals and medical equipment 
Medical supplies to the blind and disabled 
Books and newspapers, maps and charts  
Health and medical services 
Equipment for blind and handicapped 
Educational services (public, not for profit, charitable) 
Transport services (bus, boat, air or rail) 
Financial and insurance services and trading in shares 
Funeral services 
Conveyance of real property  
Sale and lease of housing and land 
Charges or royalties for exploitation of natural 
resources 
Betting and gaming services 
Trade union subscriptions, but not goods and services 
financed by subscriptions 
Structure of tax Exports and related supplies, 
Transportation and transit and ancillary services related 
to exports 
Duty free shops 
Zero rated goods 
and services 
Policy  Aviation kerosene 
Basic unprocessed foods including milk, fish, animal 
products, infant foods 
Agricultural produce  
Medical supplies 
Building supplies for charitable organizations 
Supplies to privileged persons (President, diplomats, 
donors, aid funded technical assistance, etc)  
Hotel accommodation in Livingstone, 
Raw materials for mosquito nets manufacture 
Specified tourist activities  
Imports for the President,  
Imports and supplies to aid funded activities, the 
diplomatic corps 
Structure of 
import duty 
Items normally exempt from import duty such as 
used/personal goods of changing residents or passenger 
baggage, temporary imports/exports, transit, packing 
containers, urns, wreathes, coffins and human remains, 
aircraft stores in international transport,  etc 
 
Exempt imports 
Policy For charitable and religious organization activities 
Items imported under Investment Certificate 
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Appendix C 
Final VAT collections:  
What share comes from import VAT? 
 
Imports and the collection of indirect taxes on imports form a key source of revenues 
in SADC Member States.  In the case of VAT collected on imports a significant share 
of the VAT becomes deductible input VAT, but a large share remains a final VAT 
collection.  As such border collections by customs services become a critical front line 
point of collection.  It is therefore of importance to estimate the share of final VAT 
collections that are derived from import VAT collections. 
 
Revenues from a credit-method VAT using the destination principle are derived 
effectively from two bases:  (i) final consumption by the private and government 
sectors, and (ii) purchases of inputs by VAT exempt businesses.   The non-
deductibility of input VAT by exempt businesses effectively increases the VAT base 
beyond that afforded final consumption.  Exempt businesses (such as exempt financial 
institutions, farmers or small businesses outside of the VAT net) produce intermediate 
inputs into other businesses producing VATable goods and services for final 
consumption.  Essentially, the VAT on the inputs to these exempt businesses results 
in double taxation or tax cascading within the VAT system. 
 
A destination VAT is collected on imports and on domestic transactions.  Many 
imports are capital or intermediate inputs into domestic production and as a result the 
import VAT is potentially deductible.  Much of the import VAT is final as it goes 
directly into final consumption or is not deductible by exempt businesses or the 
importers are outside the scope of the VAT.   The issues in analyzing import and 
domestic VAT collections to determine the source and amount of final VAT 
collections are the same:  basically there is a need to identify the shares of import 
VAT and domestic output VAT that are (i) VAT on final consumption, (ii) VAT on 
exempt business inputs, and (iii) input VAT that will be deducted by or refunded to a 
domestic business.  Assume that import VAT (Rimp) forms a share λ of the total VAT 
collections, and that a share γ of the import VAT is deductible as input VAT and a 
share δ of output VAT on domestic supplies ( outputdomR ) is deductible as input VAT, then 
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the total VAT collections (R) in a year, which is composed of domestic VAT (Rdom) 
and import VAT (Rimp), can be restated as follows:101  
R  =  Rdom  +  Rimp      (1) 
      =  Rdom  +  +   λR      (2) 
      =   [ outputdomR  -
input
domR  - 
input
impR ]  +  Rimp   (3) 
      =  [ outputdomR   -   δ outputdomR   -  γ Rimp ]  +  Rimp  (4) 
      = outputdomR (1 - δ )  +  Rimp ( 1- γ )    (5) 
Now, outputdomR (1 - δ )  is the portion of output VAT that is the VAT on final 
consumption and on exempt business inputs.  These are final, non-deductible and non-
refundable VAT collections.  Similarly, Rimp ( 1- γ ) is the portion of import VAT that 
is composed of VAT on final consumption and exempt business inputs.   Therefore,  
R    =  finaldomR    +   
ebi
domR   +   
final
impR    +  
ebi
impR    (6) 
      = finalcombineddomR    +   
finalcombined
impR       (7) 
  
      =    finalcombineddomR  +   λ( 1- γ )R    (8) 
      = ebifinal RR +       (9) 
 
In practice, λ, the share of import VAT collections out of total collections is known 
for most, but not all countries with VAT systems.  This typically falls in the range of 
50% to 70% of total VAT collections.   For example, import VAT in South Africa is 
about 50% of total VAT, while in Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia, it has 
been around 60% in recent years (2000-2002), generally rising from around 50% in 
earlier years.102  Early data from the new VAT in Botswana show about 70% of the 
VAT collected on imports.   The share of import VAT that becomes deductible as 
input VAT, however, is not so commonly known.  A recent study in Ghana was able 
to determine this figure in that country where approximately 60% of the import VAT 
was deductible during 1999-2001 based on the import VAT reported as input VAT 
                                                 
101 In this analysis it is assumed that VAT accruals and collections (or refunds) are equal.  This means 
that there are no arrears in the collection of positive VAT and all accrued refunds are paid. 
102 The use of VAT deferrals on capital equipment imports in Zambia and VAT exemptions for mining 
sector and government purchases in Tanzania would serve to depress the share of VAT collected on 
imports. 
Appendix C:  Final VAT collections: What share comes from import VAT? 
:                                                                                      
 
C - 3 
deductions on VAT returns.103   The share of import VAT in Ghana over these years 
average around 70%.  Hence, the share of import VAT that was a final (or non-
deductible) collection was 40% of the import VAT or nearly 30% of the total VAT.   
This indicates that collection of VAT at the borders on imports is a very important 
component of VAT collections.   The deductible share of the import VAT is not 
typically known unless VAT returns report the value of import VAT claimed as input 
VAT deductions.  As a result a sensitivity table is used to check range of likely shares 
of total VAT that is final in terms of λ and γ.    See Table 1.    For example if 50% of 
VAT is deductible, then some 25% to 35% of the total VAT will become final 
collections.   
 
Table 1.  Final import VAT collections as a 
share of total VAT collections 
     
  
Import VAT as share of 
VAT collections, λ 
    0.5 0.6 0.7 
0.3 0.35 0.42 0.49 
0.5 0.25 0.3 0.35 Share of import VAT deducted, γ 
0.7 0.15 0.18 0.21 
 
 
In practice, to estimate the share of import VAT that is deductible, γ, in (4), (5) and 
(8) above, two approaches can be used.104   One approach is to make estimates 
directly from the VAT returns in cases where a country requires reporting of whether 
an input VAT deduction is based on import or domestic VAT paid.   The share of 
import VAT that becomes deductible is found from the import VAT (Rimp) and the 
input VAT deduction from imports inputdomR  on the domestic VAT return as 
imp
input
imp RR /=γ .     Many countries do not require explicit reporting of input VAT 
deduction claims based on import VAT, but some such as Ghana and Malawi do 
require such reporting on VAT returns.  Even in those countries, however, the import 
                                                 
103 Graham Glenday, “VAT analysis and revenue estimation based on micro-simulation data,” a report 
prepared for the Ministry of Finance, Ghana, August 2003. 
104 If full computerization of import and VAT data is implemented, then matching of import entries by 
registered VAT businesses would be possible.  The import VAT collections on such entries would give 
an estimate of the import VAT deductions. 
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VAT amounts claimed are not reported publicly and special analysis of the VAT 
returns is required to estimate the amounts.  
 
Another approach is to use the end use categorization of imports, such as provided by 
the Broad Economic Code (BEC) classification system.  If import data includes 
information about the type of goods and their final use classifications, and the type of 
importer, then more or less strong inferences can be drawn about whether the import 
VAT will be deductible or not, and where it is not deductible, whether it is going into 
final consumption or an exempt business.    The type of goods can be broadly 
classified as capital and transport equipment, industrial inputs, primary goods for 
industry or consumptions, fuels, consumption goods, etc.   These can be used to 
assign probabilities of their destinations and deductibility.  For example, most 
industrial machinery and capital equipment, and raw and intermediate inputs would 
have probabilities near 100% of being deductible.  If farmers are VAT exempt, then 
agricultural inputs would be largely non-deductible.  In addition, information about 
the type of importer (VAT registered or not and sector) can be used to identify certain 
exempt businesses.  For example, imports of financial institutions would be exempt 
business inputs.  If the direct data from VAT returns is available to estimate inputdomR , 
consistency checks can be made of the estimates of the probabilities of deductibility 
of import VAT categories leading to the same aggregate estimate of import VAT 
deductibility.   Unfortunately, few countries report imports classified by end-use and 
none report import VAT classified by end-use categories.  This type of exercise 
requires special analysis of import data.   
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APPENDIX D 
VAT design and operation in the context of multiple jurisdictions 
 
The VAT is most commonly used as a national tax administered by a central 
government.  As such, the VAT is implemented in most countries across the world as 
a tax on consumption using the credit-method and destination principle.  Goods and 
services destined for use in a country are taxed – imports are taxed, but exports are 
not, rather they are zero rated.   The credit-method, under ideal circumstances, ensures 
that all the taxes paid at intermediate stages of production are credited back such that 
only final consumption is taxed, and exports bear no tax.   This VAT structure works 
well at the country level because of the control of border transactions by a national 
customs service – imports are taxed and exports can be verified and zero rated.   
Where VAT is collected as a national tax, VAT revenues typically enter the 
consolidated revenues and the benefits are distributed to the regions of the country 
either as transfers or direct expenditures on services delivered in or to the regions of 
the country.  Less commonly, some share of the VAT revenues may be earmarked by 
some formula for transfer to the regions.105   In general, under a national VAT there is 
separation of the collection and regional incidence of the VAT burden (or the regional 
distribution of taxable final consumption) from the mechanisms for allocating the 
benefits of the VAT revenues across regions of a country. 
 
This model of the national consumption VAT supported by customs-enforced border 
controls breaks down in two types of situation.   The first case is where a country has 
a federal structure or any degree of decentralization where the responsibility for VAT 
collection is allocated to sub-national jurisdictions.  A core problem arises because of 
the lack of border controls between the regions (the states or provinces of the 
country.)  This makes the charging and allocation of the credit-method VAT on a 
destination basis difficult.  The states or provinces are the destinations (or location of 
consumption) in this case rather than the nation. 
 
The second case arises where countries form customs unions or common markets and 
weaken or completely remove the border controls on the flows of goods and services 
between the countries.  This is the situation is arising within the SACU, and is also 
expected to arise within SADC as it forms a common market.  It has already arisen 
within the European Union where fiscal border controls have been removed.  No fully 
satisfactory solution has yet been developed and implemented to deal with this 
situation.  A range of potential solutions has been developed and some have been 
implemented, but in general the solution has to be designed to fit the institutional 
circumstances of the different groups of economies.  Therefore, an analytical 
framework is needed to consider what may work in the context of SADC Member 
States.  
 
This appendix lays out the mechanics of how different VAT structures work (or may 
work) on international or inter jurisdictional trade.  The VAT structures will all retain 
the basic credit method structure, but consider the use of both destination and origin 
                                                 
105  For example, China transfers 25% of the domestic component of VAT collected in a province to 
the provincial government.  See Chapter 4 of World Bank, “China National Development and Sub-
National Finance: A review of Provincial Expenditures,” Report No. 22951-CHA, April 9, 2002.  
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principles, and within these structures consider situations where border controls are 
retained or not.  Border controls are critical as to whether VAT can be charged and 
collected on imports or not.   A further key consideration for each tax structure is 
whether the importer is a registered VAT trader or not.   This is important in the 
SADC region given the prevalence of unregistered small and informal sector 
businesses in most of this region.   In each of the tax structures, the total tax burden on 
final sales need to be examined and the distribution of the revenues between the 
member countries. 
 
In all the following, the focus is on international trade between member countries of a 
mature customs union or common market which forms a single customs territory.   
Trades within such a customs union or common market for customs purposes are not 
treated as “imports” or  “exports.”   Hence, such “internal trade” is similar to trade 
between the states of a federal state.   In the case of the destination principle, 
“external trade” with countries outside of customs union or common market are 
treated in the standard fashion: VAT on imports, zero rate exports.  This means that, 
viewed as a whole, the tax fall on consumption within the customs union or common 
market.  How the internal trade between member countries is treated, however, will 
effect which internal trades are taxed and at what rates, especially where countries 
have different tax rates, and which countries actual receive the revenues.  In the case 
of the origin principle, a distinction will be made between whether the origin principle 
applies to both internal and external trade (such that the VAT falls on production 
within the customs union or common market), or whether the origin principle applies 
only to internal trade such that the destination principle on external trade leaves VAT 
as a tax on consumption within the group of countries, but the revenue distribution is 
biased towards the countries with the larger shares of production. 
 
Trade across internal borders will be analyzed by focusing on the tax structures 
affecting the firms or individuals acting as the “exporter” (firm 1) and “importer” 
(firm 2) and the tax flows accruing to the two jurisdictions or countries.  The 
following range of VAT structures and trades will be analyzed: 
 
I. Destination principle 
a. Border controls and VAT registered/unregistered importers 
i. Zero rated exports 
ii. Deferred VAT 
iii. VAT on internal exports with reconciliation 
iv. Compensating VAT on internal exports 
b. No border controls and VAT registered/unregistered importers 
Same four cases 
 
II. Origin principle 
a.  Origin principle on internal and external trade: production base 
b.  Origin principal on internal trade, destination principle on external 
trade 
i. No reconciliation 
ii. Pooling and sharing 
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I. I.  Destination principle 
 
a. Border controls 
 
i. Zero-rated exports 
Zero-rated exports is the normal arrangement for a destination-based 
national VAT.  In this case, internal exports are zero rated such that to = 0.   
See Fig D1.  If the importer is registered for VAT, VAT is collected on the 
internal imports at ti which is then credited to the registered importer, firm 
2, tic = ti, and firm 2, then collects the VAT on final sales of tf.  From these 
transactions, the total tax collected is tf.  The revenues collected by 
countries A and B, RA and RB are given by: 
RA = to = 0 
RB = ti - tic + tf.  =  tf.   
 
If the importer is unregistered, then the import VAT, ti is the final VAT 
(and country B forgoes (tf. - ti ), and the revenue collections are: 
RA = to = 0 
RB = ti.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ii. Deferred VAT 
Here the situation is the same as with normal zero-rated exports, except 
that the importing country allows the registered firm to defer paying 
the import VAT until it claims the input VAT credit such that no VAT 
is actually collected at the point of import and no credit is paid to the 
importing firm.  The final VAT is collected on the sales of the registered 
importer.  See Figure D2.  As an example, this deferment arrangement is 
provided for specified capital equipment imports in Zambia.  It avoids any 
cash flows costs to the importing firm that arise from the delay in 
receiving a refund for the import VAT on the investment.  Deferment, 
however, forgoes the discipline on the registered importer of having to 
claim the import VAT out of output VAT collections.  Effective control of 
deferment therefore requires the cross checking of import entries against 
 
 
FIRM 2 
Fig D1.  Normal zero rating 
COUNTRY A COUNTRY B 
 
FIRM 1 
BORDER 
to= 0     ti     tic = ti                 tf  
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domestic VAT returns.  The revenues collected by the countries are given 
by:  
RA = to = 0 
RB = (ti - tic) + tf.  =  tf.   
 
If the importer is unregistered, no deferment of the import VAT is offered 
and the import VAT, ti is the final VAT, and the revenue collections are: 
RA = to = 0 
RB = ti.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
iii. VAT on internal exports with reconciliation 
Under this arrangement, internal exports are not zero rated, but the 
importing country gives credit based on VAT invoices at the point of 
importation for the VAT paid in the exporting country, to, against the gross 
import VAT payable, ti.  If the importer is a registered company, it claims 
an input VAT credit for the gross import VAT payable (tic = ti) against the 
final output VAT collected, tf.  The importing country claims 
compensation for the VAT collected in the exporting country, co = to, 
based on import documents.  With two-way internal trade, periodic 
reconciliation of the mutual debts on export VAT can be settled.  See 
Figure D3. This mechanism requires an international treaty between the 
countries and a super-national agency to supervise the net compensation 
payments.  This type of mechanism provides defense against export frauds 
caused by export zero rating which can encourage either false claims of 
exports or rounding tripping of goods (exportation followed by re-
importation without declaration.)  Both export frauds cause the exporting 
country to lose VAT revenues on what are actually domestic sales.  This 
problem arises where there are weak border controls and considerable 
cross-border shopping such as is the case between South Africa and 
Lesotho.  An early version of this type of structure was referred to as a 
 
 
FIRM 2 
Fig D2.   Deferment 
COUNTRY A COUNTRY B
 
FIRM 1 
BORDER 
to= 0     (ti - tic) = 0                 tf 
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“bilateral transfer” mechanism.106   Over recent years a draft tax treaty 
between South Africa and Lesotho has been arranged to facilitate such a 
mechanism.107  This mechanism of taxing internal exports with 
compensation to the importing country has been successfully implemented 
between South Africa and Lesotho since 2003 after the establishment of 
the Lesotho Revenue Authority. 
 
In the case of registered firms importing, the revenue collections by 
countries A and B are:  
RA = to - co = 0 
RB = (ti - to)  - tic + co + tf.  =  tf.   
 
If the importer is unregistered, then the import VAT, ti is the final VAT, 
and the revenue collections are: 
RA = to - co = 0 
RB = (ti - to)  + co  = ti.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
iv. Compensating VAT on internal exports 
Here, instead of charging the normal VAT rate of country A on the internal 
export (as in the case iii. above), a special or compensating VAT rate, 
co, is charged on internal exports.  This structure has been referred to as 
a CVAT.108   As above, country B gives credit for the VAT paid in country 
                                                 
106 Graham Glenday, “The Design of Bilateral Direct Transfer Schemes between Lesotho and the 
Republic of South Africa,”  International Tax Program, Harvard Law Scholl, Development Discussion 
Paper No 487, April 1994. 
107 Agreement between the Government of the Republic of South Africa and the Government of the 
Kingdom of Lesotho on Mutual Assistance and Co-operation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with 
respect to Sales Tax and Value-Added Tax, Draft 2002 
108 Ricardo Versano, “Subnational Taxation and the Treatment of Interstate Trade in Brazil:  Problems 
and a Proposed Solution,” in S. J. Burki and G. Peary, Eds, Decentralization and Accountability in the 
Public Sector,  Proceedings of the Annual Bank Conference on Development in Latin America and the 
Caribbean, Washington, World Bank (1999); Charles E. McLure, “Implementing Sub-National Value 
Added Taxes on Internal Trade:  The Compensating VAT (CVAT),  International Tax and Public 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                      
 
 
 
                                                                                                                             
 
 
 
FIRM 2 
Fig D3.  VAT on internal exports with reconciliation 
COUNTRY A COUNTRY B
 
FIRM 1 
BORDER 
to      (ti-to)  tic= ti                   tf  
co = to 
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A on the import, and then, if the importer is VAT registered, credit is paid 
for the gross import VAT payable in country B, and a output VAT is paid 
on the supplies by the registered importer.  Country B should charge the 
same compensating VAT rate on internal imports.  Country A 
compensates country B for co, the VAT collected on the internal export.   
See Figure D4.  This structure is essentially the same as the internal VAT 
on exports above, the compensating VAT rate is a rate agreed by both 
countries to be charged on internal trade.  In that case, ti = co and (ti-co) = 0 
and tic= ti = co.  The compensating tax rate may differ from standard VAT 
rates of both the countries.  One institutional difference that can be 
introduced is that the compensating VAT is paid directly to the super-
national agency that reconciles the trade accounts and makes gross 
payments to the importing countries.  This results in different timing of tax 
flows compared to the case of countries collecting the internal export VAT 
and making reconciliation balance payments to the net importing member 
countries, as elaborated on further below.  
 
In the special case, where both countries have the same uniform standard 
VAT rate, to= ti = co, and both VAT charging of VAT on internal exports 
and the charging of compensating VAT on internal exports gives the same 
results.   
 
Another special case is if co = 0, then the result is the same as case (ii) 
above of zero rated exports and deferment of import credits – no VAT is 
collected on the internal trade and no compensation is paid.  An important 
difference arises with unregistered importers, however, as they would pay 
no import VAT if ti = co = 0, whereas unregistered importers would not 
qualify for deferment and would pay the import VAT. 
 
The advantage of the CVAT over the general case of charging VAT on 
internal exports discussed above arises from the both export VAT and 
import VAT being charged at the same rate.  The border rate is known by 
both sides with certainty and no tax differential (ti-to) arises on internal 
imports.  The disadvantage is that it puts an obligation on the exporting 
business to differentiate between domestic sales at to and internal exports 
at co as well as external exports at zero.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                            
Finance, 7(6), pp 723-40, (2000); Michael Keen, “CVAT, VIVAT and All That:  New Forms of VAT 
for Federal Systems,”  Canadian Tax Journal, 48(2), pp 409-24 (2000). 
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A more general case of the CVAT has been proposed where the special 
VAT rate would be charged on all trades between all registered firms 
located within the member countries.  This has been called the VIVAT or 
the Viable Integrated VAT.109  The actual required VAT would be charged 
on all final VAT sales to individuals and unregistered businesses.  The 
VIVAT becomes the same as the CVAT in its treatment of internal trade if 
the special VAT rate is extended to all internal exports such that 
unregistered importers pay the special VAT rate in addition to the 
registered importers.   
 
 
One important summary conclusion is that with border controls, the non-registered 
importer pays VAT directly to country B as import VAT if the internal exports are 
zero rated, and indirectly through the reconciliation payments if VAT is charged on 
the internal exports.  Country B collects the import VAT in all cases with border 
controls.   
 
The cases where border controls do not exist are now covered.  Note that distance 
shopping by importers (internal imports initiated by telecommunications or 
mail) is effectively the same as internal trade without border controls unless all 
postal and shipping agents are under customs controls.  Similarly, the taxation of 
imported services is also effectively the same as internal trade without border 
controls.   
 
 
                                                 
109 Michael Keen and Stephen Smith, “The Future of the Value added Tax in the European Union,” 
Economic Policy, Oct (23), pp375-411, 419-20 (1996); Michael Keen and Stephen Smith, “Viva 
VIVAT!”, International Tax and Public Finance, 7(6), pp 741-51, (2000) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                              
 
 
 
 
 
FIRM 2 
Fig D4.  Compensating VAT on internal exports 
              with reconciliation 
COUNTRY A COUNTRY B 
 
FIRM 1 
BORDER 
to=co   (ti-co)  tic= ti                    tf 
co  
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I.   Destination principle 
 
b. No border controls 
 
i. Zero rated exports 
Without internal border controls, country A has no way of confirming 
exports to country B without the co-operation of country B such that 
fraudulent export claims by firms in A are likely.  Country B, however, 
can only effectively assist country A confirm exports if the importer is a 
registered business.   In the case of unregistered businesses or individuals 
in country B importing from country A, country B has difficulty in 
enforcing the collection of import VAT such that no VAT is collected, ti  = 
0.  In the case of registered firms, import VAT cannot be collected at the 
border, but can be self-declared by the firm at the time of filing a domestic 
VAT return (or VAT is collected by reverse charging by the importer) in 
which case a credit is simultaneously claimed, and hence, only the output 
tax paid.   Note that self-declaration of the import VAT is effectively the 
same as the deferred VAT structure above such that (ti  - tic) = 0.  This is 
effectively the same as setting the import VAT at zero on internal imports 
(ti  = 0 and tic = ti  = 0). 
 
In the case of registered firms importing, the revenue collections by 
countries A and B are:  
RA = to = 0 
RB = (ti  - tic) + tf.  =  tf.   
 
If the importer is unregistered, then the import VAT, ti is the final VAT, 
and the revenue collections are: 
RA = to = 0 
RB = ti  = 0   
 
The EU under its current “transitional arrangements” effectively 
administers a borderless destination-based system with zero rated internal 
exports.   As just noted above, such a system works effectively for goods 
exports and where the import is VAT registered. In addition, a significant 
level of administrative co-operation should be possible to confirm exports 
from information from importing businesses.  This system breaks down if 
importers of goods are unregistered businesses or individuals.  This is 
common with distance shopping and service purchases by unregistered 
importers.  In the case of services, other than consulting and financial 
services, which are subject to reverse charging on importation, origin-
based VAT is charged and the registered importer is expected to claim a 
refund from its own revenue authority rather than being compensated by 
the exporting authority.    
 
ii.   Deferred VAT 
As discussed above, without border controls, imports by registered firms 
effectively get deferred import VAT treatment if import VAT is charged, 
given that the import VAT would be paid at the same time as the input 
VAT is claimed.   Deferred VAT effectively has no relevance to 
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unregistered importers.   The result is that tax burdens and tax collections 
are the same as the case of normal zero rating without border controls 
above.  Neither country collects VAT on internal imports by unregistered 
traders 
 
iii. VAT on internal exports with reconciliation 
If VAT is charged on internal exports from country A to B, then, in the 
case of a registered importer, country B awards the importing firm a VAT 
credit for the VAT collected by country A against the output VAT of the 
firm, tf.   See Figure D5.  Country B then claims compensation from 
country A based on the input VAT claim of firm 2 and the VAT 
invoice issued by firm 1.  Given internal trade is going both ways 
between countries A and B, only the net amount of VAT claimed is paid 
by the country with a positive trade balance in taxable goods and service to 
the country with the negative trade balance.   This VAT reconciliation 
process would require an international tax treaty between the countries and 
a supervisory agency to ensure its implementation.   
 
There are strong conflicts of interest here that the treaty will need to 
resolve.  Country A will only want to pay compensation for actual tax 
collections on internal exports.  Country B will only want to credit input 
VAT up to the amount it will receive as compensation, but firm 2 will 
want to claim all the VAT it pays on the inputs.  If Country A under 
collects, then it would need to bear the risk of compensating country B for 
the VAT paid by firm 2 and claimed as a credit.  Country A will have an 
interest in ensuring firm 2 does not over claim.  The supervisory agency 
will have to have the powers to reconcile the sales of firm 1 with the 
purchases of firm 2. 
 
If the importer is an unregistered person, then the process of country B 
claiming the VAT on the consumption by its person is not feasible.  
Country A collects the VAT revenue and the tax rate paid by the importer 
would depend on the VAT rate in country A which may be higher or lower 
than that in B. 
 
 
 
In the case of registered firms importing, the revenue collections by 
countries A and B are:  
RA = to - co = 0 
RB = - tic + co + tf.  =  tf.   
 
If the importer is unregistered, then the domestic VAT, to is the final VAT, 
and the revenue collections are: 
RA = to  
RB = 0.   
 
iv. Compensating VAT on internal exports 
If a compensating VAT is charged on internal exports at a rate agreed by 
the member countries, then the result is similar to the case of the VAT rate 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                              
 
 
 
FIRM 2 
Fig D5.  VAT on internal exports with reconciliation 
COUNTRY A COUNTRY B 
 
FIRM 1 
 to            tic= to                     tf  
co = to 
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of the exporting country being charged on exports, as discusses above, 
with the following differences.  See Figure D6.  First, the compensating 
VAT rate may be the same or different from that of the exporting country.    
 
Second, the compensating tax could be paid to a separate supervisory 
agency for reconciliation and payment of the gross compensation amounts 
to the importing countries.  Alternatively, a system of net reconciliation 
payments could be maintained as discussed above, but then the exporting 
countries collect the compensating VAT and the supervisory agency 
determines the net reconciliation payments to be made by the net exporting 
country.  As discussed above, the supervisory agency would need 
information on to confirm exports and imports to calculate and/or confirm 
reconciliation payments.  
 
Third, if the importer is unregistered, in the case of the compensating tax 
being paid to a supervisory agency, then the importing country may or 
may not capture the tax.  The exporting firm in country A would pay the 
tax to this agency if it had information that the buyer was a resident of 
country B (as would be the case of a mail order or other direct shipment).  
The agency would then compensate country B.  If the exporting firm, was 
unaware of the location of the buyer it would charge the domestic VAT 
rate by default and country A would collect the VAT on the export. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In the case of registered firms importing, the revenue collections by 
countries A and B are:  
RA = co - co = 0 
RB = - co + co + tf.  =  tf.   
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Fig D6.  Compensating VAT on internal exports 
             with reconciliation 
COUNTRY A COUNTRY B 
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If the importer is unregistered, then the domestic VAT, to is the final VAT 
if the location of the buyer was unknown, but the compensating tax is 
charged if the importer is identified as being from country B, and the 
revenue collections are: 
RA = to or co - co = 0 
RB = 0 or co 
 
 
In summary, a destination VAT can operate such that the target is the consumption 
within the borders of member countries so long as there are international treaties to 
reconcile the VAT charged on internal exports.  Problems remain with the proper 
allocation of VAT to the consuming countries with internal exports made to 
unregistered persons.  In the case of a compensating VAT paid to a supervisory 
agency, a higher share of the VAT can be paid to the importing country where 
the residency of the buyer can be determined, as with direct order and 
shipments; otherwise the country of origin will capture the VAT. 
 
 
II. Origin principle 
 
a. Origin principle on internal and external trade: production base 
  
 Under the origin principle, VAT is charged on exports, but not on 
imports.  Without any adjustments, this results in tax being charged 
and collected on a production rather than consumption base.   A 
production tax will be expected to reduce exports, which in turn 
will weaken the real exchange rate and result in offsetting increases 
in exports and decreases in imports.  By contrast, a consumption 
tax reduces imports and strengthens the real exchange resulting in 
increases in imports and decreases in exports.  With these 
offsetting exchange rate effects, if real trade is balanced, then the 
two tax bases are similar.  If a country has major trade deficit, 
however, consumption may be a larger effective base than 
production.     
 
Under the origin principle, exports are taxed.  Under the credit-method, this 
export VAT should be credited against any subsequent VAT to prevent tax 
stacking prior to the final sale.  The importing country, however, will have 
difficulty in verifying the VAT paid on the imported inputs without special 
arrangements.  As a result, the import country has to resort to crediting the 
registered firm with a notional input VAT, possibly equal to the standard VAT 
that would have been paid on the import, tic= “ti”.  See Figure D7.  The firm 
then credits this “input tax” against its output VAT.  With an international 
treaty, the exporter could supply copies of tax-paid invoices to the importing 
firm 2 and country B could have the right to request confirmation of the VAT 
paid from country A and then give a credit for this VAT, or tic = to exactly.  
This crediting process by the importing country does not depend upon border 
controls.  The importing country then collects VAT from the stages of 
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production within its borders.    If the importer is unregistered, no further VAT 
is collected in the importing country (country B) as if this is final 
consumption.  
 
If the importer is registered, the revenues collected by countries A and B are 
given by: 
RA = to  
RB = - tic + tf.    
RA + RB = to - tic + tf   
                    =  tf ,  if  tic = to  
 
If the importer is unregistered, then the revenue collections are: 
RA = to  
RB = 0.   
 
An origin tax can effectively be collected from all registered traders on all 
supplies (including services and distance sales to persons in other countries) at 
the point of sale rather than at the point of export.  Exports by unregistered 
traders would be missed without border collection of the export VAT, but this 
is usually less of a problem in that exporters are typically the larger businesses 
in an economy.  If border controls exist, then payment of VAT on goods 
exports can be enforced by customs, but not on exported services.  Generally, 
in the case of origin-based taxes, border control does not serve such a key role 
in ensuring the correct collection of taxes as does border control in the case of 
a destination based tax.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
b. Origin principal on internal trade, destination principle on external 
trade 
 
i. No reconciliation 
 As pointed out above, taxing consumption is generally viewed as the more 
attractive VAT base than production, but the origin principle operates 
better in an environment of weak or no border controls.  This leads to 
consideration of a structure of applying the destination principle to 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                        
 
FIRM 2 
Fig D7.  VAT on exports:  origin principle 
COUNTRY A COUNTRY B 
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external trade of the member countries of a customs union or common 
market, but applying the origin principle to internal trade where there may 
be weak or no border controls.  If the origin principle is limited to internal 
trade among member countries, then exports to third party countries 
receive normal zero rating under the destination principle and imports 
from third party countries are subject to import VAT.  This results in the 
VAT falling on consumption within the customs union or common market, 
but the VAT revenues collected may not be distributed among the 
countries according to consumption within the countries if the origin 
principal is applied for internal trade as the VAT charged on internal 
exports is retained in the exporting country unless some compensatory 
payments are made between the countries.  Note that this is essentially 
what happens in the destination cases above without border controls either 
where VAT is charged on internal exports or where a special 
compensating VAT is charged on internal exports in the presence of a 
supervisory agent.   In both these cases, however, the import country is 
compensated for the VAT on internal exports and the importing firm 
receives a VAT credit equal to this tax charged on the internal exports 
such that the importing country collects the full amount of the tax.   With 
origin taxation in the presence of some tax treaty to help ensure that tic = to, 
the tax collections by the countries would be as follows: 
 
If the importer is registered, the revenues collected by countries A and B 
are given by: 
RA = to  
RB = - tic + tf.    
RA + RB = tf     
 
If the importer is unregistered, then the revenue collections are: 
RA = to  
RB = 0.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                        
 
 
 
FIRM 2 
Fig D8.  VAT on internal exports:  origin principle 
and international supervision 
COUNTRY A COUNTRY B 
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Origin taxation of the internal trade leaves the imports into country B 
subject to the same total taxation as in the case of taxation of internal 
exports under the destination principle without border controls, but the 
distribution of the revenues will favor the countries with a higher share of 
the taxable production (net internal exports) rather than taxable 
consumption (net internal imports).110  Note that tax will be collected at 
least at the tax rate of the exporting country on all taxable supplies, no 
mater whether they are supplied to a registered or unregistered persons or 
are services or distance sales.    
 
The same tax coverage can be achieved by use of the compensating VAT 
on all internal exports of goods or services and distance sales where the 
location of the buyer is unknown.   Compensation of the importing country 
is required, however, where input credits are awarded for the import VAT, 
and where the compensating tax is allocated to the importing country in 
the cases of final sales of goods or services to unregistered importers.  This 
results in the countries with the higher share of consumption (or net 
internal imports) receiving the higher share of the revenues from internal 
trade.  It is also consistent with the destination approach being applied to 
external trade that results in a consumption base for the VAT. 
 
ii. Pooling and sharing 
Another approach for the revenues to better match consumption rather than 
production bases, using the origin principal for internal trade, but 
destination principle for external trade, is to pool all the VAT collections 
from all the member countries and then allocate shares in the pool in 
proportion to estimates of the GDP or consumption or more accurate 
estimates of the value of the VAT base of each member country.  This 
requires a common tax structure be applied across all countries.  This 
approach has been suggested for the European Union111 and will be 
applied under the new SACU Agreement for the collection of excise 
duties. 
 
In summary, three choices of credit-method VAT emerge for SADC that would allow 
a weakening of internal border controls as common market is developed.   
 
1. Destination principle supported by a special uniform compensating VAT 
paid to a super national agency on all internal exports of goods and 
services and all distance sales outside of the country.  A VAT treaty 
would be required to provide for enforcement co-operation and 
reconciliation of VAT compensation payments.  Countries could have 
different VAT rates.  Revenues would be close to those from a national 
consumption tax base.  If border controls are weakened and agreement 
                                                 
110 With origin taxation internally and destination taxation externally, unusual distributions of VAT 
could arise depending upon the trade balances of countries internally and externally.  A country that is 
a net external importer, but a net internal exporter would gain a disproportionately high share of the 
total revenues of all member countries.  By contrast, a country that was a net external exporter, but net 
internal importer would receive a disproportionately low share of the total revenues. 
111  Commission of the European Communities, “A Common System of VAT: A Programme for the 
Single Market,” COM(96) 328, July 1996. 
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cannot be reached on a uniform compensating tax rate, then, at a 
minimum, VAT should be charged on internal exports. 
 
2. Destination principle applied to external trade, but the origin 
principle applied to internal trade supported by an international treaty to 
allow cross-border checking, enforcement and dispute resolution.   
Countries could have different VAT rates.  While aggregate common 
market VAT revenues would be derived out of a consumption base, 
revenues would go disproportionately more to countries that were net 
internal exporters. 
 
3. VAT collections put in a common pool from collections on a destination 
basis from external trade and origin basis from internal trade.  All 
countries would have to apply the same VAT structure.   Revenues are 
collected in a common pool and shared in proportion to a measure of 
consumption.  Two partial pooling and sharing formulas, however, are 
presented in Appendix E to deal with some of the adverse incentives and 
measurement difficulties that arise with complete pooling.
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Appendix E 
Revenue Sharing Formulas 
 
One approach to implementing a multi-jurisdictional VAT is “pooling and sharing.”  
This approach requires that (i) a uniform VAT structure is applied across all 
jurisdictions, (ii) VAT is charged on internal trade using the origin principle (as if all 
jurisdictions were part of a unified country), (iii) all revenues are pooled, and then (iv) 
the pool is shared according to estimated shares by each jurisdiction of total 
consumption.  While conceptually simple, a few major concerns arise in practice.  
Aside from the issues of accurately estimating the consumption base in each 
jurisdiction for purposes of revenue sharing, concerns arise about: 
 
i. the weak incentive of each jurisdiction to make an effort to collect VAT, 
especially if a jurisdiction will get a share of the revenue pool 
irrespective of its effort – a basic “free rider” problem, and  
 
ii. the different efficiencies of the VAT systems across jurisdictions that arise 
from differences in the bases that are not measurable112, differential 
compliance as well as differential tax administration effectiveness.   
The jurisdictions with low VAT efficiency will tend to get a higher 
share of the revenues than their tax effort and efficiency would justify.   
 
Two related approaches to mitigating these problems are explored here.  The one is 
partial retention by each jurisdiction combined with consumption-based revenue 
sharing of the residual pool, and the other is almost full retention combined with 
adjustments for internal trade imbalances.    In both cases, the higher the degree of 
retention of VAT collected within a state, the less the adverse incentive and 
differential efficiency concerns. 
 
E.1.  Partial Retention Combined With Consumption-Based Revenue 
Sharing 
 
Here “n” different jurisdictions in a common market or federation all apply the same 
VAT structure.  Jurisdiction “i” would collect CiR if it applied a consumption-based 
VAT on a destination principle with VAT efficiency ie on a consumption base iC , 
which is a share ic of the total consumption base 
TC across all jurisdictions.  
Alternatively, it would collect OiR  if it applied the origin principle on internal trade 
and pooled all the revenues.   Net internal exporters would collect more under the 
origin principle than the destination principal, and the reverse for net internal 
importers. The total revenues from all jurisdictions, TR , would be given by 113 
                                                 
112  The effects on the VAT base of some VAT exemptions, such as that for small businesses, are not 
readily measurable, as the exemption categories may not match standard statistical categories.   
113  Here the effects of differences in tax efficiency between jurisdictions on internal trade are ignored.  
The switch from destination to origin-based collection results in the exporting state collecting rather 
than the importing state.  If the importing state was the more efficient VAT collector than the exporting 
state, then total revenues may fall, and vice versa.  
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and the share of total VAT revenues collected by jurisdiction “i”, iα , would be given 
by  the efficiency weighted share of consumption114 
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In the case of all jurisdictions having the same VAT efficiency, then the share of total 
VAT revenue owed to a jurisdiction would be its share of total consumption, ic .   If 
the share of total consumption is used to share this revenue pool rather than the 
efficiency weighted share, then jurisdictions with below average efficiency will get 
higher revenue shares.   Unfortunately, measures of VAT efficiency, ie , are generally 
not available. 
 
Now, if the origin principle is applied to all internal trade such that the collection in 
the jurisdiction is OiR , and if each jurisdiction can withhold a share iρ  of OiR with the 
remainder going into the pool, then (i) the retained amount in the jurisdiction 
R
iR would be given by  
 
O
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R
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and (ii) the pool of revenues from all “n” jurisdictions, PR , would be given by  
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and (iii) the revenue share received by the jurisdiction from the pool, PiR , would be 
given by  
P
i
P
i RcR =        E.5 
 
Hence, the total revenue of the jurisdiction from retentions and its share of the pool 
would be given by  
 
  Pi
O
iii RcRR += ρ      E.6 
 
Now, the combined retentions and pool share of the jurisdiction should equal the 
expected consumption based revenues CiR , which from E.2 and E.6 is given by: 
 
P
i
O
ii
T
i
C
i RcRRR +== ρα    E.7 
                                                 
114 If there are different positive VAT rates, then the effective bases would also need to be weighted by 
the different positive tax rates.  Here it is assumed that only one positive VAT rate is used. 
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Hence, the retention rate for the jurisdiction, using E.4, should be set at  
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If all jurisdictions have the same VAT efficiency, then ii c=α  and the retention rate, 
iρ , should be set at zero and all collections go into the pool for sharing in terms of 
consumption shares, ic .  Otherwise to have each jurisdiction receive
C
iR  as per E.7, 
retention rates vary across jurisdictions and are higher in jurisdictions with relatively 
higher VAT efficiency such that ii c>α , but lower the higher OiR  owing to net 
internal exports.  Retention rates could be negative for very inefficient jurisdictions.   
Is it possible that retention rates would be equal across jurisdictions?  The conditions 
for this can be checked by setting all ij ρρ =  in E.8 and solving for iρ as follows: 
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Inspection of E.9 shows that an equal retention rate is possible if the more VAT 
efficient jurisdictions ( ii c>α ) are also net internal exporters ( CiOi RR >  such that 
i
TO
i cRR >/ ) and all the more VAT inefficient ones ( ii c<α ) are net internal 
importers ( Ci
O
i RR <  such that iTOi cRR </ ).   This condition may be approximated 
within SADC, but is not necessarily generally the case.   Using some level of 
retention, however, say 50% across all jurisdictions, can be expected to improve the 
allocation and collection efficiency compared to no retention at all. An exception 
arises when the most VAT efficient countries are net internal importers – not a likely 
situation.  In this case, such countries should receive a disproportionately large share 
of the largest possible pool. 
 
 
E.2.  Retention combined with Adjustments for Internal Trade 
Imbalances 
 
An alternative approach to revenue sharing is to focus on the trade imbalances in the 
internal trade between members of a common market or federation.  Under a 
consumption-based VAT, internal exports are zero-rated and internal imports are 
taxed, but the reverse is the case if internal trade is subject to origin-based VAT.  
Hence, if the for jurisdiction “i” the internal exports are iIX , internal imports are 
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iIM , the net internal exports are )( iii IMIXNX −= , and as a share of revenues are 
O
iii RtNXx /= and where t is the effective VAT rate, then the revenues from origin 
and consumption-based revenues is given by 
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When VAT on internal trade is taxed on an origin basis, but jurisdictions are owed the 
tax that would be collected on a consumption base, jurisdictions that are net importers 
need to be compensated by jurisdiction that are net exporters.  To achieve this, the net 
exporters need to contribute to a pool to compensate the net importers.  Hence, net 
importers can be allowed to retain all collections, whereas net exporters need to 
contribute to the compensation pool.  This structure effectively internalizes the VAT 
collection incentives and efficiencies within jurisdictions.   
 
Following this approach, if jurisdiction “i” is a net internal importer or 0≤ix , then 
1=iρ  and the jurisdiction retains all its collections and looks to the pool for 
compensation for VAT charged by other jurisdictions on its internal imports.  By 
contrast, if jurisdiction “j” is a net internal exporter or 0>jx , then jj x−= 1ρ  and 
the final revenues of the jurisdiction, jR , are its retained revenue: 
 
  Ojj
O
jjj RxRR )1( −== ρ     E.11 
 
The pool revenues from the revenues not retained by the “m” net internal exporting 
jurisdictions amounts to: 
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m
j
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This revenue pool should divided among the (n-m) net internal importing jurisdictions 
in proportion to their net internal export revenues forgone by the origin-based VAT 
on internal trade such that for jurisdiction “k”: 
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Hence, the net internal importing jurisdiction revenues from retentions and its pool 
share amount to  
 
  Pk
O
kk RRR +=       E.14 
 
While this approach of full retention by net internal importers and compensation from 
the net exporters forms a relatively simple structure and clear retention and pooling 
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obligations, it does require member jurisdictions to maintain records of internal trade 
to measure the net internal trade balance of each country.  This means that national 
customs services would need to maintain control over and record internal trade and in 
a fashion similar that which exists within the Southern African Customs Union to 
share customs duties.   
 
Problem of retentions on international trade  
 
It needs to be recognized that one of the advantages of no retentions and the pooling 
and sharing of all VAT collections avoids the problem of collecting VAT on 
international imports which may be assigned either to the country in which the 
imports arrive, or one of the other member countries if they enter in transit.  When all 
or a share of VAT revenues collected in a jurisdiction are retained, retentions on 
international import VAT need to be assigned to the jurisdiction of destination of the 
imports.   Hence, while the approach of using retentions to deal with the problems of 
lack of collection incentives and differential efficiency, it does add the administrative 
problem of assigning the import VAT among member countries where imports are 
destined to importers outside of the jurisdiction of arrival.  Retentions collected on 
imports destined for another country should be paid to the member country of final 
destination.  In the case of sharing of the net internal export revenue, however, this 
adjustment for imports arriving on one state where revenue are collected and then 
exported to another state would be made as part of the internal trade sharing 
adjustments based on net internal exports and imports.  
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APPENDIX F 
VAT ADMINISTRATION QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
AN ASSESSMENT OF THE CURRENT STATE OF VAT 
IMPLEMENTATION IN SADC MEMBER STATES 
 
Tax administration capacity questions for Member States: 
 
(Note – please provide answers electronically in the grey shaded 
area.) 
 
1. Tax Administration 
 
1.1 Organization of VAT/Sales tax administration 
1.1.1 Is tax administration the responsibility of a Revenue Authority or a Department 
of the Ministry of Finance 
Answer:   
1.1.2 Is VAT/sales tax administration conducted by a separate department or is it 
integrated with the customs or income tax administration 
Answer:   
1.1.3 Organization of tax administration across types of tax – how is each type of 
inland tax1 is administered?  Separately or in an integrated fashion?  The 
latter integrated approach is referred to as functional administration where 
each function (audit, debt collection, etc) is administered by one unit for all 
inland taxes.  If a functional approach is used, is there a tax administration law 
for all inland taxes? 
Answer:   
1.1.4 Is a Large Taxpayer Unit (LPU) used?  If yes, 
Answer:   
1.1.4.1 Which taxes are collected and what are the criteria for taxpayers to be 
serviced by LTU?  What is total number of taxpayers serviced by LTU? 
Answer:   
1.1.4.2 How many VAT/sales taxpayers are serviced by LTU?  What share of VAT 
revenues collected by LTU? 
Answer:   
1.1.5 What are the arrangements for the appointment of and reporting by top 
managers of revenue agencies, including VAT commissioner? 
Answer:   
 
1.2 Tax administration expenditures for past three financial years 
1.2.1 Total tax administration expenditures (breakdown if available into personnel, 
capital and other current) 
Answer:   
1.2.2 Administrative expenditures on Customs 
                                                 
1 Inland taxes include all taxes collected from domestic persons, but exclude all taxes collected from 
border transactions (imports or exports) 
APPENDIX F:  VAT Administration questionnaire 
                                                                                  
 
G - 2 
Answer:   
1.2.3 Administrative expenditures on VAT or Sales Tax 
Answer:   
1.2.4 What are the mechanisms for determining budget of tax agencies?  For 
example, are they based on a legislated formula or are they negotiated each 
year with the Ministry of Finance? 
Answer:   
 
1.3 Registered VAT/sales tax businesses 
1.3.1 Number of registered businesses? 
Answer:   
1.3.2 Number of active VAT/sales taxpayers: businesses paying tax or generating 
credits/refunds or filing returns in a year? 
Answer:   
1.3.3 What is distribution of registered businesses by annual turnover? 
Answer:   
1.3.4 What is minimum turnover rate for compulsory registration? 
Answer:   
 
1.4 VAT/sales tax personnel 
1.4.1 Number of tax officer positions in establishment?  Number filled and vacant? 
Answer:   
1.4.2 Qualifications of tax officers 
Answer:   
1.4.2.1 Number of officers with university degrees? 
Answer:   
1.4.2.2 Number of qualified professional accountants (indicate whether included 
above or not)? 
Answer:   
1.4.2.3 Number of officers with other post secondary school certifications?  Give 
examples of types of certificates included. 
Answer:   
1.4.3 Number of support or administrative staff in establishment?  Number filled and 
vacant? 
Answer:   
 
1.5 Pay scales of tax officers 
1.5.1 Are pay scales the same or different scales from civil service? 
Answer:   
1.5.2 Are conditions of employment of tax officers the same or different from the 
civil service?  If different, please elaborate? 
Answer:   
1.5.3 Comment on the adequacy of salary and benefit packages to retain tax 
officers? 
Answer:   
 
1.6 Degree of computerization of Customs and VAT/sales tax administration 
1.6.1 Which of three descriptions below best describes the degree of 
computerization of Customs? 
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Answer:   
1.6.1.1 Only revenue collection and trade statistics are computerized 
Answer:   
1.6.1.2 Customs administration data (including revenue collection and trade 
statistics) are computerized, but a parallel paper process is maintained as 
final basis for customs clearing and enforcement 
Answer:   
1.6.1.3 All customs administration processes and data bases are computerized 
which is also the primary basis for customs clearing and enforcement 
Answer:   
1.6.2 Which of three descriptions below best describes the degree of 
computerization of VAT/sales tax? 
Answer:   
1.6.2.1 Only revenue collection statistics are computerized 
Answer:   
1.6.2.2 All data from VAT/sales tax forms and accounts are computerized, but 
parallel paper process is maintained as final basis for administration and 
enforcement 
Answer:   
1.6.2.3 All VAT/sales tax administration processes and data bases are 
computerized which is also the primary basis for administration and 
enforcement 
Answer:   
 
1.7 Audit capacity and procedures 
1.7.1 Organization of internal audit capacity?  Location and reporting in 
organization? 
Answer:   
1.7.2 Desk audit procedures? 
Answer:   
1.7.3 Organization of field audit capacity? 
Answer:   
1.7.3.1 Number and qualifications of field auditors 
Answer:   
1.7.3.2 Describe audit selection process?  Use of risk assessment 
Answer:   
1.7.3.3 Type and frequency of audits? 
Answer:   
1.7.3.4 Nature of audit reports and follow-up procedures? 
Answer:   
1.7.3.5 Oversight procedures for field audits? 
Answer:   
 
1.8 Arrears/debt collection 
1.8.1 Organization of debt collection?  Separate unit? 
Answer:   
1.8.2 Number of tax officers dedicated to debt collection? 
Answer:   
1.8.3 Debt enforcement mechanisms used (penalties and interest, demand notices, 
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attachment of accounts, attachment of property, courts, etc)? 
Answer:   
 
1.9 Penalties and enforcement processes 
1.9.1 Are courts used to prosecute VAT/sales tax fraud cases?  If yes, how many 
cases a year are prosecuted? 
Answer:   
1.9.2 Number of cases of administrative penalties per year (if possibly by type – 
inadequate books and records, late/no filing, underpayment, etc) 
Answer:   
 
1.10 Taxpayer appeals systems  
1.10.1 What levels of appeal are open to taxpayer under VAT/sales tax? 
Appeal to Commissioner, Minister, Tribunal, Courts, etc? 
Answer:   
 
1.11 Taxpayer service capacity 
1.11.1 Mechanisms for educating new taxpayers (visits, courses, booklets, 
pamphlets, etc)? 
Answer:   
1.11.2 Mechanisms for educating taxpayers of change in laws, regulations or 
procedures (radio, TV, newspapers, web site, pamphlets, workshops, etc) 
Answer:   
1.11.3 Capacities and strategies to service taxpayers (dedicated office, dedicated 
telephone, web site, workshops for accounting profession, etc) 
Answer:   
 
1.12 Training capacities 
1.12.1 Training school? 
Answer:   
1.12.2 Courses offered (entry and refresher courses – type, duration and frequency 
of courses)? 
Answer:   
1.12.3 Use of external training facilities in-country and/or outside of country – type 
and location of courses 
Answer:   
 
2. Tax stocks and flows for VAT/sales tax 
 
2.1 VAT/sales tax collections by year (for last three years) 
2.1.1 On imports 
Answer:   
2.1.2 On domestic transactions 
Answer:   
 
2.2 VAT/sales tax arrears by year-end (for last three years) 
2.2.1 Composition of arrears (unpaid self assessed taxes, estimated taxes, 
penalties and interest, etc)? 
Answer:   
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2.2.2 Months of tax (Stock of arrears/average tax collected per month)? 
Answer:   
2.2.3 Concentration by sector.  Parastatal versus private sector? 
Answer:   
 
2.3 VAT credit carry forwards by year-end (for last three years) 
2.3.1 Number of months (Stock of credits/average new credits generated per 
month)? 
Answer:   
 
2.4 Unpaid VAT/sales tax refunds by year-end (for last three years) 
2.4.1 Number of months lag (Stock of refunds in arrears/average new refunds per 
month)? 
Answer:   
2.5 Taxes assessed based on enforcement actions 
2.5.1 Self assessed and declared taxes 
Answer:   
2.5.2 Additional assessments based on audit of books and records 
Answer:   
2.5.3 Additional assessments based on estimated taxes without books and records 
Answer:   
2.5.4 Penalties 
Answer:   
2.5.5 Interest 
Answer:   
 
Tax policy questions 
1. Identification of disadvantage caused to domestic suppliers caused by 
exemption of any particular product or service or exemption of purchases 
by any particular sector. 
Answer:   
2. Identification of disadvantages caused by restrictions or delays of refunds 
of any excess VAT input deductions whether from supply of exports or 
other zero rated items or through investment in physical capital or 
inventory. 
Answer:   
3. Identification of cross border shopping or trade caused by tax rate 
differentials. 
Answer:   
4. Identification of export fraud issues arising from zero rating exports. 
Answer:   
5. Self-perception of revenue potential of VAT (or conversion to VAT) as a 
replacement for trade tax revenues:  What adjustments to rates and/or 
bases are contemplated to expand revenues? 
Answer:   
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APPENDIX G 
Meetings with Officials of SADC Member States 
 
1. Angola 
 
Note: The SADC National Contact Point and the Director Tax Registration and 
Collections Luanda hosted the meetings.   
 
David Hollinrake met with: 
1. Francisco Assis de Aurelio Junior, A/Director Tax 
2. Ignacio (Julio) Domingos, Head of Section Collections Directorate 
Registration and Collections (and translator) 
3. Jose Bast Balthazar, Head of Section Legal Directorate 
4. Ana Maria Cesar, Head of Section (Registration) Directorate Registration 
and Collections 
5. Ernest Bonito Almedi, Head of Section (Audit) Directorate of Audit 
6. Miranda Sobrinho, Head of Section (Repartition) large Trader Control  
7. Silvine Kiamva, Head of Section (Audit), Large Trader Control  
8. Joan Jesus S Fernandes, Deputy Head of Section (Repartition) Large Trader 
Control 
 
2. Botswana 
 
Graham Glenday met with:  
1. S. Lekau, Chief Customs Administrator (VAT), Department of Customs and 
Excise, Republic of Botswana 
2. Gerry Cawley, Advisor, Ministry of Finance, Republic of Botswana 
 
David Hollinrake met with:  
 
Note: All posts were in the process of being transferred to the Botswana Unified 
Revenue Service  
 
1. Bontle Ruth Lesedi, Director VAT, Department of Customs and Excise, 
Republic of Botswana 
2. S. Lekau, Chief Customs Administrator, Department of Customs and Excise, 
Republic of Botswana 
3. Mr Kaden Molapo Manager Audit (VAT), Department of Customs and 
Excise, Republic of Botswana 
4. Tom Dikoloti, Manager Technical (legal interpretation and policy, VAT), 
Department of Customs and Excise, Republic of Botswana 
5. My Prasaad, Information technology technician VAT, Department of 
Customs and Excise, Republic of Botswana 
 
3. Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) 
No visits were made 
 
 
APPENDIX G:  Meetings with Officials of SADC Member States 
                                                                                  
 
G - 2 
4. Lesotho 
 
David Hollinrake met with the following at Lesotho Revenue Authority: 
1. Kevin Donovan, Commissioner General,  
2. Jan Hansen, VAT Adviser 
3. Nthako Sekome, Commissioner VAT 
4. Moshe Neo Kao, Head Executive Support 
5. Setsoto Ranthocha, Assistant Commissioner Direct Assessment 
6. Retselisitsoe Motsoeneng, Assistant Commissioner Excise 
7. Mosonngoa Monkhi, Assistant Commissioner Audit and Investigations 
8. Motselisi Matsela, Senior Economist 
9. Pule Chere, Assistant Commissioner VAT 
 
 
5. Malawi 
 
David Hollinrake met with the following officials in the Malawi Revenue 
Authority: 
1. Crispin Kulimeka, Director, Policy, Planning and Research, 
2. Ms Roza Fatchie, Deputy Director, Policy Planning & Research  
3. Herbert Chirwa, Assistant Commissioner Surtax (Audit)  
4. Humphry Mwalughali, Principal Revenue Officer, Enforcement and 
Collection  
5. Kondwani Sauti–Phiri, Revenue Officer, Registration 
6. Yasin Kalambang’ombe, Principal Revenue Officer, Audit  
7. Billy Bwanali, Principal Training Officer, Training  
8. Nellie Kolonda, Principal Revenue Officer, Refunds  
9. Lucy Jones, Economist (DFID) Policy, Planning and Research 
  
 
6. Mauritius 
 
David Hollinrake met with: 
1. Champawatee Gunnoo, Acting Commissioner VAT 
2. Patrick Yip, Director Tax Policy Ministry of Finance  
3. Beekhee, Senior Economist, Ministry of Finance 
4. Asraff Dulull, Commissioner Large Taxpayer Department 
5. Hurry, Assistant Commissioner Taxpayer Service 
6. Boolack, Assistant Commissioner Repayment Audit 
7. Udjdah, Senior Officer Intelligence Investigation and Control of Gaming 
Taxes;  
8. Boodoo and Chiniah, Officers 
9. Rogjee, Senior Officer Desk and Field Audit  
10. Payen, Officer 
11. Marie, Objections and Appeals 
12. Gunjamaly, Assistant Commissioner Debt Management 
13. Pierrot, Data Processing and IT 
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7. Mozambique 
 
David Hollinrake met with: 
1. Dr Aboobacar Z. D. Changa, Head of URTI (Inland Tax Reform Project) 
Director Ministry of Finance and Planning 
2. Dr Sebastiao Banze, Chief of Division URTI (Director Ministry of Finance 
and Planning) 
3. August Fernandes Junior, National Director Tax (Director Ministry of 
Finance and Planning) 
4. Marie Filoueeces Councido Ribeiro, Director IVA - DNIA (Deputy Director 
Ministry of Finance and Planning) 
5. Ilidio Guibalo, Deputy Director of Taxes and Auditing DNIA (Ministry of 
Finance and Planning) 
6. Victorino Alfonso Clhuindya, Head of VAT Department, Returns 
Management and Control 
7. Justino E Mutima, VAT I Department DNIA (URTI Project) 
8. Helio Titos Macie, Department Chief Benefits DNIA who acted as translator 
 
 
8. Namibia 
 
David Hollinrake met with: 
1. Anna Caroline Nakal, Commissioner: Revenue Management (HQ) 
2. Jack le Roux, Deputy Director Legislation (HQ) 
3. R B Strauss, Sub Division Legislation (HQ), Control Taxation  
4. T. Mans, Operations (HQ) 
5. S. Goliath, Deputy Director Taxation (HQ)   
6. N. Mujentensa, Refunds (Windhoek Regional Office) 
7. S. Groot Boon, Assessment Division (Windhoek Regional Office) 
8. H.W. Stein, Audit Division (Windhoek Regional Office) 
9. H. Jansen, New Registration (Windhoek Regional Office) 
 
9. South Africa 
 
Graham Glenday met with: 
1. Martin Grote, Chief Director, Tax Policy Chief Directorate, National 
Treasury, South Africa and Chairperson of SADC Tax Subcommittee 
2. Cecil Morden, Director, Indirect Tax, Tax Policy Chief Directorate, National 
Treasury, South Africa 
3. Peter Frank, VAT Commissioner, South African Revenue Service 
4. Muzi Khumalo, Director, Regional Integration, National Treasury, South 
Africa 
5. David Hollinrake, Advisor to Tax Policy Chief Directorate, National 
Treasury, South Africa 
 
David Hollinrake met with officials of the South African Revenue Service 
including: 
1. Peter Frank, Law Administration 
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2. Donvan Hart, Law Administration 
3. Prenesh Ramphal, Law Administration 
4. Alan Toweell, Audit Manager 
 
 
10. Swaziland 
 
David Hollinrake met with: 
1. Mjuta Vilakazi, Commissioner Customs 
2. Alpheus Mdlulu, Deputy Commissioner Customs 
3. Sibongile Mbhamali, Chief Customs Officer, Sales Tax 
4. Malamwla O Dlamini, Principal Customs Officer, Excise 
5. Richard Gamedze, Chief Customs Officer, Training 
6. Estelle Shongwe, Principal Customs Officer, data input 
7. John Msimango (now deceased), Principal Customs Officer, Audit and Post 
Audit  
8. Peggy Mhlongo, Senior Customs Officer, Audit 
 
 
11. Tanzania 
 
David Hollinrake met with the following at Tanzania Revenue Authority:  
1. J. N. Mally, AG Commissioner VAT 
2. I. Nyange, Head of Technical Unit VAT 
3. M. Mgaya, Debt Management Section (Dar HQ) 
4. P.I. Marwa, Taxpayer Education Manager VAT (Dar HQ) 
5. P.J. Kiatu, Technical Unit, VAT Section (DAR HQ) 
6. B.M. Samson, Technical Unit, VAT Section (DAR HQ) 
7. S. M. Mkindi, VAT Information Processing (VIPS) 
8. R. Shao, Head of Operations (Sykes Regional office) 
9. Y. Mzava, Ag Regional Revenue Officer (Sykes Regional office) 
10. Hlupenja, Head of Compliance (Sykes Regional office) 
11. Nkoto, Deputy Head Investigations/Prosecutions 
 
 
12. Zambia 
 
Graham Glenday met with: 
1. Emmanul Ngulube, Director, Budget, Ministry of Finance and National 
Planning, Zambia 
2. Danies Chisenda, Principal Economist, Tax Policy, Ministry of Finance and 
National Planning, Zambia 
3. Harrison Banda, Commissioner VAT, Zambia Revenue Authority 
4. Muyangwa Muyangwa, Deputy Commissioner, VAT Policy, Zambia 
Revenue Authority 
5. Chriticles P. Mwansa, Commissioner Customs and Excise, Zambia Revenue 
Authority 
6. Maarten de Zeeuw, RIZES Project Manager 
7. Besa Muwele, Principal Statistician Central Statistical Office, Zambia 
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David hollinrake met with from the Zambia Revenue Authority: 
1. Harrison Banda, Commissioner VAT (shortly to retire) 
2. Muyangwa Muyangwa, Deputy Commissioner Operations (later promoted 
to Commissioner VAT) 
3. Chris Habeenzu, Deputy Commissioner Policy 
4. Tresphore Mulala, Assistant Commissioner VAT Policy 
5. Derek Chonga, Assistant Commissioner Debt Management 
6. Maimb Nyanga, Senior Economist (Statistics) 
7. Moses Chuko, Assistant Commissioner Large Trader Control and VAT 
Investigations 
8. Joy Muleya, Assistant Commissioner Audit 
9. Namaka Ntini, Senior Inspector Advice Centre 
 
And at the ministry of Finance and Planning: 
 
1. Danies Chisenda, Principal Economist, Tax Policy, Ministry of Finance and 
Planning 
 
 
13. Zimbabwe 
 
David Hollinrake met with the following at the Zimbabwe Revenue Authority 
1. E Mudzi, Commissioner, Projects and Planning, ZIMRA  
2. C Chibaya, Legal Adviser to the Projects and Planning Division  
3. Florence Jambwa, Secretary and Legal Adviser  
4. Max Mugani, Legal Assistant 
5. Godfrey Mutasa, VAT Supervisors (Audit) 
6. Margaret Chakeredza, VAT Supervisors (Audit) 
7. Christine Msemburi, Human Resources Manager 
8. Tichaona Chiradza, Commissioner Investigations   
9. Agatha Foroma, IT Manager 
10. Andrew Matiza, Internal Audit 
11. Shelton Pundo, Training Manager 
12. Nixon Kanyemba, Public Relations Manager 
13. Pricilla Sadomba, Public Relations Controller 
14. Roseweeter Seremani, Public Relations 
 
 
 
